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Overcoming the "Impossible Issue"
of Nonobviousness in Design Patents
Janice M. Mueller and Daniel Harris Brean
ABSTRACT
The United States offers legal protection for designs-the overall aesthetic
appearances of objects-through the patent system. To obtain a U.S.
design patent has long required something more than novelty. Just as the
patentability of a utilitarian device mandates a "nonobvious" advance
over earlier technology, the patentability of a new and ornamental design
requires that it differ from prior designs to an extent that would not have
been "obvious to a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the
type involved." Ostensibly promoting progress in design, Congress in 1842
shoehorned design protection into the existing utility patent system. From
that time forward, the design patent system has languished from prolonged
inattention rather than benefited from any purposeful development. Even
the initial imposition of a qualitative requirementfor "invention" in designs
(from which the modern requirement of nonobviousness derives) was likely
the product of a typographical error Failing to appreciate the fundamental
distinctions between designs and utility inventions, the legislature and
judiciary have repeatedly sought to assimilate these very different types of
intellectualproperty. Nowhere in the design patent system is this assimilation
more harmful than in the imposition of the nonobviousness requirement.
i Janice M. Mueller is a Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, a registered pat-
ent attorney, and a former law clerk to the late Judge Giles S. Rich of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. Mueller was a Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky
College of Law during the Spring 2oo semester. Daniel Harris Brean is an associate at The
Webb Law Firm in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and a registered patent attorney. Our thinking
about how to improve legal protection for designs benefited greatly from conversations with
Professor Dr. Annette Kur of the Max Plank Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition,
and Tax Law, Munich, Germany; Donald S. Chisum, Co-Founder and President, Chisum
Patent Academy; and Perry J. Saidman, Principal, Saidman DesignLaw Group. Industrial
designers Randy Rossi, Ron Spears, George McCain, Tucker Viemeister, Cooper Woodring,
Ron Kemnitzer, Tony Shoemaker, and Paul McGroary provided essential information and
insights about the creative process of design. We thank Pitt Law Librarian Linda Tashbook
and Pitt Law student Brian J. Jackson for their research assistance. All views expressed herein
(as well as any errors) are our own and should not be attributed to our respective employers.
We welcome comments by e-mail to mueller2@pitt.edu and dbrean@webblaw.com.
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The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts continue
to struggle with gauging the nonobviousness of designs despite repeated
acknowledgement that the requirement is inapt, subjective, unworkable,
and even "impossible." Although design protection would be more
appropriately provided through a sui generis system outside the patent
regime, a wholesale restructuring of U.S. design protection appears unlikely.
Nonobviousness therefore continues to be imposed for design patentability.
Our insight is that courts and the USPTO have previously unrecognized
flexibility in how they apply the nonobviousness requirement to designs.
Drawingfrom the industrial design literature as wellas our interviews with
experienced designers of differing career paths, we conclude that the current
nonobviousness framework is fundamentally misaligned with the creative
processes and objectives of designers. We accordingly propose a number
of powerful yet practical tools for reconceptualizing the nonobviousness
requirement in a manner that truly promotes innovation in design. The
Federal Circuit's recent decisions in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Titan
Tire v. Case New Holland, and International Seaway v. Walgreens
signal a welcome judicial receptiveness to rethinking design nonobviousness.
The time is rpe to bridge the gap between design patent standards and the
reality of design. ThisArticle offers a roadmapforovercomingthesupposedly
"impossible issue" of applying the nonobviousness requirement to designs.
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INTRODUCTION
D ESIGNs-the exterior shapes and ornamental features that makeproduct  visually appealing and desirable to consumers-are
fundamentally different from the mechanical, chemical, and process
inventions protected by utility patents. Today's consumers appreciate this
distinction and value a product's aesthetics and user experience as much as
the technology and craftsmanship underlying the product's functionality.
To satisfy this consumer demand, firms in the global marketplace are
increasingly competing on the basis of innovative product design. Such
firms are quantifiably outperforming their competitors who fail to grasp
the value-added of design.' In order to stay competitive, companies that
2 The U.S. patent system currently grants three types of patents: utility patents, design
patents, and plant patents. The phrase "utility patent" refers to a patent granted on an inven-
tion falling within one or more of the subject matter categories enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2oo6); that is, a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." Id. We refer
herein to such inventions as "utility inventions." Designs are not encompassed within the
§ 1o categories. Rather, the subject matter of patentable designs is separately governed by
35 U.S.C. § 171 (zoo6) (A design patent is available for a "new, original and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
Plant patents are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2oo6).
This Article focuses on "design" in the sense of the subject matter protected by a U.S.
design patent, that is, an "ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 35 U.S.C. § 171.
We interpret the statutory phrase "ornamental design" to mean the overall aesthetic appear-
ance of an article of manufacture, such as a three-dimensional object or product. The process
of design on which we focus involves a designer creating the overall aesthetic appearance of
an object by including one or more features not entirely dictated or required by the object's
function, such as dimensions, surface ornamentation, contours, and the like. (Graphic design
and the creation of two-dimensional representations such as posters, prints, and films are out-
side the scope of this Article.)
In practice, designers often create both ornamental and functional aspects of the products
they work on. See infra Part I (detailing designers' creative processes and methodologies).
Design patents, however, protect only the overall appearance of a designed product. To the
extent that functional features exist in the product, it is only theform of those features in the
aggregate that we refer to herein as the product's "design." For example, a handle on a door is
functional in the sense of providing a means of opening or closing the door, but the particular
form of the handle is part of its design as discussed herein.
The craft or business of design as addressed by this Article encompasses the field of
"industrial design." Scholars have observed that the meaning of the phrase "industrial de-
sign" seems simple enough on its face-"it is the business of determining the form of objects
which are to be made by machines, rather than produced by hand." EDWARD LUCIE-SMITH, A
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 7 (1983). Yet the breadth of the objects encompassed in this
definition is virtually boundless; "[i]ndustrial design can concern itself with everything from
a teacup to a jet aeroplane." Id.
3 See Linda Tischler, Afastemr of a Design: A// About Yves, FAST COMPANY, Oct. 2007, at 94
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traditionally emphasized manufacturing efficiency "must master a new
set of skills known as 'design thinking,"' or having "an intense focus on
understanding real problems customers face in their day-to-day lives."'
"Both worlds-the quantum one where designers push boundaries to
surprise and delight, and the Newtonian one where workers meet deadlines
and margins-are meaningful. The most successful companies will learn
to build bridges between them and leverage them both."'
Although the aesthetic form of a product and its underlying function are
inherently distinct aspects of the product, patents are the preferred form of
legal protection in the United States for both types of intellectual property.
Unlike the rest of the world, the United States chose to protect industrial
design through the grant of "design patents" that cover the "new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture."' Design patents
have become an increasingly popular means of obtaining competitive
advantage in the United States, with the number of issued design patents
nearly doubling in the past ten years.'
Despite their increasing popularity, design patents and the legal
requirements for obtaining them have garnered surprisingly little notice or
study. From their 1842 enactment of the first design patent law until today,
policymakers have failed to pay adequate attention to these awkward
offspring of the utility patent system.' The U.S. design patent framework
is built upon repeated attempts to assimilate protection for designs into the
legal framework for patenting utility inventions. Legislators as well as courts
have mechanistically applied the requirements for utility patentability to
designs without consideration of desired policy goals or consequences.
("A three year study of more than 4o Fortune 500 companies by the research firm Peer Insight
found that companies focused on customer-experience design outperformed the S&P 500
by a io-to-i margin from 2000 to zoo5."); Design Index, DESIGNCOUNCIL.ORG.UK, http://www.
designcouncil.org.uk/publications/Design-Index/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (In the British
stock market, "the share prices of a group of more than 150 quoted companies recognised as
effective users of design out-performed the stock market by zoo per cent between 1994 and
2003.").
4 Sara Beckman, Welcoming the Nerw, Improving the Old, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 6, 2oo9, at BU3 .
5 Id.
6 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2oo6).
7 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2oop, USPTO.GOV (2oio), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (showing a steady increase in
design patent applications and issued patents over time, wherein the number of applications
and issued design patents nearly doubled from 1998-2oo8). The USPTO recently celebrated
the grant of the 6oo,oooth U.S. design patent. See Nathan Pollard, Conferences/Design Patents:
AIPLA Panelists Discuss Design Protection, Functionality and Egyptian Goddess Impact, 78 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 774 (Oct. 23, 2009) (describing USPTO ceremony awarding
the 6oo,oooth design patent, featuring speeches by Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and USPTO Director
David J. Kappos).
8 Congressional enactment of the first design patent legislation in 1842 is detailed infra
Part II.
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"[P]rolonged inattention, rather than any ongoing purposeful development,"
grounds the U.S. design patent system.9
Nowhere in the design patent law are purposeful development and
thoughtful analysis more lacking than in application of the nonobviousness
requirement. Codified in 1952 at 35 U.S.C. § 103,0 the nonobviousness
requirement was implemented in response to dissatisfaction with
nineteenth-century efforts to gauge patent-worthiness via a nebulous test
of "invention."" Today's statutory standard of nonobviousness reflects
longstanding judicial recognition that a patentable device, substance, or
process must involve something more than novelty." Nonobviousness is
the ultimate, most difficult requirement for patentability." An applicant
for patent must take a "large step" forward,14 establishing that its advance
would not have been obvious to a hypothetical person having ordinary skill
in the pertinent technology when the claimed invention was made."
Assessing the extent of an advance in mechanical or chemical technology
is by no means easy, but the applicable jurisprudence is relatively well-
9 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 5:41 (4th ed. 2009).
1o The statute provides that
[a] patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 1o of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § I03(a) (2006).
ii See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" As Replaced by § 1o3 of the 1952 Patent
Act, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. I47, 157 (2004) (reproducing full draft of Kettering Award Acceptance
Speech delivered by Judge Rich on June 18, 1964) (Section 103 "is not a 'standard of inven-
tion' and it is not called a requirement of invention. The presence or absence of 'invention'
is not mentioned. The use of the term was, in fact, carefully avoided with a view to making a
fresh start, free of all the divergent court opinions about 'invention.' And in doing that it was
contemplated, as the House Report (1923, p. 7) states, that 'This section should have a stabi-
lizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.').
12 See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248, 267 (185o) ("[U]nless more inge-
nuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required
in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary me-
chanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenu-
ity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement
is the work of the skilful [sic] mechanic, not that of the inventor.").
13 See generally NONOBVIOUSNESS-ThE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY:
PAPERS COMPLIED IN COMMEMORATION OF THE SILVER ANNIVERSARY OF 35 USC 103 (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 198o).
14 ALAN LATMAN, NAT'L COMM. FOR EFFECTIVE DESIGN LEGISLATION, PROTECTION FOR
DESIGNS 15 (1959) (copy on file with authors and Kentucky Law Journal).
15 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2oo6).
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developed and stable.'" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Federal Circuit) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
routinely apply the established tests and factors of the nonobviousness
inquiry to utility inventions." Occasional Supreme Court correction
of outlier decisions (as in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.") has not
fundamentally changed this landscape.
Far greater complexities arise in applying the nonobviousness
requirement to designs. Assessing the extent of an advancement in design
must focus on the overall appearance and aesthetic success of a product's
external design, not its internal structure or utilitarian functionality. This
assessment of visual appeal or distinctiveness is an inherently subjective
effort. Courts have long admitted their discomfort with the task. 9 The
USPTO, the federal agency responsible for examining design patent
applications, very rarely discovers and cites prior art designs as rendering
a design application unpatentable. 5 Inattention to the nonobviousness
requirement may explain in part why the agency has nearly doubled its
grant of design patents in the last ten years."
16 See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2007) ("Although
this study falls short of painting a complete picture of the Federal Circuit's performance with
respect to patentability, the view that emerges is of a modern jurisprudence of obviousness
that is more stable, more consistent, and more flexible than has been heretofore understood.
These results, then, should give pause to those who argue for a radical reshaping of the Federal
Circuit's doctrine under 35 U.S.C. § 103.").
17 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (establishing the modern analytical
framework for assessing nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
18 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399, 419 (2007) (rejecting as overly rigid
the Federal Circuit's application in that case of the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation"
(TSM) test for combining the disclosures of multiple prior art references to establish that a
claimed utility invention would have been obvious, but recognizing that the TSM test can
serve more generally as a "helpful insight" in analyzing nonobviousness).
19 See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.03[6] (2009) [hereinafter CHISUM
ON PATENTS] ("With a design, the problem-how to make an article that is more ornamental
and attractive to the eye-is normative in character and thus more open-ended. Not surpris-
ingly, the courts openly admit that any assessment of the obviousness of the solution is neces-
sarily subjective.") (citations omitted). Part III, infra, further describes judicial struggles to
meaningfully apply an invention or nonobviousness requirement to designs.
20 See Dennis Crouch, Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO Part I, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 22,
2009, 10:56 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2oo9/o4/ design-patents-sailing-through-
the-pto-part-ii.html (reporting that only 3.5% of design application rejections included in
Crouch's statistical analysis of 86 design patent applications were based on prior art).
21 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years i963--oog, USPTO.GOV (20 o), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (showing a steady increase in
design patent applications and issued patents over time, wherein the number of applications
and issued design patents nearly doubled from 1998-zoo8).
In addition to the low incidence of prior art-based rejections, another factor responsible
for the recent increase in design patenting is undoubtedly the significant contraction in avail-
ability of trademark law protection for product configuration. The Supreme Court held in
20IO-20II1 425
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The unfortunate result of the "prolonged inattention" suffered by
the design patent system is a fundamental inconsistency between the
legal framework for evaluating design nonobviousness and the reality
of the objectives and creative processes involved in generating new
design. We interviewed experienced designers and consulted design
texts to determine whether the extant design patent nonobviousness
jurisprudence accords with its purported policy objectives to "encourage[]
. . . the decorative arts"" and promote more and better design." The
results were astonishing. In several important respects the jurisprudence
directly conflicts with the reality of how designers work and operates to
suppress, rather than encourage, innovative design.24 Leading industrial
designers view the current U.S. design patent system as a failure.- We
have seen no evidence that policymakers, the USPTO, or the courts have
ever deliberately investigated or given any significant consideration to the
actual objectives and processes of designers.
Unlike their legislative counterparts in Europe' 6 the U.S. Congress has
not seen fit to implement a sui generis legal system uniquely tailored to
foster design innovation. The nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 was enacted in 1952 with a view to stabilizing the requirements for
patenting utility inventions. No consideration was given to how §103 might
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), that trademark rights in prod-
uct designs do not arise unless and until secondary meaning can be proven for a design. Id.
at 216 ("[A] product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing
of secondary meaning."). Rather than having to build up a trademark-like association with
one's product design over time (if such an association can be developed at all), the award of
a design patent affords the patentee an immediate right to exclude others from the design.
See 35 U.S.C. § 27 i(a) (2oo6) (Containing no requirement of use by the patentee to sue for
infringement, and stating that "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any pat-
ented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."); 35 U.S.C. § 171
(2oo6) ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents
for designs....").
22 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511,524 (1871) (Design patent law was "plain-
ly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts.").
23 See infra Part I.
24 See infra Part III.
25 See Telephone Interview with Tucker Viemeister, Lab Chief, LAB at Rockwell Group
and Fellow, Industrial Designers Society of America (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter Viemeister
Interview] (expressing the view that the existing design patent system is not promoting better
design and that designers are not happy with it).
26 See infra Part IV (describing the European Union's suigeneris system of legal protection
for industrial designs).
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apply to designs.1 Rather, the drafters of § 103 intentionally set aside the
acknowledged "problem" of designs for later review."'
Both before and after the 1952 Patent Act, repeated attempts to enact
a separate statutory scheme better adapted for designs never succeeded?
More than 150 years after Congress shoehorned design protection into the
pre-existing framework of the utility patent system, the judiciary and the
industrial design community continue to struggle with the "impossible
issue" of applying the nonobviousness requirement to designs.3 0 Patent
Office leaders concur that nonobviousness "is not well suited to ornamental
designs."' The utility patent standard of nonobviousness continues to be
applied to designs simply by default. A thorough reexamination of the
nonobviousness requirement for designs is therefore long overdue.
Prolonged neglect of the design problem has implications for U.S.
competitiveness in the global economy. "[M]any critics feel that it is the
hostile legal environment faced by American designers which has caused
the United States to lag behind European and Asian countries in design
innovation, even during a period in which the United States has dominated
in other areas of production." 2 Although U.S. manufacturers have long
been recognized as international leaders in technological innovation, they
did not receive widespread acclaim in the field of industrial design until
much more recently. While the innovative designs of products such as
27 SeelnreNalbandian,66i F2d 1214, 121 9 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (RichJ., concurring) ([T]he
new § 103 ... was written with an eye to the kinds of inventions encompassed by § iol with
no thought at all of how it might affect designs."); id. at 1218-19 ("When work on revision of
the patent statutes began in 1950, a deliberate decision was made not to attempt any solution
of the 'controversial design problem' but simply to retain the substance of the existing design
patent statute and attack the design problem at a later date, after the new Title 35 had been
enacted.").
28 Id. at 1219.
29 These attempts are further described infra Part II.
30 In re Nalbandian, 661 F2d at 1219 (Rich, J., concurring) (Urging enactment of then-
pending legislation [H.R. 20, 97th Cong. (1981)] "tailored to the problems of designers, of
their employers and clients in the business world, and of the government agencies now con-
cerned." The legislation would "get the impossible issue of obviousness in design patentabil-
ity cases off the backs of the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office, giving some sense
of certainty to the business world of what designs can be protected and how.").
31 See id. (quoting Aug. 8, 1981 speech of then Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Gerald Mossinghoff to the American Bar Association's Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
Section).
32 David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road, a History of the Fight over Industrial
Design Protection in the United States, 45 . COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 21, 2 1-22 (1997).
33 See Telephone Interview with Dr. Ron Kemnitzer, Fellow, Industrial Designers
Society of America and Chair, Indus. Design Program, Sch. of Architecture & Design, Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Aug. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Kemnitzer Interview] (expressing
view that Europe was unquestionably the leader in industrial design in the 196os, and that
it is only since the 1980s that the United States has taken the international lead in industrial
design prominence).
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Apple's iPod digital music player and the Motorola Razr mobile telephone
are now lauded around the world, this positive recognition for U.S.-
generated design is a new phenomenon.
This Article identifies the heart of the problem as the placement of
design protection within the patent system, which led to the inappropriate
imposition of an invention/nonobviousness requirement for designs.3
We argue that the nonobviousness requirement plays a previously
unrecognized role in setting back U.S. leadership in industrial design. The
United States lagged behind other developed nations for many years in
recognizing industrial design as an independent professional field, and it
still trails behind in legal protection for designs. By setting the bar for
design patentability unreasonably high, the nonobviousness requirement
perpetuates the "hostile legal environment" for U.S. designers."
Scant academic attention has been paid to the negative impact of the
nonobviousness requirement on design innovation.16 Among many design
patent practitioners, obviousness is generally considered a "non-issue.""
This view is understandable because design patent applicants rarely
confront obviousness rejections from the USPTO. Prior art rejections
of any kind, let alone obviousness rejections, are uncommon in design
applications." When the USPTO does enter an obviousness rejection, the
34 The historical source of the obviousness problem can be traced back to the original
shoehorning of designs into the patent realm of "inventions," as opposed to the copyright or
trademark systems. See infra Part II (describing historical development of U.S. design pat-
ent legislation). Copyright or trademark law provide more suitable forms of protection for
designs. See generally Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and
Rely on MoreAppropriate Copyrightand Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16'Thx. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 325 (2008). In addition to the misfit between design patents and the nonobvious-
ness requirement, other legitimate criticisms of the current design patent system include the
quality of substantive examination, the cost of preparation and prosecution of design applica-
tions, and the long pendency period from filing to issuance. See Perry J. Saidman & Theresa
Esquerra, A Mansfesto on Industrial Design Protection: Resurrecting the Design Registration League,
55 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 423,425-26 (2008). These additional criticisms likewise all stem
from the original placement of design protection in the patent system, which requires satisfac-
tion of a multitude of formalities during the application and prosecution process to facilitate
substantive examination, as well as compliance with all pertinent Patent Office regulations
and procedures.
35 Goldenberg, supra note 32, at 2 1.
36 An article published almost forty years ago praised the "ordinary, intelligent observ-
er" perspective adopted in In reLaverne, 356 E2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.). Alfred L.
Michaelsen, Design Patents and Obviousness-Obvious to Whom?, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 62o, 636
(1970). This aspect of Laverne was subsequently overturned by In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d
1214, 1217 (C.C.P.A. 1981). Among other options for reconceptualizing the nonobviousness
requirement for design patentability, we recommend that the Laverne standard be reinstated.
See infra Part IV.
37 Telephone Interview with Cooper Woodring, Fellow, Industrial Designers Society of
America (July 14, 2009) [hereinafter Woodring Interview].
38 See Crouch, supra note 20. The USPTO's lack of tools that can effectively locate the
428 [Vol. 99
2010-20111 NONOBVIOUSNESS IN DESIGN PATENTS
design applicant rarely appeals to the Federal Circuit. From its creation
in 1982 through January 2010, the Federal Circuit has decided only six
precedential decisions in design patent application appeals raising an issue
of obviousness. 9
After design patents have issued, the statutory presumption of their
nonobviousness' seems to be infrequently challenged. The low incidence
of Federal Circuit decisions reviewing the issue of obviousness on appeal
from district court litigation is an indicator of such infrequency. From its
creation in 1982 through January 2010, the Federal Circuit has issued only
fourteen precedential decisions deciding the merits of an obviousness
challenge to an issued design patent (including decisions on motions for
preliminary injunctions).41 Ten of the fourteen decisions (seventy-one
most pertinent prior art designs helps explain such a low incidence of prior art rejections. To
address the paucity of easily locatable prior art, we recommend that USPTO examiners more
routinely issue requests for information to design patent applicants under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105
(2009). See infra Part IV.F for further discussion of this recommendation.
39 See In re Haruna, 249 F.3 d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Borden, go E3d 1570, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Harvey, 12 E3 d io6i, 1o62 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Klein, 987 F.2d 1569,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Carlson, 983 E2d 1032, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Sung Nam Cho,
813 F.2d 378, 380-82 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
40 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2oo6) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
41 See Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3 d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court's denial of preliminary injunction because unlikely that design pat-
ent would survive obviousness challenge at trial); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F-3d
1373, 1379 (Fed. Cit. 2002) (vacating district court's judgment that design patent was invalid
for obviousness because district court failed to make any findings in support of judgment;
remanding for district court to make findings as to obviousness under FED. R. Civ. P 52);
Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 E3 d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cit. 2002) (affirming
district court's judgment that upheld validity of design patent against obviousness challenge);
Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F3d 1456, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's
judgment that design patent was invalid for obviousness); Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys,
Inc., 122 F.3 d 1396, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment
sustaining validity of design patent against an obviousness challenge based on confidential
prior art designs that had been disclosed to inventor and thus deemed 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
prior art references); Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 1o E3 d 1oo, i0i (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(reversing district court's judgment that design patent was invalid for obviousness); L.A. Gear,
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 E2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's
judgment that upheld validity of design patent against an obviousness challenge); Chrysler
Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 E2d 951, 953-54 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirm-
ing district court's denial of preliminary injunction because design patentee had failed to
meet its burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits against accused
infringer's invalidity challenges, which included obviousness); Avia Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. L.A.
Gear Cal., Inc., 853 E2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cit. 1988) (affirming district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment upholding validity of design patent in suit against an obviousness challenge);
Pac. Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 8oo F.2d 11 I, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(affirming district court's judgment that upheld validity of design patent against an obvious-
ness challenge); Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 E2d 1552, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's judgment that upheld validity of design patent against an
obviousness challenge); Petersen Mfg. Co.. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1547-49
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percent) sustained the validity of the design patent against an obviousness
challenge; the remaining four decisions (twenty-nine percent) held the
design patent invalid for obviousness.
Prior to the Federal Circuit era, the regional circuit courts of appeals did
not view design patents so favorably. Sustaining the validity of a design
patent was considered "exceedingly difficult" because of the requirement
for nonobviousness, or its predecessor, the invention requirement. 42 In
1981, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) described design
patents as "suffer[ing] a 70% mortality rate in the courts at the hands of
judges reviewing the § 103 unobviousness of the designs."4 3
Although the Federal Circuit has thus far treated design patents much
more favorably than did the regional circuits, four recent judicial decisions
signal that this trend may be nearing its end: (1) the Supreme Court's latest
pronouncement on the nonobviousness requirement in KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., a 2007 case involving an electro-mechanical utility patent
invention;' (2) the Federal Circuit's 2008 en banc rejection of the "point
of novelty" component for determining design patent infringement in
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.;45 (3) the Federal Circuit's 2009 review
(on appeal from denial of a preliminary injunction) of the nonobviousness
of a design patent in Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc.;6 and (4)
the Federal Circuit's 2009 examination in International Seaway Trading
Corp. v. Walgreens Corp. of whether design patent validity doctrines require
modification in light of Egyptian Goddess."7 Although the Federal Circuit
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment that design patent was
invalid for obviousness); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1426-27 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's judgment that upheld validity of design patent against
an obviousness challenge); Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 740 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (affirming district court's judgment that upheld validity of design patent against an
obviousness challenge).
The Federal Circuit considered but did not decide the merits of a design patent
nonobviousness issue in International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Wa/greens Corp., 589 F3d 1233,
1244 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating district court's summary judgment invalidating design patent
as anticipated under § 102 and remanding for reconsideration of both anticipation and
nonobviousness). For a further discussion of International Seaway, see infra Part IIIC.3-
42 See G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Prods., Inc., 436 F.2d 1176, I1 78 (2d Cir 1971) ("'[T]o ob-
tain a valid design patent is exceedingly difficult."' (quoting Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe
Trading Corp., 194 E2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1952))).
43 In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring).
44 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,401-02 (2007) (rejecting as overly rigid the
Federal Circuit's application in that case of the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" (TSM)
test for combining the disclosures of multiple prior art references to establish that a claimed
invention would have been obvious, but recognizing that the TSM test can serve more gener-
ally as a "helpful insight" in analyzing nonobviousness).
45 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F3d 665,678 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (en bane).
46 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F3d 1372, 1375, 1380-84 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
47 See Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F3d 1233, 1237-41 (Fed. Cir.
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was able to decide the appeal in Titan Tire without resolving the "new and
untested ground" of whether and how KSR should be applied to design
patents, 48 Titan Tire signals that KSR's applicability to design patent
nonobviousness is an issue ripe for judicial determination. 49
The recent developments in nonobviousness jurisprudence have the
potential to quickly increase the "mortality rate" for design patents. The
rising number of design patents issuing from the USPTO also suggests that
more enforcement litigation and, consequently, more validity challenges
will be brought. Courts, the USPTO, advocates, and policymakers should be
prepared to more frequently confront the difficult issue of nonobviousness
as applied to designs.
This Article aims to provide all stakeholders with a variety of tools to
understand and apply the nonobviousness requirement to designs in an
appropriate and practical way. We do not dispute that current statutory
and decisional law imposes a nonobviousness requirement for design
patentability. Rather, we posit that the courts and the USPTO have
previously unrecognized flexibility in how they apply the nonobviousness
requirement to designs. We offer a number of recommendations for
applying nonobviousness in a manner more specifically tailored to
promoting progress in the design arts.
2009) (concluding that the Federal Circuit's abandonment in Egyptian Goddess of a point of
novelty component for infringement determinations necessitated an analogous rejection of
a point of novelty component in the tests for design patent anticipation and obviousness).
48 Titan Tire, 566 F 3 d at 1384 ("The trial court's decision [to deny design patentee's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction] did not depend on the analysis in KSR. To the contrary, the
court recognized that the application of KSR to design patents was new and untested ground."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The year-long pendency of the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in Titan Tire suggests possible internal disagreement about KSR's applicability. The Titan
Tire decision was issued on June 3, 2oo9, almost one year after the Federal Circuit heard oral
argument on June 4, 2oo8, Oral Argument Recordings, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/searchscript.asp (search "Appeal
Number" for "2oo8-1078") (entry for Case NO. 2008-1078 indicating that oral argument was
heard on June 4, 2oo8) (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
49 Another potentially relevant Federal Circuit decision in a design patent case is cur-
rently pending. See Ford Global Techs., L.L.C. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Nos. 2007-1357 & 2007-
1526, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 29084 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 2oo9). The Federal Circuit heard oral
arguments in Ford Global in February 2009. OralArgument Recordings, UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/searchscript.asp
(search "Appeal Number" for "2007-1357") (last visited September. 9, 2009). The decision
on appeal is Certain Automotive Parts, No. 3 3 7-TA- 5 57, USITC Pub. 4012 (JulY 5, 2007) (Final)
(declining, inter alia, to reconsider Commission's determination not to review Administrative
Law Judge's final Initial Decision, which had sustained validity of seven design patents
against a charge of obviousness, after Supreme Court's decision in KSR v. Telefex). The ITC
in Certain Automotive Parts declined reconsideration because "[tihe ALJ's decision was not
based on a lack of an explicit suggestion to combine prior art references, which was the key
issue in KSR." Id. at 6 ("Commission Opinion").
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Part I of this Article describes what designers do-the process known as
"design." Drawing from our interviews and conversations with designers,
we seek to contribute to patent law scholarship a better understanding
of how designers work and how their creative design process differs
fundamentally from the inventive process leading to the devices, methods,
and compositions protected by utility patents. In Part II we examine
the historical development of the U.S. design patent statutes, focusing
particularly on the haphazard legislative evolution of the nonobviousness
requirement. We describe the discordant (if not mistaken) application of
nonobviousness to designs against the backdrop of a sluggishly developed
culture of American industrial design. We also survey the repeatedly
unsuccessful proposals to enact a sui generis legislative framework for
design protection, independent of the patent system. Part III critiques the
judiciary's attempts to apply the utility patent construct of nonobviousness
to designs. The resulting jurisprudence demonstrates an inadequate
understanding of the design process and the unique value of designs. The
courts' difficulties can largely be traced to two nineteenth-century Supreme
Court decisions that spawned a confusing dichotomy of approaches to
design protection.
Part IV presents a menu of recommendations for reconceptualizing the
nonobviousness requirement as applied to designs. Our proposals begin
by recognizing that KSR and other Supreme Court decisions applying
the nonobviousness requirement to utility inventions have very little,
if any, applicability for design patentability. Rather, courts possess the
flexibility to fine-tune the nonobviousness requirement for designs in a
manner analogous to their past consideration of plants, another type of
non-utility patent subject matter. We next recommend that courts utilize
the "ordinary observer" standard of Gorham Co. v. White,s0 the Supreme
Court's foundational design patent decision, as the proper perspective for
determining design patent nonobviousness. In contrast with the prevailing
"designer of ordinary skill" perspective,"1 the ordinary observer perspective
is far better aligned with the actual process and goals of design. Moreover,
the ordinary observer perspective would tend to harmonize U.S. practice
with the European Union's application of an "informed user" perspective
for assessing design validity."
50 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (187I).
51 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., ioi F.3d oo, 1o3 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("In the
design patent context, the ultimate inquiry under section 1o3 is whether the claimed design
would have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the type in-
volved." (citing In re Rosen, 673 F2d 388, 390 (C.C.P.A- 1982))); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d
1214, 12 16 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("In design cases we will consider the fictitious person identified in
§ 1o3 as 'one of ordinary skill in the art' to be the designer of ordinary capability who designs
articles of the type presented in the application.").
52 See infra Part IV.C.3 for an examination of how the EU's design protection experi-
ence, including its adoption of an "informed user" perspective for evaluating a design's reg-
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Part IV also recommends that Gorham's "substantial similarity" test be
adopted as the measure of design obviousness, while testing for anticipation
of a design be analyzed under a stricter standard of identicality. Further,
we explain why the utility patent examination practice of combining
the teachings of prior art references to establish obviousness should
be modified, if not eliminated, for designs. Finally, we suggest that the
USPTO implement mechanisms to locate more and better design prior art.
Such mechanisms should improve the quality of design patent examination,
which will also lead to a more robust design obviousness jurisprudence.
Part V concludes.
I. THE PURPOSE AND PROCESS OF DESIGN
This Part analyzes the creative processes of designers, with a view to
assessing whether the nonobviousness requirement for patenting a design
is appropriately aligned with designers' goals and motivations. Because
design is essentially an art form, there may well be as many different
approaches to design as there are designers. Accordingly, we do not presume
to explain the creative process of design, but rather to identify what appear
to be the fairly universal tools and themes underlying the design process."
Industrial designers are frequently charged with optimally merging
form and function, and so their "design" of a product is often influenced by
the product's functional features.' Because this Article addresses design as
it is protected by design patents (which cover only the overall appearance
of articles of manufacture"), we focus primarily on the aesthetic aspects
of the design process. Herein we use the word "design" to refer to the
designer's aesthetic contribution to a product (recognizing the reality that
aesthetics are often influenced by functionality).
istrability, could helpfully inform the determination of nonobviousness under U.S. design
patent law.
53 See Telephone Interview with George McCain, Fellow & President-Elect, Industrial
Designers Society of America, and Principal, McCain Design, L.L.C. (June 22, 2009) [herein-
after McCain Interview] (expressing the view that the design process is difficult to define in
any universal way).
54 See Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33 (explaining that good design merges form and
function, and that design has a "duality of purpose" because it is influenced by functionality);
Telephone Interview with Randy Rossi, Bally Designs, and Ron Sears, Design Consortium
(June 18, 2oo9) [hereinafter Rossi/Sears Interview] (explaining that industrial design involves
a continuum of aesthetics and functionality, wherein good design seamlessly melds form and
function); see also ID Defined, INDusTRIAL DESIGNERS SOCIEYr OF AMERICA, http://www.idsa.
org/content/id-defined (last visited Oct. 8, 2oo9) ("Industrial design (ID) is the professional
service of creating and developing concepts and specifications that optimize the function, value
and appearance of products and systems for the mutual benefit of both user and manufacturer."
(emphasis added)).
55 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2oo6).
433
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The design patent law presently includes a substantial hurdle that
denies protection to any design for an article that "'would have been
obvious to a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the type
involved."'" 6 This significant requirement for patentability begs at least
two questions. First, who constitutes an "ordinary designer"? Second,
what does it mean for a design to have been "obvious"? The judiciary
has long struggled to answer these questions in the face of conflicting case
law and a vacuum of information about the design process." Surprisingly,
the patent law scholarship has not previously queried designers about the
meaning of "designer[s] of ordinary skill," or the circumstances in which
an ordinarily skilled designer would consider a particular design to have
been obvious.
To begin to remedy patent law's dearth of first-hand knowledge about
the design process, we interviewed several experienced designers of
differing career paths." We asked the interviewees to explain the nature of
their work, the creative processes involved, and their opinions as to when
a designer's work product should merit patent protection. Every designer
with whom we spoke had at least some knowledge of and experience with
intellectual property, including design patents, and voiced strong opinions
on the subject. All of the interviewees expressed some disappointment
or frustration with the current design patent system, which was generally
perceived as being "broken" in one way or another. 9 These designers
56 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1380-8i (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., oi F3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
57 See infra Part III (describing the judiciary's ongoing struggle to apply nonobviousness
requirement to designs).
58 We conducted telephone interviews with the following industrial designers: Randy
Rossi of Bally Designs, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (June 18, 2009); Ron Sears of the Design
Consortium, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (June 18, 2009); George McCain, Fellow and President-
Elect of the Industrial Designers Society of America (IDSA) and Principal, McCain Design,
L.L.C., Kirkland, Washington (June 22, 2oo9); Tucker Viemeister, Fellow of the IDSA and
Lab Chief, LAB at Rockwell Group, New York, New York (July 2, 2009); Cooper Woodring,
Fellow of the IDSA and 1985-86 President of the IDSA, Wakefield, Rhode Island (July 14,
2oo9); and Dr. Ron Kemnitzer, Fellow of the IDSA and Chair, Indust. Design Program, Sch.
of Architecture & Design, Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Virginia (Aug.
10, 2009). We are greatly indebted to these design professionals for sharing with us their
time, expertise, and insights. Notes of these interviews are on file with the authors. We also
would like to extend our gratitude to designers Tony Shoemaker of Sears Craftsman, Chicago,
Illinois, and Paul McGroary of Philips Respironix, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for their helpful
comments.
59 See Viemeister Interview, supra note 25 (expressing view that the existing design pat-
ent system is not promoting better design and that designers are not happy with it); see also
McCain Interview, supra note 53 (explaining that many designers feel that their designs are
being "ripped off," and that the existing design patent system does not adequately protect
them).
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likewise expressed appreciation for our efforts to better understand their
work as part of our assessment of the design patent system.6
A. The Traditional Purpose and Process of Utility Invention
Unlike design patents, utility patents are granted on utilitarian
inventions arising from the technological arts, that is, processes, machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter.6' The late Judge Giles Rich
imagined that the nonobviousness inquiry for utility inventions should
be analyzed in a romanticized setting of an inventor's struggle to solve a
particular technical problem. 62 He wrote that "the proper way to apply the
103 obviousness test to a case like this [involving a combination of prior art
teachings] is to first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the
prior art references-which he is presumed to know-hanging on the walls
around him."63 When the solutions to the particular problems faced by the
inventor clearly appear in the prior art hanging on the walls, the application
and/or combination of such solutions is most likely obvious.'
The essence of this romanticized image-that is, of an inventor
combining elements from multiple prior art references in order to solve a
given technical problem-persists in modern approaches to obviousness.61
60 See Rossi/Sears Interview, supra note 54 (encouraging us to help "clearly define what
is required for design patents").
61 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6). We refer herein to the subject matter enumerated as patent-
able in § io1 as "utility inventions" or "utility patent inventions."
62 In reWinslow, 365 F.2d 1017, ioo (C.C.P.A. 1966).
63 Id.
64 Id. Winslow involved a patent application directed to a method for opening, filling,
and closing thermoplastic bags. Id. at 1o7. Judge Rich described what he viewed would be
Winslow's thought process (looking at the cited Gerbe and Hellman prior art references) as
follows:
[W]hat applicant Winslow built here he admits is basically a Gerbe bag
holder having air-blast bag opening to which he has added two bag
retaining pins. If there were any bag holding problem in the Gerbe
machine when plastic bags were used, their flaps being gripped only
by spring pressure between the top and bottom plates, Winslow would
have said to himself, "Now what can I do to hold them more securely?"
Looking around the walls, he would see Hellman's envelopes with holes
in their flaps hung on a rod. He would then say to himself, "Ha! I can
punch holes in my bags and put a little rod (pin) through the holes. That
will hold them! After filling the bags, I'll pull them off the pins as does
Hellman. Scoring the flap should make tearing easier."
Id. at 1020.
65 Judge Rich would later clarify that following enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 103, it should
not be the inventor who is imagined as omnisciently knowing all the prior art relevant to his
claimed invention, but rather the hypothetical statutory "person having ordinary skill" in the
field of the invention. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 E2d 1437, 1452-54
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The courts and the USPTO continue to apply it not only in the utility
patent context, but also with respect to designs." As the next section
demonstrates, the picturesque workshop tableau of Winslow has very little
in common with the modern process of design.
B. The Motivation and Methodology of Design
Designers perform their work by placing the utmost importance on the
impressions, reactions, and desires of consumers.6 1 It is the end user or
observer who is intended to most directly benefit from or be affected by
a design, and so making the design appealing to the end user or observer
must be the paramount concern.' Designers are concerned with the
consumer's complete relationship with the designed object or product.69 A
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (Rich, J.). The actual inventor may not be a person of "ordinary" skill because
"[real inventors, as a class, vary in their capacities from ignorant geniuses to Nobel laureates."
Id. at 1454.
Despite this clarification, the Winslowian image of an inventor solving a technical problem
by selecting solutions from the various prior art references conveniently hanging on the walls
of his workshop remains pervasive in patent law. European patent law employs a similar
"problem-and-solution" approach for analyzing the analogous "inventive step" requirement
of patentability under Art. 56 of the European Patent Convention. Convention on the Grant
of European Patents (European Patent Convention), art. 56, conclusion date Oct. 5, 1973, 1o65
U.N.TS. 199 (entered into force July 10, 1977), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/
legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar56.html. See, e.g., Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, Part C,
Ch. IV, 11 .5, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, June I, 1978, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/
lawflegal-texts/html/guiex/e/civ-I i_5.htm ("In order to assess inventive step in an objective
and predictable manner, [the examiner should normally] .. .(i) determin[e] the 'closest prior
art', (ii) establish[] the 'objective technical problem' to be solved, and (iii) consider[] whether
or not the claimed invention, starting from the closest prior art and the objective technical
problem, would have been obvious to the skilled person.").
66 See generally infra Parts II-111.
67 See ID Defined, supra note 54 ("The industrial designer's unique contribution places
emphasis on those aspects of the product or system that relate most directly to human charac-
teristics, needs and interests. This contribution requires specialized understanding of visual,
tactile, safety and convenience criteria, with concern for the user. Education and experi-
ence in anticipating psychological, physiological and sociological factors that influence and
are perceived by the user are essential industrial design resources."); see also HENRY DREYFUSS,
DESIGNING FOR PEOPLE 25 (1955) ("[Olne of [a designer's] greatest rewards is the realization
that by producing a good design he is affecting the lives of millions of people. And if he de-
signs enough things in good taste, he brings better living and greater satisfaction.").
68 See Rossi/Sears Interview, supra note 54 (expressing the view that a user's reaction
to a design is very important); McCain Interview, supra note 53 (expressing the view that a
foremost concern of a designer is what would appeal to the consumer).
69 See Linda Tischler, Object Lessons: Alberto Alessi, FAST COMPANY, Oct. 2oo9, at I16, 118
(describing work of Alberto Alessi, whose internationally known firm designs distinctive do-
mestic items such as flatware, tea kettles, and corkscrews). Alessi has developed a formula
for determining whether one of his firm's newly designed prototypes should be put into pro-
duction. Id. A central parameter of the formula is a score Alessi assigns for "SMI," meaning
"sensation, memory, and imagination." Id. The SMI parameter "tries to explore what people
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consumer's immediate reaction upon viewing a new design can profoundly
influence his or her decision on whether to buy or use the product, as certain
assumptions about the product (e.g., its quality, cost, or manner of operation)
will be initially made based only on its appearance.70 Consumers also react
to designs in emotional terms by deciding whether a design reflects their
style, personality, and philosophy." If the appearance of the design fails to
immediately convey a positive impression, the consumers may never again
consider buying or using the product. It is therefore critical to the success
of any product that its aesthetic appearance alone coveys a message that
appeals to the target consumers.
In order to maximize a product's appeal, many designers intentionally
set out to have their designs' appearances elicit certain responses or ideas
in the minds of consumers. In other words, designs ideally "speak" to
consumers in ways that trigger immediately favorable reactions and
assumptions." For example, the design of a product like Apple's iPhone
might invoke thoughts like "cool," "sleek," or "high-tech," while the design
for a 1950s Cadillac car might invoke thoughts like "classic," "durable," or
"swell." Certainly, thoughts like "cheap," "unreliable," and "boring" are
to be avoided.
Even if a design invokes in consumers' minds all of the favorable
responses and ideas that the designer intends, the designer still faces
other constraints. The designer must ensure that the design still invokes
reactions that appropriately correspond to the consumers' understanding of
mean when they say,'Oh, what a beautiful object!"' Id. In Alessi's view, "[b]eauty alone no
longer expresses properly the relations of people with an object. You cannot use beauty when
you describe a [Phillipe] Starck project, for example." Id.
Obviously a substantial part of a consumer's relationship with a designed product is their
use of the product. As explained by Henry Dreyfuss, the first president of the Industrial
Designers Society of America:
[W]hat we are working on is going to be ridden in, sat upon, looked
at, talked into, activated, operated, or in some way used by people
individually or en masse. If the point of contact between the product and
the people becomes a point of friction, then the industrial designer has
failed. If, on the other hand, people are made safer, more comfortable,
more eager to purchase, more efficient-or just plain happier-the
designer has succeeded.
DREYFUSS, supra note 67, at 23-24.
70 OBJECTIFIED (Plexi Productions 2009) (documentary film directed by Gary Hustwit).
71 Id.
72 See Rossi/Spears Interview, supra note 54 (explaining this concept of "product seman-
tics" and noting that verbalization of a design is an important part of the design process). See
also Tischlersupra note 69, at I18 (describing designer Alberto Alessi's mathematical formula
for determining whether to launch a new product as also including a score for "communication
language" or "CL," which "measures the ability of a product to communicate something like
status or values"). Alessi observes that "[a] gold Rolex watch, for example, conveys wealth,
while a Richard Sapper teakettle indicates cultural sensitivity." Id.
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the underlying product. If the design strays too far from what consumers
can recognize and feel comfortable with, they may reject it." In other
words, consumers must be able to at least recognize what a product is, and
understand generally how it works. Internationally renowned designer
Raymond Loewy coined the phrase "Most Advanced Yet Acceptable" (or
"MAYA") to describe this phenomenon.74 The MAYA principle recognizes
that while consumers desire the best and newest technology and designs
in their products, they cannot always immediately embrace the most
advanced product design possible." At a certain point, the design reaches
a "shock-zone" where consumers' desire for novelty is outweighed by their
reluctance to adopt what goes against their sense of the norm. 6 Good
designers are very conscious of where the shock-zone lies for every one of
their projects."
In the days of rotary telephones, for example, many consumers likely
had difficulty accepting the first touch-tone phone. Of course, the optimal
"solution" for the new touch-tone design "calls for an understanding of the
tastes of the American consumer[s]," for which "there are no yardsticks,
no ways to chart a curve of public reaction to advanced design." 8 One of
many ways that the designers of the first touch-tone phones could have
stayed within the MAYA shock-zone would have been by continuing to
arrange the numeric buttons in a circle (which was functionally required for
rotary phones) instead of immediately adopting the more modern square
arrangement. Radical new button placement or overall telephone shapes
likely would have intimidated many consumers.
Design is undeniably intertwined with the subjectivity and complexity
of consumer purchasing psychology. Far from being an exact science,
design is more akin to an art form. 9 Unlike inventors of utility inventions,
73 See Mary Tripsas, It's Brand Nerw, but Make It Sound Familiar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009,
at BU4 (describing problem that arises when "consumers [cannot] place innovations into fa-
miliar categories," and giving as an example the introduction of the Segway motorized scoot-
er). University of Texas psychology professor Arthur Markman explains that "[niobody was
quite sure what [the Segway] was." Id. Because "[there was no clear analogy,... people had
no idea how to use it." Id.
74 RAYMOND LOEWY, NEVER LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE 277-78 (1951).
75 Id
76 Id.
77 Id. The MAYA idea remains just as relevant today as when Loewy introduced it
mid-twentieth century. Consider one of the world's largest consumer products companies,
Coca-Cola, Inc., which employs 50 in-house designers and works with 3oo agencies around
the world. See Linda Tischler, Pop Artist: David Buter, FAST COMPANY, Oct. 2oo9, at 91, 91-92
(profiling David Butler, the company's vice president of global design). Coke's core design
principles, which apply to all its designs whether involved in "packaging, point of sale, equip-
ment, or any other touch point," include the principle that every design be "'familiar yet
surprising."' Id. at 97.
78 LOEWY, supra note 74, at 278.
79 Rossi/Spears Interview, supra note 54 (expressing the view that "industrial design is
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designers do not seek to solve specific technical problems with their
designs.so Any "problem" that a designer addresses via aesthetics is
necessarily ill-defined, elusive, and subjective. For example, to say
that a particular product is "ugly" or "looks cheap" does not identify a
specific problem in any meaningful way, such that a hypothetical designer
exercising ordinary skill could point to an "obvious solution" to make the
product appear more attractive or expensive. Given the subjectivity of
aesthetics, ten designers may form ten different yet valid opinions as to
why the product looks ugly or cheap. Likewise, all ten designers may
hold different yet valid opinions about how the product's design could be
modified to make the product more appealing.
In a sense, the designer who re-designs an existing product to make
it more attractive creates both the problem and solution simultaneously.
Whatever design feature he or she adds to make the product more appealing
has now become the solution. The prior absence of that feature may now
be identified, in retrospect, as the "problem." Accordingly, it would be
meaningless to conclude that any design would have been "obvious" when
no objective and reasonably defined design goal or endpoint existed. All
the designers whom we interviewed were perplexed by what the word
"obvious" could mean in the design context, and none were able to propose
a reasonable interpretation of the word. Similarly, the notion of an aesthetic
design modification or combination of design features being "suggested"
by prior art designs was nonsensical to the interviewees.8 '
Like utility inventors, designers rely heavily on the prior art, always
consulting and building upon the work of earlier designers." Here the
analogy to Judge Rich's inventor's workshop breaks down, however.
Because designers are not seeking to solve specific technical problems that
have definite solutions, the scope of prior art that may be consulted by
designers is boundless, and their inspiration to modify or combine may
come from anywhere. Designers are not limited to consulting "analogous"
prior art, as is hypothesized for the utility invention process.8 In the view
not a science"); McCain Interview, supa note 53 (expressing the view that industrial design-
ers are right-brained, non-linear thinkers); Viemeister Interview, supra note 25 (expressing
view that designers are not homogenous).
8o To reiterate, we use the word "design" to refer to the ornamental aspects of an article
which are potentially protectable by a design patent. Design optimally involves a seamless
merger of a product's functionality with its form, but the current design patent law does not
appreciate or protect this duality.
81 See McCain Interview, supra note 53; Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33 (express-
ing view that approach of rejecting designs over combinations of prior art is "fundamentally
flawed").
82 Rossi/Spears Interview, supra note 54 (expressing the view that good design always
draws on the work of pre-existing designs and looks to many sources for inspiration).
83 Compare utility patents, where a specific problem is being addressed and prior art
must be "analogous" to be relied upon to show obviousness. Analogous arts are those in the
2010--201] 439
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of one interviewee, designers exhibit a special form of Attention Deficit
Disorder (ADD) when looking for design inspiration; they may "jump from
flip phones to armadillos to lobster claws to forklift trucks.""
It is certainly common and useful for designers to consult the same or
functionally related products for inspiration.15 However, designers routinely
seek inspiration from designs far beyond those fairly considered "related"
in any functional sense. Many designers regularly browse through photo
books or other sources containing collections of designs, looking for prior
design features to incorporate into their new designs, regardless of whether
the designs are in any way related or analogous to the product they are
presently designing. Some designers scan through any kind of prior art
simply looking for "certain curves" they can use." Designers also look at
competing products or the accessory market for inspiration."
The design of a product must not detract from or impede the functionality
or user experience of the product. Even though their sources of inspiration
are unlimited, designers recognize that "the 'degree of freedom' dictated
by a product's functionality (i.e., the extent to which a designer can modify
the aesthetics of a product without interfering with its proper function) may
constrain its design.88  For many products, however, substantial advances
in manufacturing technology have lessened these design constraints. For
example, the advent of space-age synthetic materials made feasible the
manufacture of innumerable objects and shapes that otherwise would have
been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible (e.g., intricately molded plastic
glasses and bottles, medical supplies, or cell phone housings).
Technology advances have particularly increased the degree of freedom
available in designing electronics. For example, electronics such as radios
once had to house many complex and bulky circuits, transistors, mechanical
same field of endeavor, or reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor. See In re
Antle, 444 F.2d i168, I171-72 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
84 Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33.
85 See Rossi/Spears Interview, supra note 54 (discussing an example of a designer charged
with designing a new fire helmet, and consulting the designs of various helmets and headwear
created for purposes entirely unrelated to fire safety, such as bike helmets).
86 McCain Interview, supra note 53.
87 Woodring Interview, supra note 37 (stating that competitive research can be a very
useful source of inspiration for designers). Woodring further noted that accessories sold for
products can often reveal deficiencies in the functional aspects of the products themselves.
Id. For example, sales of non-slip adhesive stickers to be placed on the floor of a bath tub
reveals a flaw in the bath tubs themselves, namely, that they do not adequately protect against
slipping. Id. As a more aesthetically driven example, the existence of aftermarket decorative
decals or "skins" for portable electronics may indicate that consumers would respond well to
including surface ornamentation on the electronic product itself.
88 McCain Interview, supra note 53; Viemeister Interview, supra note 25 (comparing the
limited scope of variation available when modifying a scroll on a spoon with the greater scope
of variation possible when designing a cellular telephone); see infra Part IV for an examination
of the European Union's approach to a designer's degree of freedom.
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switches, visual indicators, and vacuum tubes. The functional requirements
for these elements effectively dictated the size, proportions, and placement
of many components in the electronics product, which in turn substantially
limited the degree of freedom with which designers could impact the
product's appearance. Today, many of the former bulky components have
been replaced with compact microchips, integrated circuits, LCD screens,
and the like. These much smaller and more streamlined components can
be easily rearranged, giving today's designers wide latitude to design many
types of electronics as they please."
Even when working within a restrictive degree of freedom, designers
can often create fairly complex designs. It can be "simple to make a design
complex, and complex to make a design simple."" As an example of the
former, the complex mechanical configuration of inventor Elias Howe's
sewing machine imposed substantial limits on the contours and proportions
of the machine's external appearance.91 Howe hired an artist to "stylize"
the sewing machine by adding filigree roses to the ironwork.92 This
styling complicated the appearance of the product, and yet involved little
maneuvering around the functional constraints of the sewing machine. 93
The more complex and challenging task is to optimally merge form
and function by simplifying a product's appearance via "reduction to
essentials." As Raymond Loewy explained, this modern design philosophy
posits that "[w]hen every component part has been stripped down to its
simplest form, every duplication ruled out, projections and asperities
reduced or eliminated, colors and textures simplified, the result is bound
to be aesthetically correct."9 Successful simplification is far more difficult
than adding superfluous ornamentation to a product. For example, Apple's
iPhone houses numerous high-tech, interconnected, and delicately
configured components, all of which must work together in minimal space
with maximum efficiency. In view of these technical challenges, it was
89 See Woodring Interview, supra note 37 (observing that electronics and technological
developments have made possible greater freedom in the design process, allowing engineers
to adapt products and make them fit with a given design, in contrast with designer's earlier
subservience to engineers).
9o Id.
9 1 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 LOEWY, supra note 74, at 211. Loewy also clarified that "[flor the sake of the record
and to avoid possibilities of misunderstanding and misquotation, let me state once more that
I am all in favor of the 'beauty through function' theory. However, I would like to alter it to
'beauty through function and simplification."' Id.; see also DREYFUSS, supra note 67, at 240
("I have the temerity to suggest that, by reducing objects to simple, unobtrusive forms, by
relieving them of absurd and excessive decoration, by using appropriate colors and textures,
and by avoiding obtrusive noises, we contribute to the serenity of those who use them. That
is what we try to do.").
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considerably complex and difficult to endow the iPhone with an appearance
that is simple, streamlined, and sleek.'
The innovative design of Apple's iPhone is lauded around the world
for its elegant simplicity. Paradoxically, the more simple a design for a new
product, the more likely that it will be viewed as a minor improvement
or "obvious variation" over the prior art.9 Because of this double-edged
sword, some designers perceive the present design patent system as
punishing the best designs by rejecting them as "obvious."97
Whether a design is worthy of patent protection is, at best, a highly
subjective question. None of the designers whom we interviewed were
comfortable giving us a definitive test or metric for analyzing the issue.
The interviewees conceded that it is very difficult to decide what they
themselves believe should be patentable.98 However, all agreed that the
degree of freedom available to the designer is relevant to the inquiry."
The adaptation or addition of prior art design features onto a new object
having different degrees of freedom was generally viewed as worthy
of protection.'" For example, Apple's design guru Jonathan Ive, who is
responsible for the designs of such highly acclaimed products as the iMac
and the iPod, drew heavily on the work of 1960s Braun designer Dieter
Rams.10
95 Woodring Interview, supra note 37. It is important to clarify that when we discuss
the substantial "complexity" involved in making the iPhone design simple, most of the com-
plexity was presumably on the functionality side of the "design" process, even though the
intended simple aesthetic result is surely what dictated the efforts of the engineers and pro-
grammers.
96 Id.
97 Id
98 See, e.g., Viemeister Interview, supra note 25; Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33.
99 See, e.g., Viemeister Interview, supra note z5; McCain Interview, supra note 53.
oo See, e.g., Viemeister Interview, supra note 25; McCain Interview, supra note 53.
1o Jesus Diaz, ip6os Braun Products Hold the Secrets to Apple's Future, GIlZMODo (Jan.
14, 2oo8, 10:3o AM), http://gizmodo.com/34364i/i960s-braun-products-hold-the-secrets-to-
apples-future (images copied from website).
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Rams' Speaker vs. Ive's iMac
Rams' Pocket Radio vs. Ive's iPod
In these examples, the degree of freedom differed considerably between
the Braun and Apple products. One key distinction is that the housing
of acoustic speakers is influenced by certain size and space requirements,
and needs particular supporting means, electric connections, and power
supplies, all of which greatly differ from those for graphical interfaces
such as LCD screens. Here, Ive's borrowing of a basic design concept
and adapting it to a device having different functional requirements and
limitations is generally viewed to be laudable.
The designers we interviewed generally felt that they should be
encouraged to borrow, adapt, and combine prior design features in their own
original way.'0 In their view, this would lead to new and better designs. By
102 Viemeister Interview, supra note 25; McCain Interview, supra note 53; Kemnitzer
Interview, supra note 33; Rossi/Spears Interview, supra note 54; see Woodring Interview, supra
note 37.
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contrast, outright copying of an entire design, even with de minimis changes,
was generally not viewed as warranting protection.103
Design nonobviousness should be assessed from a perspective consistent
with the realities of the design process. Current law applies the perspective
of a "designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the type involved."'I
The concept of an "ordinary designer" was generally perceived by our
designer interviewees to be nonsensical, if not offensive.",' Moreover,
the legal construct of an "ordinary designer" is based on a fundamentally
flawed assumption. Many designers, unlike inventors such as mechanics or
chemists, do not specialize in designing any particular type of article.
Approximately half of the members of the Industrial Designers Society
of America (IDSA) are design consultants who work on designs for a wide
variety of products, as needed by their clients.1" Most of the remaining
members are in-house designers for corporations, whose work is more
focused on particular types of articles.10 In the case of a design patent
application directed to a chair, for example, is the proper "ordinary designer"
the in-house designer who works for a chair company or the consultant who
may design chairs only occasionally? Both types of designers play equally
valuable roles, yet the existing legal standard recognizes only one.
Although the "ordinary designer" perspective made little sense to
them, an "ordinary observer" perspective generally squared well with all
of our interviewees. Some designers we interviewed acknowledged that
consumers are not always the most discerning or understanding of the
subtleties of the design process. 0 s Nevertheless, they all agreed that
given designers' paramount focus on the visual impressions conveyed by
their designs, the perspective of the consumer-the targeted observer and
intended user-is ultimately the best perspective from which to measure
103 See Viemeister Interview, supra note 25 (expressing view that designers should not
be allowed to blatantly copy, but they should be allowed to improve on what other designers
have done; agreeing that incremental innovation in design is important).
104 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1380-8i (Fed. Cir. 2oo9)
(citing Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., ioi F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also infra
Part III (discussing case law development of the "ordinarily skilled designer" perspective).
105 Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33 (expressing view that trying to define a "designer
of ordinary skill" is an inherently fuzzy issue, "a great big furball"); see Viemeister Interview,
supra note 25 (noting that designers as artists are not homogeneous, and posing the question,
"was Picasso an ordinary artist?").
io6 Wood ring Interview,supra note 37; see also IndustrialDesignervSociety ofAmerica (IDSA)
Fact Sheet, INDus. DESIGNERS Soc'Y OF Am. (Aug. 6, 2010, 1 i:o4 AM), http://idsa.org/content/
content ilindustrial-designers-society-america-idsa-fact-sheet ("As of July 2010, IDSA's total
membership is over 2,300. An estimated 49 percent work in consultancies, 40 percent work in
corporate offices and Io percent work as educators.").
107 Woodring Interview, supra note 37.
io8 Viemeister Interview, supra note 25; see Woodring Interview, supra note 37.
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whether a design successfully makes a meaningful contribution over the
prior art.'"
The nonobviousness requirement as currently applied to designs does
not accurately reflect the realities of the creative processes and objectives
involved in design. Rather, the excessive rigor and utilitarian focus of
the nonobviousness requirement operates to discourage designers from
engaging in their typical creative processes, effectively hindering the
progress of the decorative arts. The next Part, which traces the strained
development of design patent legislation as a neglected byproduct of the
utility patent system, confirms what our designer interviewees intuitively
grasped: that policymakers have yet to devote adequate attention to the
fundamental differences between designs and utility inventions.
II. THE DISCORDANT DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN AND U.S.
DESIGN PATENT LEGISLATION
This Part critically examines the historical development of the
U.S. design patent statutes, focusing particularly on the legislative
evolution of the nonobviousness requirement. Our inquiry revealed
that nonobviousness (or its predecessor, the qualitative requirement for
"invention") was originally imposed on design patentability through what
appear to be mistaken and unintended changes to the statutory text. We
map the awkward application of nonobviousness to designs against the
backdrop of a sluggishly developed culture of American industrial design.
We also survey the repeatedly unsuccessful proposals to enact a suigeneris
legislative framework for design protection, independent of the patent
system.
A. The Origins of Industrial Design in the United States
The earliest American manufacturers were individuals who made their
own tools, weapons, harnesses, and clothing in order to survive. "Every
farmer was his own mechanic, and every home was a manufactory in
which adults and children worked together to serve their own needs."Io
Although successful families sold or bartered their excess goods, making
them visually appealing to purchasers was not of concern. Rather, the
goal was survival and adaptation to frontier conditions."' Beyond a few
noticeable exceptions such as the silversmith and patriot Paul Revere,
1og See Woodring, Interview, supra note 37; Viemeiser Interview, supra note 25; Rossil
Spears Interview, supra note 54; Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33.
IIo ARTHUR J. PULOs, AMERICAN DESIGN ETHIc: A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN TO
1940, at 5 (1983).
III See id.
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colonial manufacture was limited to hand-made products that solved
functional needs. Aesthetic appeal was not yet a conscious focus, despite
the fact that "things made by hand unconsciously acquire a certain element
of beauty.""'
The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century brought
tremendous mechanical and communications innovation to the U.S.,
introducing inventions such as Whitney's cotton gin," Morse's telegraph,114
Howe's sewing machine,"' Bell's telephone," 6 and Edison's incandescent
light bulb."' Moreover, goods that once required manual crafting could
now be mass-produced by machine. The gains in production capacity also
meant a loss of the beauty inherent in handmade products. Like their
frontier forebears, manufacturers of mass-produced items simply did not
concern themselves with aesthetics. Mass production techniques tamped
down any earlier inclinations toward an appealing visual appearance:
[Tihe industrial revolution of the mid-nineteenth century had displaced
the craftsman, and ... engineers were really mechanics.... Will it work? was
the question. No one gave a thought to cost and far less to appearance....
[WIhen mass production appeared on the scene, the country became
flooded with products, usually of good quality but clumsily put together
and wasteful of labor and materials."8
By the end of the nineteenth century, industrial technologies were
transforming the U.S. economy, "but when a manufacturer produced a
112 Earnest Elmo Calkins, Beauty the New Business Tool, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1927,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/27aug/calkins.htm.
113 Cotton Gin, U.S. Patent No. X72 (filed Mar. 14, 1794), availableathttp://patft.uspto.
gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter "X72" in "Query" box and click "search"; then follow
"Images" hyperlink); see also HAROLD EVANS ET AL., THEY MADE AMERICA 48-55 (2004) (de-
scribing Whitney's invention of the cotton gin and his subsequent recognition as "godfather
of the machine age").
114 Improvement in the Mode of Communicating Information by Signals by the
Application of Electro-Magnetism, U.S. Patent No. 1647 (filed June 20, 1840), available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter "1674" in "Query" box and click
"Search"; then follow "Images" hyperlink); see also EVANS ET AL., supra note 113, at 70-77
(describing Morse's invention of the electric telegraph).
115 Sewing Machine, U.S. Patent No. 4750 (issued Sept. 10, 1846), available at http://
patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter "4750" in "Query" box and click
"Search"; then follow "Images" hyperlink).
i16 Improvement in Telegraphy, U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (issued Mar. 7, 1876), available
at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter "174465" in "Query" box and
click "Search"; then follow "Images" hyperlink).
I 17 Electric-Lamp, U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Jan. 27, 188o),availabkathttp://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter "223898" in "Query" box and click "Search";
then follow "Images" hyperlink); see also EVANS ET AL., supra note 113, at 152 (describing
Edison as "America's most productive inventor in the 19th century" and noting the 1093 pat-
ents granted to Edison, including 389 patents on aspects of the incandescent bulb).
I 18 LOEWY, supra note 74, at I I.
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machine that worked he stopped. It never occurred to him to go on and
make his device pleasant to look at as well as efficient."I"
Critics bemoaned the lack of aesthetic appeal in mass-produced
products. The New York Times complained that "[a]long with the
development of machines goes the progressive sterilization of individual
activity; the artisan becomes a workman and the workman an ignorant
tender of a machine."z 0 Commentators warned Americans against trusting
'the cheapness of machine-made goods,'" demanding that goods must
be "'decidedly more attractive to the eye."'"2 ' European manufacturers
fought back against American success at mechanized cost-cutting by
focusing on the artistic appearance of products, allowing the Europeans to
charge higher prices.'
Piracy, rather than creativity, marks the beginning of industrial design
in America. No laws prevented the copying of a product's ornamental
appearance in early nineteenth-century America. Manufacturers were
largely imitators of foreign design rather than creators of innovative
domestic design. They were "too dependent upon imported inspiration to
tolerate any interference with their practice of borrowing and putting out
for sale any newly imported design, especially in the area of fabrics, as soon
as it became or threatened to become popular."'
The U.S. manufacturers' reputation for copying continued into the
early twentieth century, when some European manufacturers refused to
participate in the 1915 Panama-Pacific Exposition "for fear that their best
ideas would be pirated by the Americans." 2 4 In the pre-World War I years,
"the needs of American merchandisers and manufacturers for design in the
industrial arts had been satisfied for the most part by the importation of
products to be sold or copied and by the steady flow of skilled immigrants."2 I
When World War I began, U.S. manufacturers feared the loss of their best
sources of design innovation-designs produced by foreign countries that
had become enemy combatants.'
i19 Calkins,supra note I12.
120 The French College of the Crafts, N.Y. TiEs, Sept. 18, 1902, at 8. With mechanization
came "[tihe dwarfing of the individual in immense workshops where the workman is a laborer
without knowledge, inventiveness, or character. . . ." Id. "[Elventually the machine-made
articles of a land will deteriorate and lose their selling quality unless along with them goes an
output of work by individual minds, trained in workshops where they can express their artistic
thought and feeling." Id. "It is strange that . . . the United States should be so sluggish to
provide centres of instruction in the arts and crafts." Id.
121 PuLos, supra note i lo, at 243 (quoting a 1902 editorial in the New York Times).
122 See id. at 242-43.
123 Id. at 134.
124 Id. at 26o.
125 Id. at 264.
126 Id. (As World War I went on, "Americans were chafing because their own sources of
products and design had been interrupted and even halted.").
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B. The Impetus for Design Protection Legislation in the United States
Despite concern about unchecked design piracy on the part of
American manufacturers, the United States was not the first nation to
implement legislation that would protect and reward innovative designs.
Suffering from its own domestic piracy concerns, Great Britain took the
lead in addressing the problem by enacting design protection legislation in
1839. The British initially made design protection part of their copyright
system. Parliament implemented "An Act to secure to Proprietors of
Designs for Articles of Manufacture the Copyright of such Designs for a
limited Time" on June 14, 1839.127 The act created a registration system
to protect "the Authors and Proprietors" of "new and original Design[s]"
for "Articles of Manufacture," providing a one-year term of protection for
fabric designs and a three-year term of protection for designs on articles
made of metal.'a As a part of Britain's copyright regime, the act did not
include any requirement for "invention" as a prerequisite to protection.,"
Despite the relative paucity of original design work in the United
States at this time, American manufacturers watched the developments in
Britain and began to demand analogous protection for their own original
designs, including fabric patterns. Trade between the United States and
Great Britain undoubtedly contributed to the American manufacturers'
campaign for design protection legislation. The flow of goods between
the two countries "was so interlaced that any legal action taken by one
country to protect the original design of its products must certainly lead to
reciprocal moves on the part of the other." 30
On February 3, 1841, the U.S. Congress received a "Petition of [a]
Number of Manufacturers and Mechanics of the United States, Praying
[t]he adoption of measures to secure to them their rights in patterns
127 An Act to secure to Proprietors of Designs for Articles of Manufacture the Copyright
of such Designs for a limited Time, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 17 (Eng.).
128 Id. Designs were transferred to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom's Patent
Office in 1875. See History of designs, UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE,
https://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/design/d-about/d-whatis/d-history.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2011). As of 2009, protection for industrial design was under the auspices of the United
Kingdom's Intellectual Property Office. See What is a design?, UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OFFICE, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/design.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
129 See An Act to secure to Proprietors of Designs for Articles of Manufacture the
Copyright of such Designs for a limited Time, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 17 (Eng.) (silent as to pat-
ent protection for designs).
130 PuLos, supra note Io, at 134-
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anddesigns." '3 The signatories, including the inventor Jordan L. Mott,'
informed Congress that
the frequent ornamental and other improvements which are and can be
made in articles of manufacture have rendered necessary a registration of
new designs and patterns; that ornamental and useful changes can, in many
cases, be made in the design and form of articles of manufacture, for which
no patent can be obtained; that the said new designs and patterns often
require a considerable expenditure of time and money, and can be made use
of by any person so disposed, in such a manner as to undersell the inventor
or proprietor."'
Although the petition referred to the lack of patent protection for designs,
it is notable that its authors did not seek to protect their work within the
patent system. Rather, they explicitly sought a system of "registration."
The request for a registration system outside the realm of patents is
consistent with the British copyright legislation, which the American
petitioners observed had gone into effect on July 1, 1839, "to secure such
rights as your petitioners claim."'"
The petitioning manufacturers and mechanics emphasized U.S.
achievements in utilitarian manufactures, but conceded that the United
States was not yet a prominent source of aesthetic innovation. However, the
petitioners contended that the visual appearance of their products would
soon match the beauty of foreign goods if appropriate legal protection
became available:
[Tihe manufacturers and mechanics of the United States are not surpassed
by those of any other country, in the durability and utility of the articles
manufactured by them; and they confidently affirm that the articles
manufactured by them would equal any others in beauty, if new designs
and patterns were secured by registration. 3 s
131 PETITION OF A NUMBER OF MANUFACTURERS AND MECHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
PRAYING THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES To SECURE TO THEM THEIR RIGHTS IN PATTERNS AND
DESIGNS, S. Doc. No. 154, at I (2d Sess. 1841) [hereinafter PETITION].
132 Id. Jordan L. Mott, Sr., founded a New York iron works and invented "the first stove
for burning anthracite coal." Jordan L. Mott Dies in 86th Year, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1915, at 9
(obituary of Mott's son, Jordan L. Mott, Jr.). Mott Sr. was the sole named inventor on three U.S.
utility patents: Portable Furnace, U.S. Patent No. 983 (filed Oct. 19, 1838); Mode of Increasing
Adhesion of Driving-Wheels of Locomotives, U.S. Patent NO. 2,228 (filed Aug. 28, 1841); and
Mode of Constructing the Bottom Plates and Flues of Ovens in Cooking Apparatus, U.S.
Patent No. 2,503 (filed Mar. 23, 1842).
133 PETITION, supra note 13 1, at I.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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Accordingly, the petitioners requested
passage of an act, by which the rights of proprietors of new designs and
patterns may be protected from piracy, and may be secured in a safe, cheap,
and expeditious manner, to the end that the manufacturers and mechanics
of the United States may be enabled fully to compete with those of any
other country."
The 1841 petition was "[r]eferred to the Committee on Patents and
the Patent Office.""' In retrospect it is unfortunate that design protection
jurisdiction was conferred on the U.S. patent system, but not surprising.
The petitioners' primary advocate and champion was the Commissioner of
Patents, Henry Ellsworth. In his annual report to the Senate "[s]howing
the operation of the Patent Office during the year 1841,'""1 Commissioner
Ellsworth included the following recommendation: "The justice and
expediency of securing the exclusive benefit of new and original designs
for articles of manufacture, both in the fine and useful arts, to the authors
and proprietors thereof, for a limited time, are also respectfully presented
for consideration."1 39
Notably, the Commissioner recommended a copyright-type system
of registration for the "authors and proprietors" of "new and original"
designs." The remainder of Ellsworth's remarks elaborated:
Other nations have granted this privilege, and it has afforded mutual
satisfaction alike to the public and to individual applicants. Many who visit
the Patent Office learn with astonishment that no protection is given in this
country to this class of persons. Competition among manufacturers for the
latest patterns prompts to the highest effort to secure improvements, and
calls out the inventive genius of our citizens. Such patterns are immediately
pirated, at home and abroad. A patent [sic, pattern] introduced at Lowell,
[Massachusetts], for instance, with however great labor or cost, may be
taken to England in twelve or fourteen days, and copied and returned
in twenty days more. If protection is given to designers, better patterns
will, it is believed, be obtained, since the impossibility of concealment at
present forbids all expense that can be avoided. It may well be asked, if
authors can so readily find protection in their labors, and inventors of the
mechanical arts so easily secure a patent to reward their efforts, why should
not discoverers of designs, the labor and expenditure of which may be far
greater, have equal privileges afforded them?
The law, if extended, should embrace alike the protection of new and
original designs for a manufacture of metal or other material, or any new and
useful design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other fabric, or for
136 Id. at 1-2.
137 Id. at I.
138 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, SHOWING THE OPERATION OF THE PATENT
OFFICE DURING THE YEAR 1841, S. Doc. No. 169, at 1 (2d Sess. 1842).
139 Id. at 2.
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a bust, statue, or bas-relief, or composition in alto or basso relievo. All this
could be effected by simply authorizing the Commissioner to issue patents
for these objects, under the same limitations and on the same conditions
as govern present action in other cases. The duration of the patent might
be seven years, and the fee might be one half of the present fee charged to
citizens and foreigners respectively.1"
Commissioner Ellsworth's recommendations to Congress are
noteworthy in several respects. First, Ellsworth viewed the "discoverers
of designs" as a category of innovators distinct from both "authors" and
"inventors of the mechanical arts." Second, Ellsworth proposed granting
patents on designs. But his language suggests that patents were relatively
easy to obtain in 1841.141 The U.S. Patent Office was created in 1836,142 but
it was not until 1851 that the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (the
famous "doorknob case") verbalized "invention" as a third patentability
criterion, i.e., as a legal requirement that a patent-worthy invention must
exhibit something more than novelty and utility.143
Ellsworth's 1842 report contemplated that the sole requirements for
design patent protection would be "new and original" designs, in contrast
with the "new and useful" criteria then mandated by statute for utility
patents.'" His suggestion that design patents could be issued "under the
same limitations and on the same conditions as govern present action in
other cases" does not suggest anything particularly onerous for designs. 145
Further, Ellsworth's use of copyright terminology (i.e., "original") suggests
that he did not intend for designs to meet the identical patentability
requirements imposed on utility inventions.
Congress enacted design protection legislation in the following year. But
what American manufacturers ultimately received was not the "cheap and
expeditious" 146 system of piracy protection for which they had petitioned
Congress in 1841. Rather, the square peg of design was forced into the
round hole of the utility patent system with its associated complexities
140 Id.
141 See id. (asking why designers should not receive legal protection when "inventors of
the mechanical arts so easily secure a patent to reward their efforts").
142 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (establishing within the Department of
State "an office to be denominated the Patent Office").
143 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (I I How.) 248, 265-66 (1851).
144 See REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTs, SHOWING THE OPERATION OF THE
PATENT OFFICE DURING THE YEAR I841, S. Doe. No. 169, at 2 (2d Sess.1842); cf Patent Act of
1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119 ("[Alny person or persons having discovered or invented any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may make applica-
tion in writing to the Commissioner of Patents ... [who], on due proceedings had, may grant
a patent therefor.").
145 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, SHOWING THE OPERATION OF THE
PATENT OFFICE DURING THE YEAR I841, S. Doc. No. 169, at 2 (2d Sess.1842).
146 PETITION, supra note 131, at 1-2.
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and costs, where it remains today. Design protection was placed within the
Patent Office in 1842 simply for political expedience and administrative
convenience; no other suitable alternatives existed at the time.147
Thomas Hudson posits three reasons for Congress' placing design
protection under the patent system rather than copyright:
(1) The nature of the subject matter involved-that is, designs of articles
of manufacture-included underlying manufactured articles of commerce
as distinguished from "purely intellectual products" such as writings, maps,
charts, and the like;
(2) The source of the original suggestion for the design protection
law, and its basic form, came from the Commissioner of Patents, Henry
Ellsworth; and lastly,
(3) The practical fact that in 1842 no central copyright depository
existed. At that time, copies of works to be copyrighted were deposited
with the clerk of the appropriate U.S. District Court.148
Regardless of the propriety or precise motivations underlying Congress's
actions, designs have remained firmly rooted in the U.S. patent system
from the time Congress enacted the inaugural design patent legislation to
the present day.
C. The Evolution and Impact of U.S. Design Patent Legislation
Congress enacted the first U.S. design patent legislation on August 29,
1842. The statute provided that
any citizen or citizens, or alien or aliens, having resided one year in the
United States and taken the oath of his or their intention to become a
citizen or citizens who by his, her, or their own industry, genius, efforts,
and expense, may have invented or produced any new and original design
for a manufacture, whether of metal or other material or materials, or any
147 See Brean, supra note 34, at 326-27.
148 See Thomas B. Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in
the United States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 380,382-83 (1948).
The first U.S. copyright statute implemented deposit of copyrighted works with U.S.
District Court clerks. See 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
app. 7, at 7-41 (2009) (reprinting of Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124)
("[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, in cases where any map, chart, book
or books, hath or have been already printed and published, unless he shall first deposit, and
in all other cases, unless he shall before publication deposit a printed copy of the title of such
map, chart, book or books, in the clerk's office of the district court where the author or pro-
prietor shall reside . . . ."). The Copyright Act of 1909 changed this procedure by requiring
that the copies be deposited in the Copyright Office. See Copyright Act of 1909, Ch. 320, §
12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078. See also JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 146 (3d ed. 2010) (overviewing evolution of copyright formalities, including deposit
requirements); id. ("The first significant changes to the formalities required by copyright law
occurred with passage of the Copyright Act of 19o9.").
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new and original design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other
fabrics, or any new and original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or
composition in alto or basso relievo, or any new and original impression or
ornament, or to be placed on any article of manufacture, the same being
formed in marble or other material, or any new and useful pattern, or print,
or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted
or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture, or any new and
original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture not known
or used by others before his, her, or their invention or production thereof,
and prior to the time of his, her or their application for a patent therefor,
and who shall desire to obtain an exclusive property or right therein to
make, use, and sell and vend the same, or copies of the same, to others, by
them to be made, used, and sold, may make application in writing to the
Commissioner of Patents expressing such desire, and the Commissioner,
on due proceedings had, may grant a patent therefor, as in the case now of
application for a patent: Provided, That the fee in such cases which by the
now existing laws would be required of the particular applicant shall be one
half the sum, and that the duration of said patent shall be seven years, and
that all the regulations and provisions which now apply to the obtaining or
protection of patents not inconsistent with the provisions of this act shall
apply to applications under this section."'
Careful parsing of the 1842 Act is revealing. The statute contemplated
protection for anyone who "may have invented or produced any new and
original design for a manufacture."s 0 The process of creating a patentable
design required either "invent[ion]" or "produc[tion]."'6' Although
subsequent judicial decisions routinely interpreted the design patent
statute as requiring "invention" for design patentability (along with novelty,
originality, and ornamentality),5 2 such decisions misread the 1842 Act.
Several reasons support the conclusion that the first U.S. design
statute did not contemplate anything more than novelty and originality
as prerequisites to design patentability. First, the plain language of the
statute contemplated that design patent applicants had either "invented"
or "produced" their claimed designs. Congress's use of the disjunctive
"or" indicates that new designs might result alternatively from a process
of "invention" or a process of "production." In either case, the resulting
design could still be deemed a novel and original creation by the applicant
(who was, at that time, probably a mechanic or craftsman"s'). Further, the
plain meaning of "produced" suggests a far lesser quantum of ingenuity
149 Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543-44.
150 Id. (emphasis added).
151 Id. at 544.
152 See infra Part III (describing case law development).
153 "Industrial design" did not develop as a recognized profession separate from manu-
facturing and engineering, and "designers" were not distinguished from manufacturers or en-
gineers, until the twentieth century. See infra notes 207-214 and accompanying text.
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than "invented."l5 4 Statutory recognition that patentable designs could
be "produced" indicates that a new design was protectable so long as it
was somehow made or brought into existence by the applicant.' 5 In any
event, inclusion of the word "or" refutes the interpretation that Congress
intended designs to meet a qualitative criterion of "invention" in order to
merit patent protection.
Second, it is unlikely that Congress intended the first design patent
statute to include a requirement for invention when the utility patent
statute in force at that time did not do so. The Patent Act of 183616 (as
modified in 1839 to provide a two-year pre-filing grace period"') provided
that patents would be granted to those who had "discovered or invented
any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement [thereof]." 5 s To be sure, utility patents
were granted on new and useful "discoverfies] or invention[s]," echoing
the words used in the Constitution."' But "discoveries or inventions" were
merely the things conceived by utility patent applicants. The courts and
the Patent Office did not divine that the word "invention" referred not just
to a thing, but also to a qualitative standard or requirement of patentability,
until the Supreme Court's 1851 decision in Hotchkiss.'6 This something-
154 See NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DiCTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 643
(New York, Harper & Brothers, rev. ed. 1846), available at http://books.google.com/ (search
"Researching a Topic" for "1846 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language"; follow the first hyperlinked result) (defining the verb "produce" as meaning "I.
To bring forward; to bring or offer to view or notice. ... 5. To cause; to effect; to bring into
existence.... 7. To make; to bring into being or form. 8. To yield or furnish.-9. In general,
to bring in to existence or into view."); id. at 466 (defining the verb "invent" as meaning "i.
To find out something new; to devise something not before known; to contrive and produce
something that did not before exist. . . .").
155 See id. at 643 (defining the verb "produce").
156 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
157 Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354.
158 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 1 l7, I19. The statutory term "art" was under-
stood to mean "process" or "method." When the patent laws were reenacted in 1952, Congress
changed "art" to "process." See 35 U.S.C. § ioo(b) (2006) ("The term 'process' means process,
art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material."); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) ("The Patent Act of 1793
defined statutory subject matter as 'any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composi-
tion of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereofl.' Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. II, § 1,
i Stat. 318. Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word
'art' with the word 'process."').
159 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
i6o See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248, 266 (1851); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. i, 1 (1966) ("The language in the [Hotchkiss] case, and in those which
followed, gave birth to'invention' as a word of legal art signifying patentable inventions."); S.
REP. No. 82-I979 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2410-1I ("The refusal of patents
by the Parent Office, and the holding of patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of
invention ... has been followed since at least as early as 185o.").
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beyond-novelty criterion was not explicitly codified in the patent statutes
for more than a hundred years thereafter, when 35 U.S.C. § 103 added
"nonobviousness" to the utility requirement of § 101 and the novelty
requirement analyzed under § 102.161
Third, the 1842 Act language providing that "all the regulations and
provisions which now apply to the obtaining or protection of patents not
inconsistent with the provisions of this act shall apply to applications under
this section" does not compel a contrary conclusion. This language cannot
have imposed an "invention" requirement for designs in 1842 because no
such requirement existed at the time for utility inventions. The Supreme
Court did not recognize an "invention" test until 1851.162 Even assuming for
the sake of argument that lower court decisions recognized a requirement
for invention as early as 1842, imposing it on design patents would have
been "inconsistent with the provisions of this act," i.e., the design patent
provisions, in view of the text and plain meaning of those provisions.
The 1842 Act's provision of protection for anyone who "may have
invented or produced any new and original design for a manufacture""I was
161 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 ("It is undisputed that this section [1031 was, for the
first time, a statutory expression of an additional requirement for patentability, originally ex-
pressed in Hotchkiss."); S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2410-
II ("There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence [of § 103] explicitly stated in
the present statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of patents
invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention ... has been followed since at least as
early as 1850. This paragraph is added with the view that an explicit statement in the statute
may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of
some criteria which may be worked out. The second sentence [of § 1031 states that patent-
ability as to this requirement is not to be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made, that is, it is immaterial whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or
from a flash of genius."); P.J. Federico, Commentary on theNere PatentAct, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1954)
(discontinued in subsequent volumes), reprintedin 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 181
(1993) ("[I]t has been recognized for well over a hundred years that not everything which is
new is capable of being patented. The newness, that is the difference over what was previ-
ously known, must be sufficient in character, or in quantity, or in quality, in order that the new
thing may be patented. This requirement has commonly been referred to as the requirement
for the presence of invention; when the requirement is not present it is stated that the subject
matter involved lacks invention.... The inventor may indeed have made an invention in the
psychological sense, but it would nevertheless not be patentable if the quantum of novelty
over the prior art material... was not sufficient. This requirement for invention with which
we are here concerned is more of a legal concept than a psychological one.").
162 See Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (II How.) at 266-67.
163 Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
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repeated in the Patent Act of 1861,'6 as well as the Patent Act of 1870.161
Thus, in two successive amendments of the design statutes, Congress
retained the same disjunctive treatment of patentable designs as resulting
from either "invent[ing] or "produc[ing]." Congress changed "or" to "and"
in 1874, but this change was most likely an unintended typographical error,
as explained below.
As part of a larger project to reorganize and reenact all federal statutes,
Congress in 1874 reenacted the then-existing statutes from the Patent
Act of 1870.'6 The design patent provisions from the 1870 Act became
Sections 4929 to 4933 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
164 Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246. The 1861 Act is notable for changing the
term of a design patent. As originally conceived in the 1842 Act, design patents had a fixed
term of seven years. See Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544 ("[Tlhe fee in such
cases which by the now existing laws would be required of the particular applicant shall be
one half the sum, and that the duration of said patent shall be seven years . . .. "). The 1861
Act implemented a unique system in which the applicant elected a term for his design patent;
no maintenance fees were charged for any term. The statute provided that the Commissioner
could grant design patents "for the term of three and one half years, or for the term of seven
years, or for the term of fourteen years, as the said applicant may elect in his application:
Provided, [tihat the fee to be paid in such application shall be, for the term of three years and
six months, ten dollars, for seven years, fifteen dollars, and for fourteen years, thirty dollars
.... " Patent Act of 1861, § Ii. This unusual system of term election by the applicant would
remain in force until 1982, when the design patent term was changed to its current term of
fourteen years from grant. Patent Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 16, 96 Stat. 317, 321.
The 1861 Act also provided that issued design patents were entitled to a seven-year exten-
sion under same terms then applicable for extensions of utility patents. Patent Act of 1861
§ ii. Lastly, the 1861 Act is notable for establishing the term of utility patents as seventeen
years from issue, Patent Act of i86i, § 16, which term remained in effect until changed by
the Uruguay Round Amendments Act of 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 1o8 Stat. 4809,
4983-85 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2oo6)) (implementing the cur-
rent utility patent term, under which protection expires twenty years after a patent applica-
tion's earliest effective filing date).
165 The 1870 Act provided that
"any person who, by his own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, has
invented or produced any new and original design for a manufacture ...
the same not having been known or used by others before his invention
or production thereof, or patented or described in any printed publica-
tion, may, upon payment of the duty required by law, and other due
proceedings had the same as in case of inventions or discoveries, obtain
a patent therefor."
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 209-10 (emphases added).
166 See S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2395 ("[TIhe
sections of the Revised Statutes relating to patents were merely a compilation of the act of
July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198 . . . ."); see also Moy, supra note 9, § 1:21 ("The [Patent] Act of 1870
was based on a draft prepared by the Commissioners assigned to revise the federal statutes
generally, and formed the basis for the patent-related sections in the revised statutes when
Congress enacted the latter in 1873-74." (citation omitted)).
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("Revised Statutes").17 The Revised Statutes sections were intended as
"merely a compilation of the act of July 8, 1870. . . ."'6 Nevertheless, and
without any explanation, the phrase "invented or produced" from the 1870
Act was changed to "invented and produced" in the 1874 Revised Statutes.
Section 4929 of the Revised Statutes provided:
Any person who, by his own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, has
invented and produced any new and original [1] design for a manufacture,
bust, statue, alto-relievo, or bas-relief; any new and original [2] design for
the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics; any new and original [3]
Impression, ornament, patent, print, or picture to be printed, painted, cast, or
otherwise placed on or worked into any article of manufacture; or any new,
useful, and original [4] shape or configuration of any article of manufacture,
the same not having been known or used by others before his invention of
[sic] production thereof, or patented or described in any printed publication,
may, upon payment of the fee prescribed, and other due proceedings had
the same as in cases of inventions or discoveries, obtain a patent therefor."
No legislative history explains the change from the disjunctive "or" in
the 1870 Act to the conjunctive "and" in the 1874 Revised Statutes. The
change was most likely inadvertent and not intended to import "invention"
as a qualitative test or requirement for patentability of designs. First, the
Revised Statutes were not intended to make substantive changes to the
patent laws.7 0 Second, it is telling that in the 1874 version of § 4929, the
word "or" is retained in the phrase "the same not having been known
or used by others before his invention of [sic] production thereof." Had
Congress intended to change "or" to "and," it is reasonable to assume that
Congress would have applied that change consistently throughout § 4929.
It did not. Third, an 1882 Supreme Court decision sustaining the validity
167 See REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES 1873-1874, §H 4929-4934, at 954 (Gov't
Printing Office, 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter REVISED STATUTES (1874)1. The cited volume in-
cludes "Title LX. Patents, Trade-Marks, and Copyrights." Id. at 945. Chapter One is titled
"Patents," and includes § 4883 to § 4936. Id. The design patent sections are § 4929 to § 4934.
Id. See also Hudson,supra note 148, at 381 ("The laws relating to design patents, in force on
June 22, 1874, formed § 4929 to § 4934 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, adopted
and approved as law by Congress on [June 22, 18741.").
168 S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2395 (The legislative
history of the 1952 Patent Act stated, "[slince the sections of the Revised Statutes relating
to patents were merely a compilation of the act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, our present pat-
ent law is essentially the act of 1870 with subsequent amendatory and supplemental enact-
ments."); see also id at 2396 ("When the Revised Statutes, as in force on December I, 1873,
were enacted on June 22, 1874, the sections of the act of 1870 were distributed in various parts
of the Revised Statutes.").
169 REVISED STATUTES (1874), supra note 167, § 4929 (emphases added).
170 See S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2395 ("[T]he
sections of the Revised Statutes relating to patents were merely a compilation of the act of
July8,1870..-.").
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of a design patent issued in 1875 makes no mention of any "invention"
requirement. Rather, the Court observed that
[t]he design patented by the complainants differs essentially from any
other which has been called to our attention. It is not covered by the other
patents which are set out in the record. Whether it is more graceful or beautiful
than older designs is not for us to decide. It is sufficient if it is new and useful."'
In 1902 Congress eliminated the "and produced" language completely,
leaving no textual alternatives to the words "invented" and "invention."
As amended, § 4929 provided:
Any person who has invented any new, original, and ornamental design for
an article of manufacture, not known or used by others in this country
before his invention thereof, and not patented or described in any printed
publication in this or any foreign country before his invention thereof, or
more than two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on
sale in this country for more than two years prior to his application, unless
the same is proved to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the
fees required by law and other due proceedings had, the same as in cases
of inventions or discoveries covered by section forty-eight hundred and
eighty-six, obtain a patent therefor."'
The minimal legislative history for the 1902 amendmentof Revised Statutes
§ 4929 focuses on the reasons for substituting the word "ornamental" for
"useful."1 13 No explanation is provided for the deletion of "and produced"
and "production," as was also the case with the 1874 enactment of the same
section that changed "invented or produced" to "invented and produced."
Beyond explaining why insertion of the word "ornamental" was required,
the April 1902 report of the Committee on Patents merely states that "[t]he
bill proposes to amend [§ 4929] of the Statutes by striking out unnecessary
language of the statute .... 174 The report further states that "[t]his bill was
171 Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U.S. 94, 96 (1882) (emphasis added). With respect to
the "useful" criterion [then imposed on the fourth category of designs enumerated in REVISED
STATUTES (1874), supra note 167, § 4929], the Court remarked that "[tihe fact that [the design
patent in suit] has been infringed by defendants, is sufficient to establish its utility, at least as
against them." Lehnbeuter, 105 U.S. at 96-97. Congress deleted "useful" from the statute and
replaced it with "ornamental" in 1902. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
172 Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, Pub. L. No. 57-109 (emphasis added).
173 See H.R. REP. No. 57-1661, at 1-2 (1902) (report from the Committee on Patents
regarding bill to amend design patent statute). Conflicting judicial decisions defining what
consideration should be given to the word "useful" as applied to design patents had "brought
... the Patent Office much contention and some confusion." The amendment was offered
"[t]o avoid these difficulties and to make plain the distinction between mechanical patents,
where 'utility' is an essential element, and design patents, where 'utility' has nothing to do
with it, but where ornamentation is the proper element of consideration." Id. at 2.
174 Id. at I (The report submitted by the Committee on Patents to accompany H.R.
12807, after quoting then-in-effect text of REVISED STATUTES (1874), supra note 167, § 4929,
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prepared and its passage requested by the Commissioner of Patents....""
Thus it appears that Congress in 1902 agreed with the Patent Office that
retaining the words "produces" and "production" to accompany the words
"invents" and "invention" was simply "unnecessary" and that "produces"
and "production" should be eliminated as surplusage. 6
Whether intended or not, the ostensibly minor textual changes of the
1874 and 1902 legislation had major consequences for design patentability.
Courts now had an arguably viable statutory basis for applying "invention"
as a qualitative standard for patenting a design. Congress's use of the
conjunctive "and" in the phrase "invented and produced" of the 1874
Revised Statutes, followed by the elimination of "and produced" and
consequent stand-alone use of the words "invented" and "invention" in
the 1902 amendment (and subsequent amendments), gave the courts a
convenient textual hook with which to conclude that patentable designs
had to exhibit the ephemeral, something-beyond-novelty criterion of
invention.
For example, in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.,"' the Supreme Court
in 1893 first imposed a qualitative "invention" requirement for design
patents."' The starting point for the Court's opinion was a quotation of the
1874 Revised Statutes, which by including the "invented and produced"
phrase appeared to make mandatory for design patentability a creative act
rising to the level of "invention.""17  The Court provided no attribution
for the source of the new invention requirement it imposed, leaving only
stated that "[tjhe bill proposes to amend said section of the Statutes by striking out unneces-
sary language of the statute and by omitting the word 'useful' as applied to design patents by
said section and substituting the word 'ornamental."').
175 Id. at 2.
176 Contemporaneous observers charged that the 1902 legislation "completely
redraft[ed]" § 4929, "entirely reword[ing] the provisions for the granting of design patents,"
and that Congress did so "without the approval of the profession and, indeed, while the Patent
Law Association at Washington was [still preparing] an expression of opinion on the subject."
Harold Binney, Present Status of the L.arw Relating to Designs, in REPORT OF THE TwENTY-FiFTH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION 662, 662 (1902). From reporting out of
committee, to passage by Congress, to Presidential signing, "the entire history of the [19021
bill cover[edl a period of only a little more than a month," and Congress engaged in "no
discussion of the bill whatever." Id. Binney's article does not mention that deletion of "and
produced," but rather focuses on Congress's substitution of the term "useful" with "ornamen-
tal." See id. at 664-65.
177 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
178 For a detailed discussion of the facts and holding of Whitman Saddle, see infra Part
III.
179 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 677.
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the statutory "invented and produced" phrase to reasonably support its
decision.s 0
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) later perpetuated
the Whitman Saddle analysis to conclude that a qualitative requirement for
"invention" had existed as a prerequisite for design patentability under
the 1874 Revised Statutes, as well as its later amendments.'"' Referring
to the 1874 text, the C.C.P.A. opined in In re Faustmann that "since the
word 'invented' and the word 'produced' were connected by the word
'and' and not the word 'or' the existence of invention was required then
as now."' Like the Supreme Court in Whitman Saddle, the C.C.P.A. in
Faustmann failed to mention that the 1842, 1861, and 1870 design patent
statutes did not mandate that designs meet a qualitative requirement for
invention. Rather, these earlier statutes simply used "invention" as an
alternative to "production" in referring to the types of activity in which
designers engaged.
18o See id. at 677-78. Although it did not cite the case, the Whitman Saddle Court also
plainly intended to invoke the "ordinary mechanic" metaphor of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the
1851 Supreme Court decision that gave birth to the qualitative requirement of "invention"
for utility patents. See id. at 680-81 (comparing design patentee's effort to an "exercise of the
ordinary skill of workmen of the trade"). The quoted phrase from Whitman Saddle echoes the
Hotchkiss Court's comparison of a doorknob manufacturer's effort with that of an "ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business." See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.)
248, 267 (185o). The Hotchkiss Court introduced an "invention" standard for patentability of
mechanical innovation by holding that
unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening
the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the
clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic ac-
quainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill
and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.
In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic,
not that of the inventor.
Id. The Whitman Saddle Court's use of the Hotchkiss "ordinary mechanic" metaphor un-
doubtedly stems from the assimilation of designs to mechanical inventions that pervades the
Whitman Saddle analysis. See infra Part III.A (discussing how the Whitman Saddle decision
treats designs as the product of mere mechanical construction).
18 See In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d 388,393 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (referring to REVISED STATUTES
(1874), supra note 167, § 4929, as applied by the Supreme Court in Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S.
at 677-78). The court stated:
It will be noticed that the statute then read "invented and produced,"
whereas the statute at bar does not contain the word "produced." But
since the word "invented" and the word "produced" were connected by the word
"and" and not the word "or" the existence of invention was required then as
now.
In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
182 Id.
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D. Renewed Legislative Efforts Paralleled Emerging Schools of Industrial Design
By means of the preceding legislative progression, Congress (wittingly
or not) raised the bar for design patent protection through statutory text
changes, leading to judicial imposition of an "invention" requirement.
American design innovation had not yet progressed so as to routinely satisfy
the invention standard, however. Even at the turn of the 20th century,
the United States lacked a robust domestic pool of aesthetic design talent.
The invention of the automobile most clearly evidenced the problem. A
1902 New York Times editorial opined that many of the motor vehicles then
on the market were "simply shocking in their grotesque ugliness, which
contributes nothing to their utility and has no excuse."" These "costly
vehicles" were "vastly uglier than the ordinary dump cart for dirt."'"
As dissatisfaction with the quality of product design grew, so did concerns
about the rigorous standard that Congress had set for its legal protection.
Some designers "felt that originality in design did not pay because it was
too difficult to get adequate protection for an innovative concept."" A
"general demand developed for better design patents or for regulations
that would give [better protection].""1 6  Manufacturers criticized the
inadequacy of U.S. patent law as a weapon against design piracy, advocating
the need for "a simple law of design patents or registration" that would give
broader protection at lower costs."s
By 1913, even the U.S. Patent Office admitted concerns about patents
as the primary form of legal protection available for designs. Edward B.
Moore, Commissioner of Patents at that time, advocated "an extension of
the law to protect, in an adequate manner, property in industrial designs." 88
183 Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1902, at 6.
184 Id. The Times editorial remarked further that "[i]n the dump cart we recognize a fit-
ness due to the relation of means to ends, which is eminently satisfactory; in the automobile
which looks like an unfinished traction engine prematurely escaped from the machine shop
no such relation is recognizable, for the good reason that it does not exist." Id.
185 PuLos, supra note i 1o, at 260.
i86 Id.
187 For Laws Against Design Piracy, Government Ready for Business Interests to Act, Says CR.
Chifford, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1913, at XI6 (reporting Clifford's speech to Federation of Trade
Press Associations of the United States, in which he called for cooperation and assistance in
the drafting of legislation to remedy design piracy).
188 Vivian Burnett, Letter to the Editor, Pirating of Designs, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1913
(describing then-recent meeting in Washington, D.C., of Burnett with Edward B. Moore,
Commissioner of Patents). Moore "gave [Burnett] permission to quote him as being sincerely
in favor of an extension of the law to protect, in an adequate manner, property in industrial
designs." Id. Commissioner Moore "also expressed himself as hopeful of getting something
definite done soon, provided those interested could unite and present a clean-cut and practi-
cal programme. On the mere mechanical point of handling the business he thought there
would be no obstacles." Id.
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Thus began "nearly a century of earnest but unsuccessful attempts to
implement industrial design legislation," separate and apart from the design
patent system.8 9 Design registration bills were introduced in the U.S.
Congress in 1916,19 in 1924,'9 in 1957,192 in 1969 (as part of the Copyright
Revision Bill),'91 in 1980,194 and most recently in 1990.195 During this "long
and winding road," the primary justification for the proposed legislation
shifted from simply that of a moral imperative against piracy to the need for
enhancing American competitiveness in the international marketplace.19
Nonetheless, while some of the bills came close to enactment, none ever
became law.197 Commentators identify "politically powerful opposition by
automobile spare parts manufacturers, their insurance company allies, and
discount retailers" as the primary impediment.'91
The repeated calls for a new form of legal protection for designs
reflected a fundamental shift in the process of design itself-a redefinition
of what good design meant. Ideas about how to give products a pleasing
appearance evolved dramatically in the early twentieth century. Formerly,
manufacturers hired artists to add ornamentation unrelated in any way to
Commissioner Moore's 1913 usage of the phrase "industrial design" is the "earliest
known public use of the term ... as a generic description referring to the distinguishing form
of products that have marketable value." PULOS, supra note i 1o, at 260. Pulos further explains
that "[iut appears that the term [industrial design] was used nonspecifically for many years
before it was preempted as a verbal banner for the new profession." Id.
189 Saidman & Esquerra, supra note 34, at 423.
19o Goldenberg, supra note 32, at 27-28 (discussing "Oldfield Bills" [introduced as H.R.
6458, 64th Cong. (1916) and H.R. 13618, 64th Cong. (1916)] drafted by Design Registration
League) (citations omitted).
191 Id. at 31-37 (discussing the various "Vestal Bills" [introduced during 1924-1930 as
H.R. 1035 1, 68th Cong. (1925), H.R. 6249, 68th Cong. (1926), H.R. 9358, 70th Cong. (1928),
H.R. 11852, 7ISt Cong. (1930), and H.R. 7243, 7Ist Cong. (1930)] providing for registration in
the Copyright Office rather than the Patent Office).
192 Id. at 44-46 (discussing "Willis Bill" introduced in 1957 as S. 2075, 85th Cong. (1957)
and its successor, the "O'Mahoney Bill," introduced in 1959 as S. 2852, 86th Cong. (1959)).
193 Id. at 48-50 (discussing "historic docking" of design and copyright protection through
merger of the former into the Copyright Revision bill, H.R. 2223, 94th Cong. (1975)).
194 Id. at 51-53 (describing hearings on H.R. 7270, 96th Cong. (1980), which would have
created a U.S. Design Office within the Department of Commerce).
195 Id. at 58-61 (discussing 1990 and 1992 hearings on H.R. 902, foist Cong. (1990),
H.R. 3017, foist Cong. (1990), and H.R. 3499, foist Cong. (1990)).
196 Id. at 5o-5i ("[Tihe justifications for design protection have changed as the United
States has risen or fallen in competitiveness. In recent years, the debate has shifted in re-
sponse to the increased competition faced by the United States from the other industrialized
countries. No longer was design protection merely a morality bill about preventing theft. As
of 1980, design protection was discussed as a matter of competitive survival in a cutthroat and
international marketplace.").
197 See, e.g., id. at 37 (describing the history of the Vestal bill, H.R. 11852, 71St Cong.
(1930), which passed the House but not the Senate, thereafter "dieling] in committee").
198 Saidman & Esquerra, supra note 34, at 424.
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the underlying product. The addition of decorative metal rosettes to the
frame of Howe's revolutionary sewing machine is one such example.19
In the 1920s and '30s, however, leaders of American design began to
emphasize the importance of simplicity in product design aesthetics.
According to industrial designer Raymond Loewy, "multiplicity being the
essence of confusion, the designer will endeavor to eliminate or combine
parts, supports, or excrescences whenever possible."
2 0 In Loewy's view,
good design came to involve a streamlining or "'reduction to essentials.'"
201
A product's external appearance became much more intimately related to
its internal function, giving rise to the well known expression "form follows
function."zoz
Automobiles and their role in American culture continued to serve
as a focal point for industrial designers. Overcoming early criticisms for
lack of aesthetic appeal, the development of the automobile catalyzed the
merger of form and function in industrial design and led a retreat from
pure ornamentation unrelated to product functionality. In launching his
historic mass-produced Model T, Henry Ford famously "wanted no truck
with stylists, and indeed was content to make occasional changes to the
Model-T in reluctant response to technological change, without direct
reference to the market, which seemed content to accept what he chose
to give it."z0 Competitors took a different view. General Motors' focus
on giving consumers a visually pleasing automobile was so successful that
its Chevrolet eventually outsold Ford." General Motors established
a "styling section" by 1927.205 Even Ford came to see the value-added
in product design and "introduced the more stylish Model A, launching
annual model changes and deliberate styling as a marketing tactic." 0
199 See Woodring Interview, supra note 37 (discussing sewing machine); see also LOEWY,
supra note 74, at I I, 12 (Observing that by the end of the nineteenth century, well-meaning
"artistic" persons took on the "task of embellishment," resulting in "locomotives festooned
with garlands of roses, steam rollers with pink angels, and coal stoves peppered with quails,
butterflies, and nosegays of forget-me-nots."). Loewy refers to this period as "the age of de-
calcomania." Id. at 12.
2oo LOEWY, supra note 74, at 211.
201 Id.
202 American architect Louis Sullivan wrote that "form ever follows function," a phrase
thereafter shortened to the familiar maxim "form follows function," meaning that the design
of a building or an object should reflect its purpose. Alice Rawsthorn, The Demise of 'Form
Follows Function,' N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2oo9), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o6/oi/arts/oiiht-
DESIGN i.html. Technological changes since Sullivan's time may have rendered the maxim
less meaningful, however. Digital technology now allows designers to "squeeze so many
functions into such tiny containers that ... the appearance of most digital products bears no
relation to what they do." Id. (citing the iPod Shuffle as an example).
203 LucIE-SMITH, supra note 2, at 69.
204 See PULOS, supra note i lo, at 324.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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Industrial design did not "come into its own" as a profession in the
United States until the 1920s,o7 and "the design profession did not achieve
full recognition until the [19]30s."20s Part of the delayed development
is attributable to a lack of industrial design education. United States
institutions began to offer programs in industrial design far later than those
in Europe. The Carnegie Institute of Technology (today the Carnegie
Mellon University) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, launched a program in
Industrial Design in 1934.2" Carnegie Tech "was the first U.S. educational
institution to install a full-time industrial design course, and the first
institution to offer a Bachelor's degree in industrial design."210 Although
the Carnegie Tech program thereafter lost key faculty and the early interest
of Westinghouse Corporation, industrial design programs thrived during
the late 1930s to mid-1960s at other schools including the Pratt Institute in
Brooklyn, New York, and the University of Cincinnati."'
While U.S. educational institutions were just beginning to offer
industrial design programs in the 1930s, designers such as Raymond Loewy
were helping manufacturers integrate the new industrial design concepts
in ways that consumers would accept. As Loewy explained:
Our desire is naturally to give the buying public the most advanced product
that research can develop and technology can produce. Unfortunately, it
has been proved time and time again that such a product does not always
sell well. There seems to be for each individual product (or service, or store,
or package, etc.) a critical area at which the consumer's desire for novelty
reaches what I might call the shock-zone. At that point the urge to buy
reaches a plateau, and sometimes evolves into a resistance to buying. It is a
sort of tug of war between attraction to the new and fear of the unfamiliar.
The adult public's taste is not necessarily ready to accept the logical
solutions to their requirements if this solution implies too vast a departure
from what they have been conditioned into accepting as the norm. In other
words, they will go only so far. Therefore, the smart industrial designer is
the one who has a lucid understanding of where the shock-zone lies in each
particular problem. At this point, a design has reached what I call the MAYA
(Most Advanced Yet Acceptable) stage."'
207 Goldenberg, supra note 32, at 54 (describing 1994 congressional testimony of Robert
Schwartz, Executive Director of the Industrial Designers Society ofAmerica (IDSA) and sum-
marizing history of industrial design profession).
208 LucIE-SMIr, supra note 2, at 236.
2o9 Jim Lesko, Industrial Design at Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1934-1967, ioJ. DESIGN
HISTORY 269, 273 (1997).
210 Id. at 27o. The first Bachelor of Arts degree in Industrial Design was awarded in
1936. Id. at 274.
211 See id. at 270, 284-85.
212 LOEwY, supra note 74, at 277-78.
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With a growing understanding of principles such as MAYA, manufacturers
began to recognize a distinct and important role for industrial designers.
"Once consumer motivation was firmly linked to a rapidly advancing
technology, industrial design acquired a new and extremely functional
role-it confronted what was already familiar to the consumer with what
science and engineering were making possible.""' "[Elventually the
industrial designer came to be seen as an essential part of the whole process
of manufacture, and also as someone quite different from the engineer
"214
E. Modern Congressional Inaction in the Face of the Design "Problem"
Industrial design and its value-added for the consumer marketplace
were well established in the United States by the mid-twentieth century.
Regrettably, Congress made no moves to promote the progress of this
expanding field either by improving the existing design patent law or
creating asuigeneris legal system. Rather, Congress seemed bent on equating
designs to mechanical and chemical inventions insofar as mandatory criteria
for patentability. When Congress overhauled the patent statutes in 1952, it
imposed the requirement of nonobviousness on design and utility patents
alike. The industrial design profession was not consulted. The struggle to
understand and apply the concept of nonobviousness to product designs
continues to this day. 215
The patent provisions of the Revised Statutes were reenacted in the
Patent Act of 1952.21 6 The 1952 reenactment altered some language but
was not intended to make substantive changes to the patent statutes. 217
The 1952 Act replaced design patent § 4929 to 4933 of the Revised Statutes
with the following sections of Title 35, U.S.C.:
§ 171. Patents for designs
Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply
to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.
213 LucIE-SMTrrH, supra note 2, at Ii i.
214 Id. at 69.
215 See infra Part III (describing judicial decisions).
2 i6 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
217 Federico, supra note 16I, at 202 ("Three sections relating to patents for designs have
been placed in a chapter on Designs, without making any substantive changes. Section 171 is
the basic section providing for the patenting of any'new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture,' it omits the detailed conditions set out in the corresponding section of
the old statute and incorporates by reference provisions relating to patents for inventions.").
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§ 172. Right of priority
The right of priority provided for by section 119 of this title and the
time specified in section 102(d) shall be six months in the case of designs.
§ 173. Term of design patent
Patents for designs may be granted for the term of three years and six
months, or for seven years, or for fourteen years, as the applicant, in his
application, elects.z"s
As of this writing in January 2010, the text of § 171 remains unchanged. 19
(Each of § 172 and § 173 has been amended.zz0 ) Despite the conceptual
misfit in applying nonobviousness to designs, courts today do not question
that the second sentence of § 171 imports the nonobviousness requirement
of § 103 into design patentability. 21
The drafters of the 1952 Act did not envision that design patenting
would continue indefinitely to require nonobviousness, however, at least as
218 35 U.S.C. H§ 171-73 (1952), as enacted by Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593,
66 Stat. 792, 805 (1952).
219 See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2oo6).
220 Section 172 was amended in 1994 to correspond with the expansion of § i i9, which
now encompasses both foreign and domestic priority. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(c)(2), io8 Stat. 4809, 4983-85 (1994) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 154 (2oo6)). Section 172 currently provides that
[tihe right of priority provided for by subsections (a) through (d) of
section i19 of this title [i.e., the right of foreign priority] and the time
specified in section 102(d) shall be six months in the case of designs.
The right of [domestic] priority provided for by section i19(e) of this
title shall not apply to designs.
35 U.S.C. § 172 (2oo6).
Section 173 was amended in 1982 to eliminate the design patentee's option of choosing
from three different terms of protection. See Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247,96 Stat.
317, 321. Section 173 currently provides that "[platents for designs shall be granted for the
term of fourteen years from the date of grant." 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2oo6). Thus, design patents
retain the computation of patent term expiration based on the grant date, which computa-
tion was also applied to utility and plant patents prior to the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (URAA). Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, lo8 Stat. 4809, 4984-85
(1994) (conforming United States law to the April 1994 Uruguay Round trade negotiations
agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on "Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property" (TRIPS)). In order to bring U.S. law into compliance with international
norms, as well as to address the problem of "submarine" patents, the URAA changed the law
such that for utility or plant patent applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the patent term
now expires twenty years after the patent application's earliest effective filing date. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (2oo6).
221 Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F-3d 1233, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Section 171 "require[s] application of the provisions of sections io2 (anticipation) and 103
(invalidity [sic: nonobviousness])."); Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F3d
1372, 138o (Fed. Cir. 2009) (The court cited 35 U.S.C. § 171 for the proposition that "[d]esign
patents are subject to the nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103.").
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that requirement was understood for utility inventions. They intentionally
set aside the "problem" of designs for later attention.222 The drafters "were
well aware of the fact that remedying the defects of design protection was
a highly specialized problem of considerable complexity . . . involving
problems quite unrelated to patents for inventions other than ornamental
designs.""2 After co-authoring the 1952 Act, NewYork patent attorney Giles
S. Rich assumed the chairmanship in 1954 of a Coordinating Committee
under the auspices of the National Council of Patent Law Associations
"for the specific purpose of tackling the design protection problem."224
With the assistance of Pasquale J. Federico of the Patent Office as well as
Copyright Office representatives, the Coordinating Committee produced
draft legislation, known as the Willis Bill, which would have implemented
a sui generis registration system for designs."' The bill was introduced in
Congress in 1957 and reintroduced in modified form in 1963.26 These
design protection bills, like their predecessors and successors, met political
opposition and were never enacted into law.
As an attorney and later judge of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Rich
testified repeatedly on behalf of sui generis design protection legislation
"adapted specifically to the protection of ornamental designs for useful
articles, the majority of which [could not] be protected satisfactorily, if at all,
222 The Industrial Innovation and Technology Act- Hearing on S. 791 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I ooth Cong. 8 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearings] (statement of Hon. Giles S. Rich, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Federal Circuit) ("[W]hen we wrote the 1952 Patent Act, protection of designs was known to
be a somewhat difficult problem. The Patent Act [of 1952] was primarily a codification, and
we deliberately laid aside the whole problem of design legislation to be taken up at a later
date....").
223 1987 Senate Hearings,supra note 222, at 17 (commenting on the then-pending design
bills H.R. 323, iooth Cong. (1987), H.R. 769, iooth Cong. (1987), and H.R. 5523, iooth Cong.
(1987)). Judge Rich explained that the drafters of the 1952 Act
had as a major objective the speedy enactment of a new patent code and
to further that objective the decision was made to make no attempt to
change the law of design patents. It was therefore retained substantially
without change as an integral part of our general law of patents, where
it is still to be found as three short sections (171, 172, and 173) plus one
special section (289) on damages. This decision to do nothing about
designs at that time was made with the intention to take up the design
problem as a special project at a later date.
Id.
224 Id. at 18.
225 Id. at 18-19 (describing the Coordinating Committee's development of the Willis
Bill, H.R. 8873, 85th Cong. (ist Sess. 1957), introduced in the House of Representatives on
July 23, 1957).
226 Id. at 19.
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under existing patent or copyright laws.""' In 1987, Judge Rich noted that
imposition of the nonobviousness requirement "tends to make the mill-
run of designers' work unpatentable."2 8 Rich told Congress that "those
familiar with the working of th[e] design patent laws have been acutely
conscious of their defects and inadequacies."229 In earlier testimony, Rich
challenged his congressional committee audience to "attempt in its own
mind to figure out how, as a court, it would go about determining that any
given completed ornamental design would be unobvious to a professional
designer of ordinary skill or competence as a designer or would involve
'invention."' 23 0 The determination, Rich observed, "is, and always has been,
anomalous and very difficult of administration and adjudication," rendering
design patent protection "illusory." 3' Rich's concerns and criticisms, like
all those voiced before and after him, fell on deaf ears in Congress.
As this Part has shown, the analytical and practical difficulties identified
by Rich and others took their root in almost-unnoticed, minor, and most
likely unintended changes to the text of the design patent statutes. Courts
relied on the resulting statutory language as the basis for imposing first the
"invention" requirement and thereafter the nonobviousness requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 103 as prerequisites to design patenting. As demonstrated
in the following Part, the courts have not imposed these difficult if not
"impossible" standards without justifiable hesitancy.
III. THE JUDICIARY'S ONGOING STRUGGLE WITH THE "IMPOSSIBLE ISSUE"
OF NONOBVIOUSNESS IN DESIGNS
This Part critiques judicial approaches to the invention/nonobviousness
requirement for design patents.' After addressing design patents in
Gorham and Whitman Saddle in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court has not provided any further guidance on the requirements for
227 Id. at i i.
228 Id. at 13. Judge Rich pointed to In re Nalbandian, 661 F2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981), as
"[a] fairly typical example of the design patent situation." 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note
222, at 13. The Nalbandian decision is discussed in detail, infra Part III. Judge Rich told
Congress that "the manufacturers of the articles involved in [Nalbandian and In re Spreter, 661
F2d I22o (C.C.P.A. 1981)] should have been afforded protection from copying of the designs
they paid someone to make by an appropriate law such as that here under consideration."
1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 222, at 13.
229 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 222, at 17.
230 Id. at 2 I.
231 Id.
232 The statutory nonobviousness requirement is analogous but not identical to its
judicially created predecessor, the invention requirement. Both require that a patentable
invention possess something more than novelty. However, Congress created the nonobvious-
ness requirement in an attempt to fashion a more objective measure of patentability than the
nebulous invention requirement. See supra Introduction and Part I.
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design patentability. These early Supreme Court decisions spawned a
confusing dichotomy of widely disparate and inconsistent approaches to
design protection. This Part concludes that the lower courts have never
succeeded at reconciling the Supreme Court's mixed messages. The
"impossible issue" of whether and how to apply the nonobviousness
requirement to designs remains unresolved. 2 3 Nevertheless, thoroughly
tracing the courts' difficulties is an important analytical first step that
reveals the bases for the recommendations we propose in Part IV.
Some courts have only reluctantly applied the invention/nonobviousness
requirement to designs, explaining that they view the requirement to be
difficult, if not impossible to apply, but they apply it nevertheless due to
their mandate from higher authority (i.e., Congress or the Supreme Court).
Their decisions demonstrate little understanding of the reality of the
design process and the unique value of designs. The lower court decisions
may be generally broken down into two types: the court either (1) forces
an analogy to mechanical (utility) patents and conflates the design with
the underlying article, or (2) distinguishes the design from the underlying
article and emphasizes the aesthetic appearance of the design. The former
approach improperly focuses on the manner of mechanical construction
of the designed article and results in nonsensical standards that punish
a design for the apparent simplicity of its construction, regardless of its
aesthetics. The latter approach is the correct one because it focuses on the
true value of a design: its ability to create a visual impression that makes a
product appear unique, distinct, or desirable to the consumer.M
The remainder of this Part traces the attempts of the Supreme Court and
the intermediate appellate courts to apply the invention/nonobviousness
requirement to designs. The regional circuits were the first appellate courts
to grapple with the problem. After assuming jurisdiction for Patent Office
appeals in 1929,23s the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)
encountered design patentability issues with much greater frequency.
Most of the current doctrine was developed during the C.C.P.A. era, which
lasted until 1982 when the C.C.P.A. was merged into the newly-created
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 236 The Federal
233 See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1219 (Rich, J., concurring) (urging enactment of
then-pending legislation, H.R. 20, 97th Cong. (st Sess. 1981)). Judge Rich described the
legislation as "tailored to the problems of designers, of their employers and clients in the
business world, and of the government agencies now concerned." Id. It would "get the
impossible issue of obviousness in design patentability cases off the backs of the courts and
the Patent and Trademark Office, giving some sense of certainty to the business world of what
designs can be protected and how." Id.
234 See supra Part I (explaining that designers intensely focus on how their designs will
be perceived by consumers, as the visual appearance causes consumers to immediately make
assumptions and judgments about the design and the underlying product).
235 See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-914, § 2,45 Stat. 1475, 1476.
236 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §162, 96 Stat. 25,
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Circuit assumed the C.C.P.A.'s patent jurisdiction, 37  but has refined
C.C.P.A. design patent doctrine in only minor respects. As of this writing in
January 2010, the Federal Circuit has yet to determine whether or how the
Supreme Court's decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,"' dealing
with the nonobviousness requirement for utility patents, impacts design
patentability.239
A. The Supreme Court' Mixed Messages in Gorham and Whitman Saddle
The Supreme Court first addressed design patents in the landmark case
of Gorham Co. v. White.240 In Gorham, the design patent in suit was directed
to a pattern for handles of silverware, and the Court took up the task of
setting forth the proper standard for determining infringement of a design
patent.241
Gorham's White's 242
Patented Handle Design Accused Handle Design
49.
237 See id. § 127, 96 Star. at 37-38.
238 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
239 In Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 E3 d 1372, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
the Federal Circuit was recently presented with, but declined to rule on the "new and un-
tested ground" of whether and how KSR should be applied to design patents. See discussion
of Titan Tire, infra this Part.
240 Gorham Co. v. White, 8 I U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871).
241 Id. at 524 (Setting forth the Court's purpose as follows: "The sole question is one of
fact. Has there been an infringement? Are the designs used by the defendant substantially
the same as that owned by the complainants? To answer these questions correctly, it is in-
dispensable to understand what constitutes identity of design, and what amounts to infringe-
ment?").
242 Christopher V. Carani, The New "Extra-Ordinary" Observer Test for Design Patent
Infringement-On a Crash Course with the Supreme Court's Precedent in Gorham v. White, 8 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354, 359 fig. 3 n.31 (2009).
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As a threshold matter, the Court noted that design patent law was
"plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts."2 43 Unlike
utility patents which provide functional advancements, design patents
offer an aesthetic benefit, and "[it is the appearance itself, therefore, no
matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not entirely, the
contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense." 244
The Court correctly pinpointed the most substantial benefit of obtaining
protection for one's design, namely that designs have the capacity to
"enhance [the] salable value [of a product]" or to "enlarge the demand for
it." 245
The Court quickly decided that "sameness of appearance" between
the claimed design and the accused design must be the test for design
patent infringement.2 46 The more difficult issue, however, was to whom
the appearances must be the same: an expert observer or an ordinary
observer.24 1 While the lower court had decided that the observer must have
expertise in dealing with designs of the type in the asserted patent,248 the
Court concluded that such a perspective would "destroy all the protection
which the act of Congress intended to give." 249 This is because "[tihere
never could be piracy of a patented design, for human ingenuity has never
yet produced a design, in all its details, exactly like another, so like, that
an expert could not distinguish them." 2s0 The Court ultimately held that
design patent infringement exists, i.e. two designs are substantially the
same, "if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives,. . . the resemblance is such as to deceive such an
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other."s2 1
243 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 524.
244 Id. at 525.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 526-27 ("Plainly, [the test for 'substantial identity' for designs] must be same-
ness of appearance, and mere difference of lines in the drawing or sketch, a greater or smaller
number of lines, or slight variances in configuration, if sufficient to change the effect upon the
eye, will not destroy the substantial identity.").
247 Id. at 527 ("lThe only remaining question upon this part of the case is, whether it is
essential that the appearance should be the same to the eye of an expert.").
248 Id. (The lower court held that "there could be no infringement unless there was
'substantial identity"in view of the observation of a person versed in designs in the particular
trade in question-of a person engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles containing such
designs-of a person accustomed to compare such designs one with another, and who sees and
examines the articles containing them side by side."').
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 528. The Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed this test as the "sole test for
determining whether a design patent has been infringed." Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc., 543 E3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (rejecting an additional "point of novelty"
component as part of the infringement test).
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Although the Court in Gorham did not directly address the invention
requirement for designs, it did make some observations that accurately
reflect industrial designers' focus on the ultimate appearance of the design,
as well as the importance of the impressions of the end users and purchasers
of the products."'2 The Court's decision to apply the infringement standard
from the perspective of an ordinary observer allows for an end user or
consumer to measure the relative value and importance of design features,
as is intended by designers. The Court also recognized that a design's
primary purpose is to make the underlying product more appealing to
consumers, and therefore the overall end appearance is the only truly
"useful" aspect of the design.
By focusing on the visual end result as opposed to the mechanical
construction of the designed product, Gorham correctly avoided any
insistence on "invention" for designs. The Court repeatedly referred
to designs as being "produced," as opposed to being invented, in accord
with the 1842 Act's "invented or produced" language discussed supra.s3
Indeed, the Court felt that the protection afforded to designs "must refer to
finished products of invention rather than to the process of finishing them,
or to the agencies by which they are developed." 25 4 It is for this reason
that the Court held that designs are protectable regardless of the manner
in which they are made because "the mode in which those appearances
are produced" has nothing to do with the ultimate aesthetic value of
the product."' The Gorham Court further observed that "[t]o speak of
the invention [of a design] as a combination or process, or to treat it as
such, is to overlook its peculiarities."256 Gorham confirms that any proper
discussion of the merits of any particular design should have nothing to
do with the mechanical construction or the manner of combining various
design features, but should look only to the visual impression created by
the design's end appearance.
252 Seesupra Part I (explaining that designers intensely focus on the effect that the visual
appearance of their designs has on consumers, and in turn noting that the aesthetics of a de-
sign can profoundly influence a consumer's reaction to or desire for the underlying product).
253 See supra Part II (detailing the 1842 Act); Gorham, 81 U.S. at 525 ("And the thing
invented or produced, for which a patent is given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive
appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives
form. ... It therefore proposes to secure for a limited time to the ingenious producer of those
appearances the advantages flowing from them. Manifestly the mode in which those appear-
ances are produced has very little, if anything, to do with giving increased salableness to the
article.... The appearance may be the result of peculiarity of configuration, or of ornament
alone, or of both conjointly, but, in whatever way produced, it is the new thing, or product,
which the patent law regards." (emphasis added)).
254 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 525.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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In Lenbeuter v. Holthaus,5 7 the Supreme Court again took up design
patents. The patented design in Lehnbeuter was directed to a display case,
and both validity and infringement were before the Court.ss Regarding
validity, the Court held:
The design patented by the complainants differs essentially from any
other which has been called to our attention. It is not covered by the other
patents which are set out in the record. Whether it is more graceful or
beautiful than older designs is not for us to decide. It is sufficient if it is
new and useful.2 9
Lehnbeuter makes no mention whatsoever of any invention requirement
for patentability. The Court was satisfied that the design was patentable
over the prior art to the extent that it was new or different from the prior
art. By the time that Lehnbeuter was decided, the design patent statute
afforded protection for designs that were "invented and produced."2 60 The
fact that the Court did not recognize a separate invention requirement
suggests that the 1874 statutory change from "invented or produced" was
indeed no more than a typographical error that was not intended positively
to require that designs be the product of invention.2 6 1 The Court's opinion
in Lehnbeuteris admittedly brief, with virtually no discussion of the complex
legal issues relating to design validity and infringement. Nevertheless,
Lehnbeuter provides valuable insight as to how the Supreme Court regarded
designs in the early days of the design patent system.
The next, and most recent, time the Supreme Court took up a design
patent case was in 1893 in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., which concerned
the patentability of a design for a saddle. 62 The patented saddle design
was characterized as a combination of the front half of one prior art saddle
and the rear half of another, with an additional change in the contour of the
pommel .26
257 Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U.S. 94 (1882).
258 Id. at 96. As for infringement, the Court found that the accused display case was "a
service copy of the [patented design], excepting a slight inclination backwards, hardly percep-
tible to the naked eye, of the glass constituting the front of the elevated portions of the case.
We think, therefore, that the infringement is clearly established." Id.
259 Id. The word "useful" was deleted from the design patent statute in 1902. See supra
Part II.
26o REVISED STATUTES (1874), supra note 167, § 4929 (emphasis added).
261 See supra Part II (discussing the legislative history of the design patent statute, and
noting that the codification of 1874, which changed the word "or" to "and," was apparently
intended not to make any substantive changes to the design patent law).
262 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
263 Id. at 68o. The prior art included a Granger saddle, "which had a cut-back pommel
and a low, broad cantle," and a Jenifer saddle, which "had a high, prominent pommel and a
high-backed cantle, or hind protuberance, in the shape of a duck's tail." Id.
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The Whitman Saddle2 6
The Court began its analysis by setting forth the statutory requirements for
design protection, namely that a person must have "invented and produced
[a] new and original design for a manufacture." 6 s The 1874 Act had
inexplicably changed the language "invented or produced" to "invented
and produced," thereby providing a textual basis for courts to interpret the
statute as mandating an invention requirement.2 *
Whitman Saddle favorably acknowledged the Gorham Court's prior
characterization of designs as having different purposes and involving
different creative processes than the subject matter of utility patents.
67
Whitman Saddle then quickly departed from Gorham, declaring that all of the
discussion regarding design patentability in Gorham was with regard to the
ornamentality requirement only, and that because the 1874 Act included
The [patented] saddle design described in the specification differs from
the Granger saddle in the substitution of the Jenifer cantle for the low,
broad cantle of the Granger tree. In other words, the front half of the
Granger and the rear half of the Jenifer, or Jenifer-McClellan, make up
the saddle in question, though it differs also from the Granger saddle in
that it has a nearly perpendicular drop of some inches at the rear of the
pommel, that is, distinctly more of a drop than the Granger saddle had.
Id.
264 U.S. Patent No. 1o,844 (filed Sept. 24, 1878), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/
netahtmllPTO/srchnum.htm (enter "Dio,844" in "Query" box, then click "Search"; then
follow "Images" hyperlink).
265 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added).
266 See supra Part II (noting that this change from "or" to "and" has indeed caused courts
to find that "invention" is a distinct requirement for patentability of designs).
267 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 678 ("'lTlhe acts of Congress authorizing the granting of
patents for designs contemplated 'not so much utility as appearance .... It is the appearance
itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not entirely, the
contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense.'" (quoting Gorham
Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511,524 (1871))).
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the word "useful" 6 (which was absent in the 1842 Act), utility was a proper
factor to be considered when evaluating the patentability of a design.2 9
(Congress legislatively overruled this reasoning in 1902, removing "useful"
from the design patent statute.270 ) The Whitman Saddle Court then noted
that the law applicable to utility patents did not materially differ from
that applicable to design patents, quoting the 1874 Act, which provided
that "'all the regulations and provisions which apply to the obtaining or
protection of patents for inventions or discoveries ... shall apply to patents
for designs."'"71
Having concluded that utility patents and design patents must be
treated alike, the Whitman Saddle Court unequivocally proclaimed the
requirement for "[tihe exercise of the inventive . . . faculty" for design
protection. 72 To help identify whether a design involves the requisite
level of invention, the Court set forth that "'[miere mechanical skill is
insufficient. There must be something akin to genius-an effort of the
brain as well as the hand. The adaptation of old devices of forms to new
purpose, however convenient, useful or beautiful they may be in their
new role, is not invention."'2 7 This test includes language that is far more
applicable to utility patents than designs, 74 and suggests that the aesthetic
design process involves essentially the same methodology and objectives
as the engineering of the underlying product. 75 The test ignores the fact
that the true "utility" of a design lies in the visual impression given by the
268 Id. at 677 (The 1874 Act afforded protection for "any new, useful and original shape
or configuration of any article of manufacture.").
269 Id. at 678 (The Court held that "now where a new and original shape or configuration
of an article of manufacture is claimed, its utility may be also an element for consideration."
(citing Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U.S. 94 (1882))).
270 See supra Part II.
271 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 679 (ellipsis in original); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2oo6) ("The
provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs,
except as otherwise provided.").
272 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 679.
273 Id. (quoting Northrup v. Adams, 18 F. Cas. 374, 374 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1877) (No.
10,328)). The Whitman Saddle Court elaborated on this test as follows:
The exercise of the inventive or originative faculty is required, and a
person cannot be permitted to select an existing form and simply put it
to a new use any more than he can be permitted to take a patent for the
mere double use of a machine. If, however, the selection and adaptation
of an existing form is more than the exercise of the imitative faculty
and the result is in effect a new creation, the design may be patentable.
Id.
274 In particular, the Court's references to "mechanical skill" and adapting "old devices"
to "new purposes" which may make products more "convenient" or "useful" have nothing to
do with aesthetics. Id. (quoting Northrup, 18 F. Cas. at 374).
275 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 679.
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design's appearance, not in the function of the underlying product.16 By
failing to appreciate this critical distinction, the test naturally causes one to
focus on the manner in which the design was made, as the Whitman Saddle
Court did.
Whitman Saddle ultimately held that the patented saddle design lacked
the requisite invention, reasoning that there existed "several hundred
styles of saddles or saddle-trees belonging to the prior art, and that it was
customary for saddlers to vary the shape and appearance of saddle-trees
in numerous ways according to the taste and fancy of the purchaser.""'
Further, the two prior art saddles that were combined to make the patented
saddle design were shown to have frequently included design feature
variations of the type found in the patented design.118 In the Court's
opinion, "[n]othing more was done in this instance (except as hereafter
noted) than to put the two halves of these saddles together in the exercise
of the ordinary skill of workmen of the trade, and in the way and manner
ordinarily done." 7 9
The Whitman Saddle Court's application of its test highlights how
the very concept of "invention" causes one to improperly focus on the
mechanical process of making the design, rather than the resulting
appearance of the design. The Court concluded that because the design
features existed independently in the prior art, and it was well within the
skill set of "workmen of the trade" to combine such features, the design
lacked invention. Whitman Saddle effectively denied protection to the
saddle design because of the mechanical simplicity and predictability of
the construction of the saddle, with no discussion whatsoever about the
visual impression given by the patented design.
Indeed, the Whitman Saddle Court seemed to find the overall appearance
of the saddle to be of little relevance, as the Court expressly rejected the
following view set forth by the district judge who originally decided the
case:
A mechanic may take the legs of one stove, and the cap of another, and the
door of another, and make a new design which has no element of invention;
but it does not follow that the result of the thought of a mechanic who
has fused together two diverse shapes, which were made upon different
principles, so that new lines and curves and a harmonious and novel whole
are produced, which possesses a new grace and which has a utility resultant
from the new shape, exhibits no invention.o
276 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871) (noting that the appearance
of a design can enhance the salable value of a product or can increase the demand for it).
277 Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 68 1.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 68o-8i (The district judge "held that this was effected by the patentee and
that the shape that he produced was, therefore, patentable. But we cannot concur in this
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The district judge's approach recognized that the combination of design
elements, even if it is simple to construct in a mechanical sense, can still
create "new lines and curves" to result in "a new grace.""' This approach
was in accord with Gorham's conclusion that any protection given for
a design "must refer to finished products . . . rather than to the process
of finishing them, or to the agencies by which they are developed.""'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Whitman Saddle reached the exactly
opposite conclusion, holding that a design may not be protected unless its
manner of construction involves "something akin to genius."
As a practical matter, it is important to consider the Whitman Saddle
opinion in its proper historical context. When the Supreme Court decided
Whitman Saddle in 1893, there was no such occupation as an "industrial
designer." As discussed in Part II, it was not until after the Industrial
Revolution and World War I that "designers" were recognized separately
from the ranks of engineers and mechanics and were given the task to
make mass-produced products visually appealing. The only people
designing saddles in 1893 were probably those actually making the saddles.
Modern industrial designers, however, can design the form of a product
even if they lack the capability to themselves make the underlying article.
Given the nineteenth century context of its decision, the Whitman Saddle
Court's conflating of the manufacture and design of the claimed saddle is
understandable. However, Whitman Saddle still commits a serious fallacym
by measuring the value of a design by the mechanical skill involved in
making it, instead of by the design's capability to make an impression on
an ordinary observer.
Gorham and Whitman Saddle, the two primary opinions of the Supreme
Court regarding design patents, offer widely disparate approaches to design
patentability. While Gorham emphasizes the value of the overall aesthetic
appearance of the design, Whitman Saddle focuses on the skill involved in
making the product to embody the design (an analysis more akin to that
of utility patentability). As the following subsections demonstrate, these
mixed messages have yet to be adequately reconciled even after more than
one hundred years of subsequent design patent jurisprudence.
view.").
281 Id.
282 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511,525 (1871).
283 Cf. WILLIAM D. SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 24 (1929). In a section titled
"Design Confused With its Production," the author states that the method of production of
a design gives rise to "[a] fruitful source of confusion." Id. "The novelty of a design is to be
tested, not by investigation of the means employed for its creation, but by ocular comparison
of the design itself with the prior designs, which are alleged to be substantially the same." Id.
(quoting Braddock Glass Co. v. Macbeth, 64 F. 118, 120 (3d Cir. 1894)).
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B. Fallout and Dissonance in the Regional Circuits and the C.C.PA.
In the wake of Gorham and Whitman Saddle, the federal courts handled
design patent cases with substantial dissonance and inconsistency.
1. District and Regional Circuit Cases.-Starting in the nineteenth century,
the federal district courts (originally called "circuit courts") and appellate
courts were the first to confront the difficulty of determining design
patentability. Although the federal appellate courts other than the Federal
Circuit (collectively referred to herein as the "regional circuits") have
not decided patent appeals since the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982,
their analysis remains relevant and worth considering today (though not
considered binding by the Federal Circuit).
The district and regional circuit court decisions were generally split as
to how rigorously to apply the invention requirement for designs .2 " One
commentator observed that
[n]o definitive decisions have been found in which an interpretation of
the words "invented or produced" is given. The decisions generally hold
that "invention" is required. Some recognize that a relatively low order of
originality is sufficient. Other decisions take the opposite view and hold
that as high degree of invention is required in design cases as in other
patents.z"s
For example, the court in Untermeyer v. Freund took a lenient approach to
the invention requirement, saying that
[ilf [a design] presents a different impression upon the eye from anything
which precedes it, if it proves to be pleasing, attractive, and popular, if it
creates a demand for the goods of its originator, even though it be simple,
and does not show a wide departure from other designs, its use will be
protected.28 6
Similarly, the court in Smith v. Stewart held that
[tihe invention in a majority of patented designs is very small, and of a low
order. All the statute, as commonly interpreted, requires is the production
of a new and pleasing design, which may add value to the object for which
it is intended. The invention consists in the conception and production of
this, however simple it may be.z'
284 See Hudson, supra note 148, at 387.
285 Id. (citations omitted).
286 Untermeyer v. Fruend, 37 F. 342,344 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889).
287 Smith v. Stewart, 55 F. 481, 483 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1893).
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The court in Smith recognized the incongruity of treating designs as
"inventions.""'8 In its view, "[ilt would seem absurd to say that the designs
covered by these patents, generally, exhibit the exercise of 'inventive
genius,' as the term is commonly applied to mechanical inventions....
Some of the rules applied to mechanical patents are wholly inapplicable to
those for designs."289
In contrast, the court in G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Products, Inc. applied
a much more stringent standard.2 * It read the invention requirement as
insisting that a design be more than simply "'new and pleasing enough to
catch the trade,"' but must "reflect 'some exceptional talent beyond the
skill of the ordinary designer,' or 'inventive genius."' 91 In view of this
heightened standard for invention, the court itself characterized obtaining
a valid design patent to be "'exceedingly difficult."'2 92
Several regional circuit cases candidly admitted the difficulty in
applying the concept of invention/nonobviousness to designs. For
example, in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Ninth
Circuit recognized that the Patent Act and Supreme Court precedent did
not seem to contain language applicable to designs in terms of obviousness,
but nevertheless felt bound to apply the obviousness requirement. 93 In
Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., the Third Circuit observed
that the forced analogy to mechanical patents for obviousness of designs
"renders the decision-making process far from simple," but this difficulty
must be addressed by "appropriate legislative reform rather than judicial
fiat."2 94 In Fields v. Schuyler, the D.C. Circuit took the position that design
cases present "interesting questions" which raise "the possible need for a
different gloss on the obviousness standard in the case of design patents,"
but nevertheless concluded that having judges apply the standard "as is"
would not stifle design creativity.'
288 Seeid.at 482.
289 Id.
290 G.B. Lewis Co.v. Gould Products, Inc. 436 F.2d i176, 1178 (2d Cir. 1971).
291 Id. (citations omitted).
292 Id. (citation omitted).
293 Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir.
1970) ("Graham involved a mechanical (or utility) patent and some of the language therein
does not fit design patent cases with precision. Nonetheless, the statutory criteria of non-
obviousness is specifically incorporated into design patent applications by the language of 35
U.S.C. § 171, and we are convinced that the approach of Graham is equally applicable where
the question is the obviousness of a design patent.") (citation omitted)). Schrwinn also adopted
the "ordinary intelligent man" standard for the obviousness inquiry perspective from In re
Laverne. Id. at 299 n.8. See discussion of Laverne, infra this Part.
294 Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (3d Cir. 1972).
295 Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304, 13o6 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court stated:
we are in no position to say that a judge's effort to determine what is
"obvious ... to a person skilled in the art" will stifle design creativity.
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2. C.C.PA. Cases.-As the only court having jurisdiction over direct
appeals from the Patent Office from 1929 onward,29 the design patent
jurisprudence of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) is
substantially more robust than that of the district and regional circuit courts.
Nevertheless, despite the expertise of the C.C.P.A. in patent matters
generally, many of its design patent decisions were not well reasoned in
light of the unique peculiarities of designs. Although the court in some
cases gave serious thought to the legal principles it applied and came down
with sensible rulings, in others the court blindly applied utility patent
principles to designs and fashioned rules that either suppressed design or
were simply incomprehensible. The following subsections discuss how
the C.C.P.A. handled difficult and fundamental issues of design patents
such as identifying the value added by a new design and deciding whether
and how designs can be rejected for lacking an elusive "something more
than novelty."
a. In re Schnel's Initial Take on "Applied" Design
An important early C.C.P.A. case addressing design patents was In
re SchneHI. 2 97 Although Schnell addressed more the scope of design patent
claims than the invention requirement, the decision provides helpful
insight into what a design really is. The applicant in Schnell had attempted
to claim an "ornamental design for an interior fitting of an automobile
body or similar article." 98 The specification and the drawings showed the
design only as applied to a handle, but mentioned that "it is also applicable
to other fittings of an automobile."" The Schnell court observed that
designs in a sense exist independently of the articles to which they are
applied, but that "the design must be shown not to be the mere invention
of a picture, irrespective of its manner of use."30 Instead, "the applicant
The judge's experience enables him to compensate for the tendency of
inventions to look obvious-with the 2o-2o vision of hindsight. And he
will know how to use the "average observer" as an indicator of patent-
ability, especially in an area of consumer goods design, where the patent
is not a reward for an advance in utility so much as for distinctiveness,
ornament and aesthetic satisfaction.
Id. at 13o6.
296 A form of indirect appeal of a Patent Office denial of a patent involves filing a civil ac-
tion to obtain a patent against the head of the Office. See35 U.S.C. § 145 (zoo6). A§ 145 action
is tried in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. Any appeal from the D.C.
district court's decision is taken to the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (2oo6).
297 In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
298 Id. at 204.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 209.
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should be required to show by an appropriate drawing the manner of its
application."3"' The court, in affirming a narrow construction of the claim
that limited the scope of the design to "an automobile door handle or
similar article," 0 explained that
it is the application of the design to an article of manufacture that Congress
wishes to promote, and an applicant has not reduced his invention to
practice and has been of little help to the art if he does not teach the manner
of applying his design. Furthermore, we know of no statutory or other
reason why he may not be permitted to submit drawings of more than one
article if his design applies to more than one article and if it seems necessary
and essential to use more than one drawing in order that he may teach the
manner of applying the same to different articles."
The Sc/nell court recognized that the conception of an abstract design
idea constitutes only part of what the design patent system rewards.
Because an abstract design concept cannot exist independently of an article
to which it is applied, the application of the design to the underlying article
is an inextricable part of the value that designers provide. "Designing"
products necessarily involves working within the particular degree of
freedom for each product, because not every old design feature can work
with and look good in a new product."* A designer must not only design in
a way that does not detract from the functionality or the user experience,
but also must be sure to design in a way that consumers can aesthetically
accept and feel comfortable with.30 s
If a design patent applicant does not sufficiently show how the design
may be applied to articles other than those particularly shown in the
drawings, it cannot be said that such non-disclosed articles are fairly part
of the claimed design. It follows that unless a designer has sufficiently
applied his or her abstract design concept to a particular article, such
unapplied designs effectively do not yet exist.3 6 Accordingly, unapplied
301 Id.
302 Id. at 211 (quotation marks omitted).
303 Id. at 2o9 (emphasis added). Modern cases support some flexibility in the scope of
the design patent being greater than the particularly disclosed embodiment(s) in the patent.
See, e.g., Avia Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 E2d 1557, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that a patented design for an adult's shoe could be infringed by a children's shoe); seealso
8 CHIsOM ON PATENTS, supra note 19, § 23.0412], at 23-147-48.
304 See supra Part I (discussing how designs are limited by the degree of freedom of a
product, which limitations include the functional aspects of the underlying products as well as
the consumer tolerances for accepting new designs).
305 See supra Part I.
306 This notion stems from the patent law principle that one has not successfully created
his or her claimed subject matter to practice until he or she has actually made the product or
has provided a detailed description of the product. See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 E3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cit. 1998).
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designs or design features cannot serve as prior art that would defeat a later
patent directed to the design concept as applied to the particular article.
Schnell stands for the proposition that protection should be available for
a designer who is able to adapt old design features on one product onto a
different product having a different degree of freedom. The patent system
must "give encouragement to the decorative arts"30 by allowing designers
to obtain protection for such commonplace adaptive work product. 08
307 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (The design patent laws were
"plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts.").
308 For example, as discussed supra Part I, Apple's Jonathan Ive adapted the basic design
concepts of Braun's Dieter Rams into new technology such as the iMac and iPod. Ive's work
for Apple has been lauded by designers and consumers alike for creating a distinct visual
appeal. Such a concededly imitative approach to design is not only common among designers,
but is also highly creative and can yield remarkable new aesthetic effects.
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b. The Apology of In re Faustmann for the Invention Requirement
In re Faustmann was one of the early cases at the C.C.P.A. to extensively
analyze the invention requirement for designs.3 * The design at issue was
for a keyboard configuration on a typewriter.310
APPMEA1T'S DESIG
PAIRWEATHER
.95 AI
311
309 In re Faustmann, 155 E2d 388 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
3 10 Id. at 390.
311 Id. at 390.
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The claimed design had keys that were flat at the front and rounded
across the back, and a prior art patent to Lentz had keys that were rounded
at the front and flat across the back."' A patent to Fairweather disclosed
another key design with a convex rounded front and a concavely rounded
back."' The claimed design also included a space bar with beveled
corners-a feature found in a prior art patent to Bills.31 4
The Patent Office rejected the applicant's design as lacking invention,
and the applicant argued on appeal that it was improper for his design to be
rejected in this manner because it was undisputedly new and ornamental.'
The applicant felt that his design should be patentable because he created
it not by "follow[ing] the teaching[s] of any of the references," but by
"conceiv[ing] a design which the ordinary skilled worker in the art would
not have been able to produce by merely drawing upon the teachings of
the reference."" 6 The claimed design was indeed a new combination and
adaptation of the prior art, albeit with relatively minor design changes
made.
The C.C.P.A. conceded that the fundamental differences between
designs and mechanical inventions are such that "[t]o lay down any hard
and fast rules as to when invention exists in a design patent application
would be a difficult, if not impossible, task."" Nevertheless, the court
concluded that it was bound to follow the "mandate of the statute" that a
design must have been "invented." 18 The court discussed the Gorham case,
noting that even though Gorham was directed to the issue of infringement,
its comments regarding the role and value of designs expressed "certain
basic principles ... which seem pertinent here." 19 Inexplicably, the court
applied none of these principles from Gorham, but rather cited Whitman
Saddle as controlling precedent, requiring the application of its standard for
invention in designs.z 0 Ultimately, the design in Faustmann was deemed
312 Id. at 389.
313 Id. at 391.
314 Id. at 389.
315 Id. at 391.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 392.
319 Id. at 392-93.
320 Id. at 393-94. The Faustmann court cites another reason for its being bound to apply
the invention requirement:
It will be noticed that the statute [when Whitman Saddle was decided]
read "invented and produced," whereas the statute at bar does not con-
tain the word "produced." But since the word "invented" and the word
"produced" were connected by the word "and" and not the word "or"
the existence of invention was required then as now.
Id. at 393. This explanation bolsters our previous observation that the apparently inadvertent
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to be invalid for lacking invention, and the court's reasoning echoes that
in Whitman Saddle: "we can see nothing in what appellant has done that is
beyond the ability of the ordinary skilled mechanic or designer of typewriters.
We agree with the Patent Office that, in view of the prior art, the inventive
faculty was not exercised in producing appellant's keyboard.""' As in
Whitman Saddle, the Faustmann court erroneously speaks of invention
for designs in terms of mechanical construction, thereby focusing on the
difficulty of making the design instead of the appearance of the resulting
design.
Faustmann is one of several cases conceding that the concept of
invention is not readily applicable to designs, but applying the invention
requirement anyway, albeit with a tone of reluctance or apology. The
reluctance is typically due to the court's obligation to follow higher
authority, such as Congress or the Supreme Court. It is likely also due
to a philosophical reluctance to apply rules that cannot be implemented
by an objective standard. Faustmann's ultimate holding that the claimed
design lacked the requisite invention is wholly conclusory'll because
of the inescapable subjectivity of the invention requirement. Indeed,
several cases in the C.C.PA. after Faustmann openly declared that while
design protection requires the exercise of inventive faculty, the invention
requirement "defies definition and resides as a subjective standard in the
mind of the judge considered as an 'average observer."'323
c. In re Jennings and In re Glavas on Whether and How to Combine
References Cited Against Designs
In evaluating the patentability of a utility (mechanical) invention, the
longstanding approach of the courts and the USPTO is to compare the
claimed invention with the disclosures in multiple prior art references and
determine whether it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of
the prior art disclosures to arrive at the claimed invention. After Faustmann,
the C.C.P.A. began to apply an analogous approach to determine when a
combination of prior design elements constitutes invention. The court's
efforts to objectively measure the aesthetic worth of designs by applying
the same analytical technique fashioned for mechanical inventions
shift in statutory language from "invented or produced" to "invented and produced" may
have improperly influenced courts to construe invention as being an absolute prerequisite to
design protection. See supra Part II.
32i In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
322 See id. at 392 ("Applying that principle in the case at bar, we, like the tribunals below,
while cognizant of appellant's new consolidation, involving, for the most part, what seems to
be minor features relating to typewriter keyboards, do not think that he has produced any new
and ornamental design of a keyboard, or a typewriter, which rises to the level of invention.").
323 In re Johnson, 175 F2d 791, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1949) (citations omitted); see also In re
Jabour, 182 F.2d 213, 215 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (citing In reJohnson, 175 F.2d at 792).
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ultimately backfired. Its decisions suffered from the inherently inescapable
subjectivity involved in applying an "invention" requirement to designs.
The C.C.P.A. seemed to start in the right direction, at least. In re Park
followed Gorham's focus on the visual impression created by the design
when it held that "each element in a patented design [being] old does
not of itself negative invention, for patentability may reside in the manner
in which the elements are combined. The design as a whole, and the
impression it makes on the eye, must be considered."1 4
In re Jennings further elaborated on this concept."s Jennings' design
application had been rejected over five prior art patents,"' each of which
disclosed separate design features which could allegedly be combined to
produce the claimed design."' The court held that
[iun considering patentability of a proposed design the appearance of the design
must be viewed as a whole, as shown by the drawing, or drawings, and compared
with something in existence-not with something that might be brought into existence
by selecting individual features from prior art and combining them, particularly
where combining them would require modification of every individual
feature, as would be required here."'
The Jennings requirement that a design be compared with "something in
existence" correctly precludes the kind of combination of references that
tends to focus the obviousness inquiry toward individual design features.
Like Schnell, Jennings would not permit a design to be deemed lacking
invention unless the prior art in some way applied the claimed design
features to the same underlying article. The Jennings approach helpfully
moved the analysis toward a more objective standard that focuses on the
appearance of the claimed design as a whole, rather than a subjective
324 In re Park, 181 E2d 255, 256 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (citing Grelle v. City of Eugene, 221 F.
68 (9th Cir. 1915)).
325 In re Jennings, 182 F2d 207 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
326 The patents cited against the claimed design were all utility patents. Id. at 208. The
court observed:
It is obvious that the appearance of a utilitarian, or mechanical,
device properly may be cited as a reference in considering an application
for a design, although a design patent, which must be based solely upon
appearance, would not seem to be a proper reference in considering an
application for a mechanical patent.
Id.
327 Id. ("[I]t seems to have been held that by selecting features taken from five different
patents, that is, one feature from one patent, another from another, etc., a device might be
considered which would so closely resemble the drawings of appellant that his design would
not be patentable over such possible construction.").
328 Id. (emphasis added).
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standard that can be applied to deny protection where the mechanical
combination of design elements is perceived to have been "obvious."
The C.C.P.A. then took a wrong turn in In re Glavas, departing from the
Jennings approach by encouraging the combination of prior art references to
be cited against designs in certain circumstances.2 9 In Glavas, the claimed
design was for a swimming float, 330 and several prior art patents (both
utility and design) were cited against it in combination."' The claimed
float design was "a six-sided body of generally rectangular form, having
parallel side and end members and upper and lower surfaces which are
concave in the direction of the greatest length of the float body."" The
patent examiner had rejected the claimed design over the combination
of one prior art patent showing a conventional rectangular float, a second
patent showing a pillow having a single concave side, and a third patent
showing a pillow having opposing concave portions. 3 The Board of Patent
Appeals affirmed, and further relied on additional references showing
oppositely concaved surfaces, these additional references being directed to
very different objects such as bottles, soap, and razor blade sharpeners. 3 4
A central issue on appeal was whether any of these secondary non-float
references could be properly relied upon for the rejection, given that they
were clearly not from analogous arts, in the mechanical sense.335
The Glavas court noted that in the case of design anticipation by a single
prior art reference, analogousness of the reference is irrelevant as long as it
has the same appearance as the claimed design.3 6 When a "combination of
references" is alleged to invalidate a claimed design, however, "a different
situation is presented."3
A design, from the standpoint of patentability, has no utility other than
its ornamental appearance, and the problem of combining references is
therefore one of combining appearances rather than uses. The principle of
329 In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
330 A swimming float is akin to a life preserver, and is generally a buoyant device adapted
to be secured to a swimmer's chest with straps around the swimmer's body. Id. at 448.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 449.
334 Id. at 449, 451.
335 Id. at 449. Analogous arts in the mechanical sense would be those in the same "field
of ... endeavor," or "reasonably pertinent" to the problem faced by the inventor. See In re
Antle, 444 E2d Ir68, 1171-72 (C.C.P.A. 1971). In Glavas, razor blade sharpeners are clearly
very far removed from the floats in terms of functionality and mechanical operation.
336 In re Glavas, 230 F2d at 450 ("It is true that the use to which an article is to be put
has no bearing on its patentability as a design and that if the prior art discloses any article of
substantially the same appearance as that of an applicant, it is immaterial what the use of such
article is. Accordingly, so far as anticipation by a single prior art disclosure is concerned, there
can be no question as to nonanalogous art in design cases." (citations omitted)).
337 Id.
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nonanalogous arts, therefore, cannot be applied to design cases in exactly
the same manner as to mechanical cases. The question in design cases is
not whether the references sought to be combined are in analogous arts
in the mechanical sense, but whether they are so related that the appearance of
certain ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features
to the other.338
Ultimately, the Glavas court concluded that although the prior art directed
to bottles, soap, and razor blade sharpeners all included opposite concave
portions, "the articles and their shapes are of such a nature that they would
not, in our opinion, suggest the modification" to the traditional rectangular
float.339 Regarding the cited references directed to pillows, the court found
it was "plausible" that a float maker might look to pillows as "related" art,'o
but in any event concluded that nothing "in ... the former patents ... would
suggest modifying [a rectangular float] in such a manner as to produce
[the claimed] design."3' The court held that the prior art pillow having
one broad concave surface would not suggest the inclusion of opposite
concave surfaces because "the opposite face of the pillow is necessarily flat
so that it may rest firmly against a flat vertical wall."Mi Therefore, "while
its component features may be individually old in the prior art, that art
does not suggest combining them as the appellant has done, and the design
claimed here, therefore, involves patentable novelty."M 3
The Glavas test requiring that references be "so related" to "suggest"
the combination of design features is vague and nonsensical-the result
of a forced analogy to utility patents. What does "related" mean if not in
a mechanical and utilitarian sense? Designers do not limit themselves to
"related" designs when they look for inspiration-every prior art design
is potentially related to what a designer might be seeking to do. 3  Even
if the designs are defined as being "related" by virtue of having similar
appearances, what does it mean for those designs to "suggest" that certain
features be combined with other designs, if not a suggestion in terms of
338 Id. (emphasis added).
339 Id. at 451.
340 Id. The examiner at the Patent Office had taken the position that "pillows are some-
times adapted to serve as floats." Id.
341 Id.
342 Id. It should be noted that with regard to the other cited pillow patent, the concave
portions were on its narrow surfaces and so created a substantially different visual impression,
which the Court held "would not suggest the broad concave upper and lower surfaces of ap-
pellant's float." Id.
343 Id.
344 See supra Part I (explaining that designers consult a wide variety of sources for in-
spiration and design ideas, without any particular regard for the types of objects in which the
prior art designs are embodied). In many instances designers are simply looking for "certain
curves" they can use for their designs, which curves could be found in any type of product.
See supra Part I.
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the functionality of the underlying articles? Indeed, designers themselves
have no concept of what such an aesthetic "suggestion" might be.M
The Glavas court's application of the "so related as to suggest" test
highlights the test's necessary reliance on mechanical and functional
arguments to justify a combination in a way that simply does not reflect
the reality of the design process. Indeed, the court found that the pillow
prior art that included a flat side for a functional purpose (i.e., resting flat
against a wall) effectively taught against the appearance of having opposite
concave sides."6 The Glavas court engaged in no reasoned analysis as to
why the references were not sufficiently related or suggestive with regard
to appearance, but reached its decision in a wholly conclusory and subjective
manner.37 As in Faustmann, this conclusory subjectivity was the result of a
forced attempt to measure the value of aesthetic creativity in designs by a
yardstick fashioned for mechanical (i.e., utility) inventions.
i. In re Rosen Sets the Modern Standard
The final word from the C.C.P.A. on the issue of whether and how
references are to be combined against claimed designs was In re Rosen,
which set the modern analytical framework for design nonobviousness.M
The design in Rosen was directed to a contemporary style coffee tablem9
FIG. 1
The Claimed Rosen Coffee Table
345 See supra Part I (noting that the concept of a prior design "suggesting" an aesthetic
modification or combination of design features is nonsensical to designers, as aesthetic design
does not seek to solve well defined technical problems).
346 In re Glavas, 23o F2d at 451 ("[T]he opposite face of the pillow is necessarily flat so
that it may rest firmly against a flat vertical wall." There is "nothing ... which would suggest"
a design having opposite concave portions.).
347 See, e.g., id. ("[Tihe articles and their shapes are of such a nature that they would not,
in our opinion, suggest the modification."); id. ("This would not suggest the broad concave
upper and lower surfaces of appellant's float .... ").
348 In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
349 Id. at 389 &fig.i.
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The primary reference cited against this design was a desk having a semi-
circular top and v-shaped legs.3 so
Rosen Desk Reference
A secondary reference to Klein was cited for its teachings of three v-shaped
legs having a slot into which a flat top portion could be inserted and
situated."'
Rosen Klein Reference
Another secondary reference to Hysten was cited for its teachings of a table
having a circular top that could be inserted into slots as in Klein."'
35o Id. & n.2.
351 Id. & n.3.
352 Id. & n.4.
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HYSTEN lki !
Rosen Hysten Table
Finally, another secondary reference to Mudde was cited for its teachings
of three equally spaced apart legs on a table.s 3
MUDDE
Rosen Mudde Table
In view of this prior art, the examiner took the position that it would have
been obvious to "join the Rosen [desk] legs to the circular top of Hysten
by use of a slot as taught by (Klein)."M The Board affirmed, holding that
"one of ordinary skill in the art would assess the teachings of the applied
references and readily observe that three equally spaced slotted V-shaped
legs may be used to support a table top or shelf which is inserted in the
slots of the legs."s35
On appeal, the design applicant argued that none of the cited references
had "the same overall appearance as [the claimed] table" and that the
Board "wrongly emphasized construction (means of 'support') rather
than appearance or design."5 6 The court concluded that all of the cited
353 Id. at 389 & n.5-.
354 Id. at 390 (quotation marks omitted).
355 Id.
356 Id.
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references would be within the scope of knowledge of an ordinary designer
of contemporary furniture."' The court then merged the Glavas rule that
the references be "so related" as to "suggest" a combination with the
Jennings rule that patentability of a design must be based on a comparison
with "something in existence," to arrive at the following rule of law:
Thus there must be a reference, a something in existence, the design
characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design in
order to support a holding of obviousness. Such a reference is necessary
whether the holding is based on the basic reference alone or on the basic
reference in view of modifications suggested by secondary references.35 8
Ultimately, the Rosen court held that the primary desk reference was
"significantly different in concept" from the claimed coffee table design
and gave a substantially different "visual impression."a3 9 Because the desk
reference was not basically the same as the claimed design, the court did
not reach the question of whether the modifications were suggested by the
prior artM
Rosen's analysis was a positive step forward because it placed the
exclusive focus of the obviousness inquiry (at least the primary reference
part of the inquiry) on the aesthetics of the designs, adopting the central
357 Id. ("Under the 'ordinary designer' standard, in contrast to the 'ordinary intelligent
man' standard previously used in this court, the test for obviousness may well bring more art
into consideration since we must look to the knowledge of the 'ordinary designer' rather than
that of the 'ordinary intelligent man.' Thus, here, designs of contemporary furniture other
than coffee tables would reasonably fall within the scope of the knowledge of the designer of
ordinary skill, such as the Rosen desk and the Hysten table. The fact that tables may have
three equally-spaced legs (the only contribution of Mudde) would also clearly lie within the
designer's realm of knowledge. Only the Klein display stand design raises a question as to the
propriety of attributing knowledge thereof to a designer of contemporary furniture." (internal
citations omitted)).
358 Id. at 391.
359 Id. ("Nor does the Rosen desk design meet the test of a basic design reference in
which features might reasonably be interchanged with or added from those in other pertinent
references to achieve appellant's design. We have no doubt a designer would characterize
Rosen's and appellant's designs as both being of contemporary styling, but we also believe
that a designer of ordinary skill would find them significantly different in concept. Rosen
does not give the same visual impression of lightness and suspension in space conveyed by
appellant's table. On the contrary, Rosen embodies a concept of confinement of space, result-
ing in a different overall appearance and aesthetic appeal." (citation omitted)). The court also
held that the desk would not, on its own, render the claimed coffee table design obvious. Id.
("If the Rosen desk design is modified only to the extent that it becomes a table, it does not
thereby have the design characteristics of appellant's table. The table top would be notched,
and the surface surrounded by a substantial apron which is integral with the legs. Appellant's
table cannot be rejected as no more than an adaptation of the desk design to table form. Thus,
the reference clearly cannot stand alone." (internal citation omitted)).
36o Id.
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principles of Gorham361 (even though purporting to rely primarily on
cases such as Jennings and Glavas). Rosen's emphasis on the overall visual
appearance of a design is in accord with how designers actually assess
whether a design has successfully added something of value to a product.3 62
After Rosen, it seemed clear that any focus on mechanical construction
for design patentability was error.363 Yet Rosen did not go far enough. It is
unfortunate that the Rosen decision was limited to whether the primary
reference (henceforth referred to as a "Rosen reference") was proper.
Although Rosen properly focused exclusively on design aesthetics, it failed
to take the next step and provide much-needed clarification as to when, if
ever, the very appearances of multiple designs "suggest" the combination
or modification of design features.
d. In re Laverne versus In re Nalbandian: Shifting Perspectives
for the Design Nonobviousness Analysis
While the C.C.P.A. struggled to clarify whether and how to apply a
modification or combination of design elements, it also debated a more
fundamental issue: even if it is legally proper to modify or combine the
references, who is to say whether the modification or combination would
have been obvious? That is, what is the proper perspective for analyzing
whether a claimed design would have been obvious? Fifteen years after
answering the question in In reLaverne, the C.C.P.A. dramatically changed
its position. In a move that erroneously assimilated design patent standards
to those of utility patents, the court's flip-flop in In re Nalbandian seriously
undermined the policy objective of promoting progress in the decorative
arts.
In its 1966 decision, In re Laverne,M the court acknowledged that
Congress at some level recognized the differences between "patents for
inventions" and "patents for designs." 6  Nevertheless, the obviousness
361 Compare id. ("Rosen does not give the same visual impression of lightness and sus-
pension in space conveyed by appellant's table. On the contrary, Rosen embodies a concept
of confinement of space, resulting in a different overall appearance and aesthetic appeal."
(citation omitted)), with Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871) ("It is the
appearance itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not
entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense.").
362 See supra Part I (noting that a paramount concern in design is the effect that a de-
sign's overall aesthetic appearance makes on the consumer).
363 In re Rosen, 673 F.2d at 390 (The court reversed the asserted error of the Patent
Office and Board because those bodies "wrongly emphasized construction (means of 'sup-
port') rather than appearance or design in sustaining the rejection.").
364 In re Laverne, 356 E2d 1003 (C.C.PA. 1966).
365 Id. at 1005 ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply
to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 (2oo6))).
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provisions of § 103, which were drafted with language directed to utility
inventions (e.g., referring to the "ordinary skill in the art"),3" had been
deemed to apply to designs. 67 Accordingly, it was "somewhat difficult to
apply to the problem of the patentability of designs."16 In Laverne, the
claimed design was directed to a molded chair, which begged the following
fundamental questions:
What is "the art to which the subject matter pertains" in this case? Is it
the molded chair "art" or is it the ornamental design "art"? In what field is
the "inventor" of the design operating? Since those who create designs are
designers, not chair makers, it would seem to follow that he is operating in
the field of industrial design and that it is the "art" involved. 69
Thus, the C.C.P.A. in Laverne refused to cabin the pertinent art to the
design of a particular article. Rather, the "art" involved was industrial
design, generally. This approach properly reflects the reality that designers
generally look to designs for all types of articles for inspiration, and that
approximately half of all industrial designers are consulting designers who
develop designs for many different types of products.370
Next, the Laverne court asked, "who is a'person having ordinary skill in'
this art?"' In the case of utility patents, one can distinguish between an
"ordinary mechanic" who is a "craftsman or routineer," and an "inventor"
or "innovator [of] unobvious innovations," even though both are workers in
the same "art."' For designs, it is more difficult to draw this distinction.
Because designing is done by designers,
if we equate [the class of competent designers] with the class of mechanics
... are we not ruling out, as a practical matter, all patent protection for
ornamental designs for articles of manufacture?3 3 Yet the clear purpose of
366 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2oo6). The statute describes the obviousness inquiry as whether
"the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." Id
The § 103 hypothetical person having "ordinary skill in the art" is the historic successor to the
"ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business" of Hotchkissv. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ii How.)
248, 267 (185 1). Hotchkiss is the first case in which the Court applied a qualitative requirement
of "invention" for the patentability of utility inventions. See supra Part II.
367 35 U.S.C. § 171; In reLaverne, 356 F2d at ioo5.
368 In re Laverne, 356 F.zd at ioo5.
369 Id. at 1005-o6 (citation omitted).
370 See supra Part il.
371 In rr Laverne, 356 F.2d at ioo6.
372 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
373 Id. In other words, if designers are deemed to be equivalent to the ordinary mechan-
ics in the utility invention context, then there is no one in the design realm who would be
equivalent to the inventors and innovators of the mechanical realm. As such, the work prod-
uct of all designers would be deemed obvious for being "no more than a 'competent designer'
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the design patent law is to promote progress in the "art" of industrial design
and who is going to produce that progress if it is not the class of "competent
designers" ?314
Thus, an "ordinary designer" approach would effectively "deny[] patents
to everything competent designers produce by the skill of their calling.""'
Accordingly, the Laverne court concluded that obviousness should be
determined not from the perspective of a designer, but rather an ordinary
observer.
[W]hat we have to do is to determine obviousness to the ordinary intelligent
man. The test is inherently a visual test, for the design is nothing more than
appearance, and the appearance is that of the article as a whole. No special
skill is required to determine what things look like, though individuals
react differently. It is bound to be an individual reaction.3 16
Under this test, Laverne's claimed design would not have been obvious.
Numerous small differences between the claimed design and the prior
art reference resulted in a "cumulative effect" that "create[d] a different
appearance.""'
might produce." Id.
374 Id. The court further elaborated:
We feel that the test of patentability of an admittedly new design
cannot be whether it is no more than a "competent designer" might
produce. That would be parallel to saying of a mechanical invention
that it is no more than a "competent inventor" might produce. The test
must be obviousness, for that is the dictate of section 103, but it must be
applied in a way which will implement the legislative intent to promote
progress in the field of industrial design by means of the patent incen-
tive. This will not be done by denying patents to everything competent
designers produce by the skill of their calling.
Id.
375 Id.
376 Id. (internal citation omitted).
377 Id. at loo6-07.
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APPELLANTS
II
-
REFERENCE
378
The court viewed these two designs for molded chairs as two distinct
designs, which were more than mere variations of the same design.37 9
One might feel that the two chairs were part of the same style trend, just
as competing automobiles or refrigerators or radios seem to follow similar
patterns from year to year, but they are, in our opinion, distinctly different
designs within that style trend. The design which initiates a new style does
not automatically close the field to all other designs within the same style
pattern.?
Laverne therefore stands for the proposition that even where the visual
impressions given by two designs are similar, they should each be
protectable (i.e., patentable) in their own right to the extent that there are
378 Id. at oo4.
379 Id. at 1007-o8.
38o Id.
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differences noticeable to an ordinary observer. This principle facilitates
competition in designing and provides incentives for more designers
to produce new and better designs. Further, viewing the obviousness
inquiry from the perspective of an ordinary observer accurately captures
how designers themselves would measure the value of a design, looking
at whether consumers would view the design as being distinct when
compared with prior designs."'
Despite its important and well-reasoned policy justification, the
ordinary observer rule of Laverne was overturned fifteen years later in the
C.C.P.A.'s 1981 decision, In re Nalbandian.8 2 The claimed design and
primary reference cited were directed to illuminable tweezers."'
Appellant's
Johnson's
The C.C.PA. noted that after Laverne, several regional circuits had rejected
Laverne's ordinary observer test in favor of an "ordinary designer" test.38"
At least one other regional circuit, however, directly addressed the issue
and was convinced that the Laverne "ordinary observer" standard was "the
appropriate measure and one which has substantial historical backing."8
381 See supra Part I.B (noting that designers place the utmost importance on the visual
impressions given to consumers by their designs, and that therefore it makes sense for the
value and protectability of a design to be based on whether consumers recognize it as being
distinct).
382 In rNalbandian,66i E2d 1214, 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
383 Id. at 1215.
384 Id. at 1215-16 ("Since the Laverne decision, the Second, Third, Tenth and District
of Columbia circuits have specifically considered the 'ordinary observer' test set forth therein
and rejected it. These circuits continue to interpret 'one of ordinary skill' as requiring obvi-
ousness to be tested from the viewpoint of the'ordinary designer.' Since board decisions may
be reviewed by the District of Columbia Circuit as well as this court, the PTO has been faced
with two standards in design cases. We believe it is appropriate to close this schism." (internal
citations omitted)).
385 Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 299 (9th Cir.
1970). The Schwinn court cited Whitman Saddle for its statement that "[tihe test is the eye of
an ordinary observer, the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary acuteness, bringing to
the examination of the article upon which the design has been placed that degree of observa-
tion which men of ordinary intelligence give." Id.
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To close what it perceived as a "schism," the Nalbandian court decided that
"the test of Laverne will no longer be followed. In design cases we will
consider the fictitious person identified in § 103 as 'one of ordinary skill
in the art' to be the designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of
the type presented in the application.""' The court justified this decision
by citing to the Supreme Court (namely, Graham v. John Deere Co., the
paradigm nonobviousness decision for utility patents) and Congress as
requiring the present result."'
The Nalbandian court dismissed the analysis of Laverne as being simply
caught up in semantics.
If an "ordinary designer" test for designs were necessarily equivalent
to applying an "ordinary inventor" test for inventions, we would not
return to it here. However, the problem thus stated can be viewed as one
created by semantics. The "ordinary designer" means one who brings
certain background and training to the problems of developing designs in a
particular field, comparable to the "mechanic" or "routineer" in non-design
arts. We do not have a name for that person in the design field other than
"designer" which is also the name we must use for the person who creates
a patentable design."
Here the Nalbandian court gravely misconstrued the rationale of Laverne.
The C.C.P.A. in Laverne was not engaging in semantics. Its "ordinary
observer" standard implemented the policy goal of Congress as explained
by Gorham-promoting progress in the design arts. The Laverne court
conceded that the statutory scheme required application of the obviousness
test, but recognized that it should not be applied identically for utility
inventions and designs. Design patentability required a more nuanced
approach. As keenly observed in Laverne, the test of obviousness "must
be applied in a way which will implement the legislative intent to promote
progress in the field of industrial design by means of the patent incentive.
This will not be done by denying patents to everything competent
designers produce by the skill of their calling."8 9
Based on its inaccurate reading of Laverne, the Nalbandian court
concluded that the required inquiry into the level of ordinary skill can be
made with respect to designs to arrive at an "ordinary designer. "" Further,
386 InreNalbandian,66I F.2d at 1216.
387 Id. ("This approach is consistent with Graham v. John Deere Co., which requires
that the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art be determined." (citation omitted)); id.
("[Tihe statute does not specifically create a test for nonobviousness of a design which is
different from that for inventions defined in 35 U.S.C. § ioi. That § 103 applies to designs
follows from 35 U.S.C. § 171, which states: 'The provisions of this title relating to patents for
inventions shall apply to patents for designs . . . ."' (ellipsis in original)).
388 Id.
389 In re Laverne, 356 F2d oo3, ioo6 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
390 In re Nalbandian, 661 Fzd at 1216-17.
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the court believed the "ordinary designer" standard had certain pragmatic
benefits, namely that it would be easier and more objective to identify a
designer in the field for purposes of assisting a jury in a patent litigation
context, or for obtaining expert affidavits during patent prosecution.3 91
This was perceived to be a substantial advantage over the ordinary observer
standard because "[n]o affiant can be qualified as an expert ordinary
observer."392
The Nalbandian court did not adequately explain why an affiant could
not be an "expert" with regard to what ordinary observers perceive. A
person who had worked in the industry of the claimed design and had
experience interacting with consumers, such as a purchasing, sales, or
marketing manager, would be able to offer objective evidence about the
visual impressions that the designs would likely make on such consumers."
The court also did not address the fact that consumer surveys are another
objective means to present evidence of how an ordinary observer would
view the claimed design and the prior art. Consumer surveys are standard
evidence in other types of intellectual property cases such as in trademark
litigation."*
Applying its "ordinary designer" standard, the Nalbandian court
concluded that the claimed design and the prior art design were
substantially identical, with the primary differences contained in the finger
grips of the claimed and prior art tweezer designs being de minimis. * The
claimed design was deemed obvious because "it is well within the skill of
an ordinary designer in the art to make the modification of the fluting and
that it would have been obvious to do so. Such changes do not achieve
a patentably distinct design."39 Nalbandian did not make any findings
or point to any evidence of record as to the level of ordinary skill of an
391 Id. at 1217 ("It is apparent the 'ordinary designer' standard has been found helpful
to courts in infringement litigation because of the objective evidence which can be brought
to bear on the question of obviousness under the tests of Graham. We believe it also can be
more effectively dealt with by an applicant during patent prosecution than can the 'ordinary
observer' test. For example, where an examiner selects features from various designs, or relies
on common knowledge in the art, the possibility is present of submitting an affidavit from an
expert in whose opinion, subjective though it may be, it would not have been obvious to an
ordinary designer, despite knowledge (or imputed knowledge) of the prior art to combine
features or make modifications as shown in an applicant's design." (citations omitted)).
392 Id.
393 For example, a person involved in the marketing or sale of a designed product would
be able to testify concerning reactions consumers have had to the design (including which
features are more or less prominent/important), either as a result of personal interactions with
consumers or via market research.
394 See 6 1. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32:191 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the use of consumer survey evidence to demonstrate sec-
ondary meaning of a trademark).
395 In reNalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1217.
396 Id. at 1217-18 (citation omitted).
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ordinary designer in the illuminable tweezer art, 97 nor did it explain why
it would be obvious to such a designer to make the alleged modifications.
Reminiscent of the approaches taken in Whitman Saddle and Faustmann,
the Nalbandian court's decision is entirely subjective and conclusory. This
result is ironic because the Nalbandian majority placed great emphasis
on analyzing the Graham factors (e.g., the level of ordinary skill in the
art), and further praised the virtues of the "ordinary designer" test for its
objectivity."' The court, however, did not appear to consider any evidence
whatsoever that would substantiate its conclusions under the Graham
'factual inquiries."
Judge Giles Rich, author of the C.C.P.A.'s opinion in Laverne, wrote
a concurrence in Nalbandian. Rich felt it was appropriate "as the father
of the so-called 'ordinary observer' test (as applied to 35 U.S.C. § 103), to
say a few kind words over the corpse."39 Judge Rich restated his concern
about equating designers with ordinary mechanics, noting that he was
"interested in retaining within the ambit of the patent system the made-
for-hire products of 'competent designers' so businessmen or corporations
would find it economically advantageous to employ them, thus carrying
out the objective of 35 U.S.C. § 171, to promote the ornamental design of
articles of manufacture."400 He took issue with the majority's implication
that references to an "ordinary" designer necessarily suggests that there
exist "extraordinary" designers, and that only those extraordinary designers
can produce unobvious designs.4" Ultimately, Judge Rich believed that
the "real problem" was not whether the fictitious person under § 103 is an
ordinary designer or an ordinary observer, " but rather the very "presence
of 'invention' in a design."403
397 It is unclear whether the Nalbandian court even appreciated the fact that an "or-
dinary designer" of tweezers could conceivably encompass multiple types of designers, for
example, a designer employed by a tweezer company, a more generalized consulting designer,
or even a designer of an entirely different type of article. See supra Part I (discussing how an
"ordinary designer" of a particular article is not easily identifiable given that some designers
specialize while others do not).
398 InreNalbandian, 661 F2d at 1217.
399 Id. at 1218.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id. Judge Rich felt that setting the semantics issues aside, "courts will, with phraseol-
ogy of their own choosing, continue to find designs patentable or unpatentable according to
their judicial 'hunches.'" Id.
403 Id. Judge Rich's concurrence included many additional comments on the invention/
nonobviousness requirement, the legislative evolution of which we detailed supra Part II.
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C. Refinement in the Federal Circuit-For Better or Worse
The basic analytical framework of Rosen and Nalbandian has remained
essentially unchanged since the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit was
established in 1982 and inherited the C.C.P.A.'s and the regional circuits'
patent jurisdictions. The Federal Circuit has generally re-expressed and
applied the previously settled principles, following the Rosen framework
and focusing on the overall appearance of the claimed design.'" The
most significant contribution to the analysis in the Federal Circuit era has
been some elaboration on when a combination or modification is deemed
to have been "suggested" by the appearance of the prior art designs.
Such elaboration, however, raises more questions than it answers.405
1. Clarifying the "Suggestion" Prong.-The Federal Circuit correctly applied
Rosen's appearance-oriented analysis in In re Carlson."4 There, the claimed
design was directed to a symmetrical dual-compartment bottle.407
. .408
404 See, e.g., Durlingv. Spectrum Furniture Co., lo F.3d 100, 104 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that because of significant differences in design features between the claimed and prior art
designs, the prior art "does not create ... the same visual impression" as the claimed design,
and the claimed design is therefore nonobvious).
405 See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.zd I117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(The court stated that "not only the individual elements, but the ornamental quality of the
combination must be suggested in the prior art," without providing any definition of what is
meant by "ornamental quality" (citations omitted)); In re Sung Nam Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 382
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (The court held that even though the prior art showed components of the
claimed design, the court was "satisfied that the overall appearance of Cho's design is not sug-
gested by the references," with no explanation of why the requisite suggestion was absent).
4o6 In re Carlson, 983 E2d 1032, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
407 Id. at 1038.
408 U.S. Patent No. 289,855 (filed Nov. i9, 1984) (issued May 19, 1987).
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By contrast, the cited prior art was asymmetrical.409
410
Although the court acknowledged that the symmetry of the claimed design
produced a different visual impression, it nevertheless held the design
would have been obvious over the asymmetrical prior art.
In a field of art such as this, where products are deliberately designed as
asymmetrical in order to create distinctive, memorable images, it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to create a "normal"
or symmetrical orientation for a design. Indeed, knowledge of symmetry is
one reason why more complex designs are developed-the expected design
configuration is one of symmetry,411
Thus, Carlson sheds some light as to what it means to say that a combination
or modification is "suggested" by the appearance of the prior art-the test
seems to be whether the change is "expected."
However, Carlson is not clear as to whether the change would have
been expected by an ordinary designer (in accordance with Nalbandian)
or by an ordinary observer (in accordance with Laverne). Carlson contends
that it would have been obvious for a designer to make a symmetrical
design in a field where asymmetry was the norm, even though the prior
art did not disclose symmetrical objects. Although designers make the
designs, it is the consumers who would "expect" a design. The logical
inference from Car/son is that the proper test for whether a modification or
4o9 In re Carlson, 983 F. 2d at 1o38.
41o U.S. Patent No. 86,749 fig. 2 (filed Oct. 23, 193 1) (issued Apr. 12, 1932). A German
Geschmacksmuster (essentially a design registration) that exhibited similar asymmetry was
also cited against the claimed design. In tr Carlson, 983 F2d at 1o34, 1o38.
411 In re Carlson, 983 F2d at 1o38-39 (internal citation omitted).
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combination would have been obvious is whether an ordinary observer-a
consumer of designs-would have expected the differences or changes.
This expectation-based approach accords with designers' views that the
success and distinctiveness of a design is best measured by the reactions
of consumers. 4 11 Carson still leaves open the crucial question, however, of
when an "expected" design modification rises to the level of being obvious.
In re Harvey provided additional gloss as to when a design combination
or modification may be considered obvious. 413 The claimed designs
in Harvey were directed to "vase[s] formed by the intersection of two
geometric solids." 4 14
415 416
The prior art included an earlier design made by Harvey having a spherical
vase with superimposed cube. 4 17
418
412 See supra Part I.B (explaining that designers seek to elicit certain reactions and emo-
tions with the appearances of their designs).
413 In re Harvey, 12 R3d io6i (Fed. Cir. 1993).
414 Id. at lo62. The design shown above on the left was characterized as an '"oblate
ellipsoid with a pentagonal cylinder,"' and the design on the right was characterized as an
"'egg-shaped revolved hyperboloid with a truncated pyramid (also referred to as a square
frustrum)."' Id. at 1o62, 1o67-68.
415 Id. at lo67 exhibit A.
416 Id. at lo68 exhibit D.
417 Id. at 1o62.
418 Id. at lo67 exhibit B.
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The Patent Office deemed the visual differences over the prior art to
be minimal, and the substitution of the different geometric shapes to be
obvious and well-known variations to designers in the art. 419 The Federal
Circuit disagreed, holding that major modifications would be required to
produce the claimed design from the prior art design.42 0 Accordingly, the
prior art cited could not qualify as a proper Rosen reference because the
visual characteristics of the claimed and prior art designs were not basically
the same. 421
The Patent Office in Harvey repeated its error in Rosen-it had
"improperly mixed principles of obviousness for utility patents with those
for ornamental design patents." 422 The Patent Office had confused the
"'design concepts' with the claimed ornamental appearance. 423 The Harvey
court distinguished the case before it from one involving the "substitution of
a single, simple, two-dimensional, geometric shape (an octagon) for another
(a circle)." 424 Rather, "the present case involves the replacement of two,
more complicated, three-dimensional figures (a sphere and a cube) with
two highly complicated solids (an egg-shaped hyperboloid and a truncated
pyramid or an oblate ellipsoid and a pentagonal cylinder)." 425 Harvey held
the design to be nonobvious, explaining that "if prior art designs are to be
modified in more than one respect to render a claimed design obvious,
then those modifications must be'deminimis' in nature and unrelated to the
overall aesthetic appearance of the design." 42 6
Harvey generally follows the Rosen approach of focusing on the
appearance of the claimed and prior art designs. Harvey fails to draw a clear
line between obvious and nonobvious designs, however. Under Harvey, a
design would be obvious when only de minimis changes are made to the
prior art having no effect on the overall appearance. 427 Of course, what is
de minimis and has no effect on the overall appearance of a design is in the
eye of the beholder, making this aspect of the test highly subjective. Also
under Harvey, the prior art may be modified in "one respect" (which is more
419 Id. at lo62-63.
420 Id. at io63.
421 Id. at 1o65.
422 Id. at 1o64.
423 Id.
424 Id. These were the facts in In reHopkins, 34 F.2d 1oi6, ior6 (C.C.P.A. 1929), which
the Patent Office relied upon for its rejections. The Harvey court also pointed out that
Hopkins was decided prior to the 1952 Patent Act and "is at best, a weak, old and questionable
precedent." In rr Harvey, 12 F3d at 1o64.
425 In re Harvey, 12 F.3d at io64.
426 Id. at 1o65 (citing In re Carter, 673 F2d 1378, 13 8o (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
427 This general notion seems to accord with the view of designers. See supra Part .B
(noting that very minor changes to a prior art design not affecting that design's appearance are
not viewed as being worthy of protection by designers).
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than de minimis) so as to render a subsequent claimed design obvious. 28
Unfortunately, Harvey provides no suggestion as to the outer limits of such
permissible modifications to the prior art (e.g., only those modifications
that are "expected," as in Carlson) which would still render new designs
obvious.
The Federal Circuit next sought to refine the concept of suggestion to
combine/modify designs in In re Borden.429 There, the claimed design was
for a twin-neck dispensing container.430
The prior art cited against the claimed design included a design to Bettix as
the primary reference, with designs to Freshn Tea and Costa as secondary
references. 431
Bettix Freshn Tea Costa
428 See In tr Harvey, 12 F.3d at 1o65. Query whether Harvey's insistence on not modify-
ing designs in "more than one respect to render a claimed design obvious" suggests that limi-
tations be placed on the number of references which may be combined against a design. Id.
429 In re Borden, go F.3 d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
430 Id. atfig.i.
431 Id. at 1572-73& 1573 figs.2,3 & 4.
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The only differences between the Bettix design and the claimed design
involved the shape of the smaller chamber on the twin neck container,
namely (1) the small chamber of Bettix included an outward flare near the
top surface, whereas the sides in the claimed design were straight, and
(2) the small chamber in Bettix was rectangular and narrower than the
width of the overall container, whereas the small chamber in the claimed
design was square and as thick as the width of the overall container.432
The USPTO examiner took the position that the Freshn Tea and Costa
references showed design features that could be combined with Bettix
to render the claimed invention obvious. 433 The Freshn Tea reference
showed a small chamber that was cubical and had straight sides, rather than
the flared edges of Bettix. 434 The Costa reference showed a small chamber
that was as thick as the width of the main chamber, rather than the narrower
small chamber in Bettix. 435
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Patent Office that the Bettix
container's design "'[was] basically the same as the claimed design"'-a
proper Rosen reference.4 6  Given that there were some differences
between the Bettix design and the claimed design, the court also noted
that when "the basic reference alone does not render the claimed design
unpatentable, design elements from other references in the prior art can be
considered in determining whether the claimed design would have been
obvious to one of skill in the art." 437 At issue was whether the references
properly suggested the combination to make the claimed design. 438 The
Borden court held that the cited references did suggest the combination,
noting that "the two missing design elements are not taken from unrelated
references, but are found in other dual-chamber containers."439 Unlike
the situation in Harvey, where the prior art "simply provide[d] a general
approach to creating new designs," the claimed design in Borden was
deemed obvious because the prior art "taught the two specific design
elements that would convert the Bettix reference into appellant's claimed
design, and did so in a setting that would suggest the combination to one
of skill in the art.""44
The Borden court sidestepped the critical issue that the secondary
references were not particularly similar in their overall appearances to
the claimed design. The applicant had argued that this should negate
432 Id. at 1574.
433 Id.
434 Id
435 Id.
436 Id. at 1575.
437 Id. at 1574-
438 Id. at 1575.
439 Id.
44o Id. at 1575-76.
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any perceived suggestion of the alleged modifications.4 ' The court
failed to explain why a designer would include the design features from
other containers that had distinct visual appearances. The message from
Borden seems to be that de minimis changes to a proper Rosen reference
are permissible to render a design obvious as long as the changes (i.e., the
different design features) are found in secondary references directed to
the same type of article (even when that article looks distinctly different).
This message somewhat accords with the views of designers, who would
generally consider the adaptation of design concepts and features to be
worthy of protection when those features are adapted into new articles
having different degrees of freedom."2 Thus, the addition of very minor
features from prior designs for the same article having the same degree of
freedom, even if their appearances are different, should not be protectable.
2. Titan Tire Skirts the Looming KSR Issue.-The U.S. Supreme Court in
2007 decided KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. ,"1 its first pronouncement
on the nonobviousness requirement for patentability in over thirty years."
The KSR Court significantly raised the bar for satisfying the nonobviousness
requirement for utility patent inventions. KSR dealt specifically with the
patentability of "combination" inventions, i.e., combinations of known
mechanical elements, and declared a broad array of evidence relevant to
determining whether they would have been obvious. "Under the correct
analysis," the Court stated, "any need or problem known in the field of
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide
a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.""5 Notions
of predictability and common sense weighed heavily in the Court's
rhetoric, although it failed to define either term."6 For example, the Court
observed that an invention may be obvious if it represents no more than
the "predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions."" 7
In Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., the Federal Circuit
raised, but did not decide, the difficult question whether or how KSR's
441 Id. at 1575.
442 See supra Part I.
443 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
444 Prior to KSR, the Supreme Court last decided an obviousness case in 1976. See Dann
v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1976) (finding it obvious to combine a modern computer
program described in the patent with "existing machine systems in the banking industry").
445 KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
446 See, e.g., id. at 421 ("When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a prob-
lem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill
has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads
to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and
common sense.").
447 Id. at 417.
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pronouncements apply to designs."8 The patented design in Titan Tire was
directed to a tractor tire.49 The district court had denied the patentee's
motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the accused infringer was
likely to prevail on its assertion that the claimed design would have been
obvious over the prior art designs. 450
Titan's Claimed Design 451
'683 Patent Prior Art42 Ram Implement Prior Art"
448 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 E3d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
449 Id. at 1374-
450 Id. at 1375.
451 Id. at 1374 fig.I-
452 Id. at 1382 fig.2A.
453 Id. at 1383.
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The district court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement in KSR that
an invention may be obvious if it is no more than the "'predictable use of
prior art elements according to their established functions."'454 The district
court rejected the patentee's argument that the quoted passage of KSR
"has no application in the design patent context because design patents
do not have functional elements," but are aesthetic creations made for the
visual appearance. 455
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first summarized the analytical
framework for design patent nonobviousness as follows:
Our precedents teach that "the ultimate inquiry under section 103
is whether the claimed design would have been obvious to a designer of
ordinary skill who designs articles of the type involved.". . . [Tihis general
principle translates into "whether one of ordinary skill would have combined
teachings of the prior art to create the same overall visual appearance as the
claimed design," and that this in turn requires that "one must find a single
reference,'a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are
basically the same as the claimed design."' Once the primary reference is
found, other "secondary" references "may be used to modify it to create a
design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design."
Further, these secondary references must be "'so related [to the primary
reference] that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would
suggest the application of those features to the other."4 56
The Federal Circuit agreed that the prior art references cited against the
patented design were both proper Rosen references having basically the
same appearance as the claimed design. 457 One design feature that the
primary references failed to teach was the hexagonal lug heads of the
patented tire.458 Another tire reference existed, however, which disclosed
enlarged six sided lug heads, qualifying it "as a secondary reference for
modifying one of the primary references to create a design with the same
overall visual appearance as the [patented] design."45 9 Because the prior art
ostensibly satisfied the presently existing obviousness framework to render
the claimed design obvious, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court had not abused its discretion in denying the patentee a preliminary
injunction. 60
The Federal Circuit in Titan Tire did not stop there, however. In the
remainder of its opinion the appellate court strongly suggested that the
Rosen framework for design obviousness is not in accord with the current
454 Id. at 1384 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
455 Id
456 Id. at 1380-81 (second bracketed alteration in original) (citations omitted).
457 Id. at 1381.
458 Id. at 1383.
459 Id
46o Id. at 1384.
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and/or proper state of design law, which should emphasize the overall visual
appearance of a claimed design:
This process, first finding a primary reference in the prior art and then
modifying it with secondary prior art references to demonstrate the claimed
design's obviousness, may have a tendency to draw the court's attention to
individual features of a design rather than the design's overall appearance.
In this respect, it is similar to the "point of novelty" test that until recently
was used in the infringement side of design patent law. The "point of
novelty" test required a trial court to examine the prior art and the claimed
design, identify one or more points of novelty that distinguished the
claimed design from the prior art, and then determine whether those points
of novelty were included in the accused design, a sometimes contentious
analysis. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F. 3d 665, 670-71 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc). One perceived problem with the point of novelty test was
that it might cause the court to focus "on whether the accused design has
appropriated a single specified feature of the claimed design, rather than on
the proper inquiry, i.e., whether the accused design has appropriated the
claimed design as a whole." Id. at 677."'
The Titan Tire court acknowledged that Egyptian Goddess was a decision
about the standard for design patent infringement rather than validity.
Even though Egyptian Goddess "reestablished the ordinary observer test as
the controlling doctrine applicable to design patent infringement,"4 6 2 the
Titan Tire court concluded that it was "not clear to what extent, if any, the
doctrine applicable to obviousness should be modified to conform to the
approach" of Egyptian Goddess."
The Titan Tire court also skirted the larger, looming question of KSR's
applicability to design patent nonobviousness. While commenting that "it is
not obvious that the Supreme Court necessarily intended to exclude design
patents from the reach of KSR,"' it offered no support or explanation for
this suggestion. Although the Titan Tire court was able to decide the case
before it without resolving the "new and untested ground" of whether and
how KSR should be applied to design patents, Titan Tire signals that the
issue of KSR's applicability is ripe for determination.?6 Titan Tire stands as
a harbinger for much-needed clarification of the nonobviousness analysis
for design patents.
461 Id. at 1383-84.
462 Id. at 1384.
463 Id. at 1384. The Titan Tire court concluded that it "need not decide that issue to
decide this case." Id. The Federal Circuit thereafter addressed the Egyptian Goddess issue in
International Seaway Trading Coip. v. Walgreens Coip., 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009), which we
further discuss infra Part III.C-3.
464 Titan 7re, 566 F.3d at 1385.
465 Titan Tire, 566 F.3d at 1384.
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Indeed, a blind application of KSR to design patents could be
devastating to the entire field of decorative arts, denying protection to
virtually every new design. Design, insofar as the aesthetic appearance
is concerned, is an artistic endeavor that is not generally perceived as or
likened to technical problem solving.' Accordingly, it is far too easy for
judges, juries, and patent examiners alike to look at a claimed design in
view of the prior art and subjectively conclude that the design constitutes
nothing more than the "predictable" and "common sense" use of prior
design features. Most lay people can envision and speculate as to what a
modification or combination of specific design features in the prior art will
look like, and the actual result will almost always seem "obvious" under
KSR's amorphous common sense and predictability approach."
3. International Seaway Unnecessarily Complicates the Analysis.-Six months
after its Titan Tire decision, the Federal Circuit again considered the
determination of design patent nonobviousness in International Seaway
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp."6 International Seaway (Seaway) sued
Walgreens and its buying agent for importing and selling clog-style shoes
that allegedly infringed Seaway's design patents.469 A district court granted
the accused infringers' motion for summary judgment that Seaway's
patents were invalid, finding them anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 by the
disclosure of an earlier design patent covering the CROCS brand Beach
model clog design. 47 0 The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case
for reconsideration of anticipation as well as obviousness.471 The district
466 See supra Part I (distinguishing the technical problem/solution approach employed in
utility invention from the creative process of designing).
467 More than one hundred years ago, Justice Holmes cautioned against permitting the
availability of protection for artistic subject matter to be decided at the mercy of the particular
tastes and opinions of a few adjudicators. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.").
468 Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
International Seaway was issued on December 17, 2009, just over six months after the Federal
Circuit's June 3, 2oo9 decision in Titan Tire.
469 Id.at I236.
470 Id. at 1236-37.
471 Id. at 1244 ("We vacate and remand for further proceedings on the limited issue of
whether the differences in the insole patterns between the prior (Crocs) art and the patented
designs bar a finding of anticipation or obviousness."). Although the district court had not
decided whether Seaway's design patents were invalid on the ground of obviousness, id. at
1237, the Federal Circuit apparently considered the issue preserved on appeal. Id. at 1243-44
("Walgreens and Touchsport assert that the issue [of obviousness under § 103] can be con-
sidered on appeal because they raised both anticipation and obviousness arguments below.").
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court's failure to compare the insoles of the
claimed and accused clog designs "precludes a finding of obviousness." Id. at 1244.
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court had erred by basing its anticipation finding on an examination of only
external design features, failing to consider the entirety of the patented
designs (including the clogs' insoles) when comparing the patented designs
to the prior art (CROCS) design. 472
The more notable issue raised in International Seaway was one that
the Federal Circuit had reserved in Titan Tire-,473 namely, whether its en
banc rejection in Egyptian Goddess of the point of novelty test as part of
the analysis for design patent infringement required a similar modification
to the analysis for design patent validity.474  The International Seaway
court observed that some of its pre-Egyptian Goddess decisions had
invoked both (1) a point of novelty test and (2) an ordinary observer test
when determining whether design patent claims were anticipated.475 In
accordance with the "general rule" that "the same test must be used for
both infringement and anticipation,"' 6 however, the court concluded that
after Egyptian Goddess the point of novelty test can no longer be part of
a design anticipation analysis. 477 Agreeing on this issue with the district
court, the Federal Circuit held that henceforth "the ordinary observer test
is the sole test for design patent invalidity under § 102."an
472 See id. at 1241-43 (explaining that the "normal use" lifetime of a clog includes its
point of sale, when the clog's insole design would be visible to potential purchasers).
473 Id. at 1237.
474 Id. at 1237-41.
475 Id. at 1238 & n.2 ("Our cases have recognized that in the past we have applied a dual
test for anticipation identical to the then-applicable test for infringement, namely the ordinary
observer and point of novelty tests." (citing Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.,
386 F.3 d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and four earlier Federal Circuit design patent decisions)).
The court explained that in these anticipation cases it had
compared the patented design with the alleged anticipatory reference to
see if it appropriated the points of novelty of the prior art reference. The
points of novelty of the prior art reference were determined by looking
to earlier prior art to determine the points of novelty in the anticipatory
reference.
Id. at 1238.
476 Id. at 1239 (citation omitted).
477 See id. at 1240 ("[W]e now conclude that the ordinary observer test must logically be
the sole test for anticipation as well [as infringement]." (emphasis added)).
478 Id. at 1241. We disagree with International Seaway on this point, insofar as the court's
application of the ordinary observer test for anticipation under § 102 contemplates that prior
art which is merely "substantially similar" to a claimed design can anticipate that design. See
id. at 1239. The court described the ordinary observer test as originating from the statement
in Gorham Co. v. White.
[If, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a pur-
chaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the re-
semblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to pur-
chase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed
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Although the district court had not reached the issue,479 the
Federal Circuit next considered whether the analysis for design patent
nonobviousness under § 103 should also be altered in light of Egyptian
Goddess. The appellate court opined that in earlier Federal Circuit decisions,
[t]he ordinary observer and point of novelty tests were applied in much the
same manner for obviousness as for anticipation, except that in the case
of obviousness the features of the prior art could be combined to create a
single anticipatory reference or an earlier single reference could be modified
based on the knowledge of a skilled artisan. See, e.g., Durling v. Spectrum
Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996).40
The quoted description of an obviousness analysis involving a combination
of prior art features "to create a single anticipatory reference" improperly
muddles the vocabulary of two distinct invalidity concepts-anticipation
under § 102 and obviousness under § 103. Nevertheless, the language
is accurate to the extent it was meant to describe the practice of first
identifying a "basic" or "primary" design reference in accordance with In
re Rosen," and thereafter modifying or combining it with features found
in "secondary" design references to show that a particular claimed design
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.482
by the other.
Id. at 1239 (quoting Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871)). Design anticipa-
tion should be limited to strict identity situations, in accordance with the preamble language
of 35 U.S.C. § 103 ("A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identical/h
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if... [it would nevertheless have
been obvious]." (emphasis added)), and should exclude mere "substantially similar" situa-
tions. See infra Part IV.D.
479 Int'l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1237 ("The district court did not determine whether the
patents-In-suit were invalid as obvious.").
48o Id. at 1238-39 (internal citation omitted).
481 In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388,391 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (In order to support a holding of design
obviousness, "there must be a reference, a something in existence, the design characteristics
of which are basically the same as the claimed design . . . . Such a reference is necessary
whether the holding is based on the basic reference alone or on the basic reference in view of
modifications suggested by secondary references.").
482 See, e.g., In re Borden, 90 F3 d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("If [a] basic reference alone
does not render the claimed design unpatentable, design elements from other references in
the prior art can be considered in determining whether the claimed design would have been
obvious to one of skill in the art. In order for secondary references to be considered, however,
there must be some suggestion in the prior art to modify the basic design with features from
the secondary references." (citations omitted)); In re Rosen, 673 F.2d at 390; In re Glavas, 230
F.ad 447, 449, 451 (C.C.P.A- 1956). Contrary to this common past practice, we recommend
that the combining of prior art designs to establish obviousness be modified or eliminated.
See infra Part IV.E.
Oddly, the Darling case cited as support by the International Seaway court did not involve
a combination of prior art design features to reach a conclusion of obviousness. Rather, the
Federal Circuit in Durling reversed a district court's judgment invalidating a furniture design
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We disagree, however, with International Seaway's description of the
perspective for assessing nonobviousness of designs. The court described a
bifurcated approach involving two different perspectives: first, "one skilled
in the art," and second, the "ordinary observer":
For design patents, the role of one skilled in the art in the obviousness
context lies only in determining whether to combine earlier references
to arrive at a single piece of art for comparison with the potential design
or to modify a single prior art reference. Once that piece of prior art has
been constructed, obviousness, like anticipation, requires application of the
ordinary observer test, not the view of one skilled in the art.483
In describing the first part of this approach, that of a skilled artisan "arriv[ing]
at a single piece of art for comparison" purposes, 4M the International Seaway
court suggests that it must be shown that an ordinary designer would
combine a proper Rosen reference4 11 with other prior art teachings to make
a single designed object similar to the claimed design.4 86 If an ordinary
designer can and would have made such a combination, the second part of
the court's approach inquires whether the resulting design is "substantially
similar" to the claimed design in the eyes of an ordinary observer.
International Seaway implies that only if both parts of its bifurcated
approach are satisfied-via both perspectives-can a claimed design
patent for obviousness. Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 1o1 F.3d 100, 105 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The Durling court explained that "[blefore one can begin to combine prior art designs, ... one
must find a single reference,'a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are
basically the same as the claimed design."' Id. at 103 (quoting In tr Rosen, 673 F.ad at 391).
The accused infringer in During had failed to identify any prior art design similar enough
to the patented design that it would qualify as a primary (or "basic") reference under Rosen.
Durling, 1o F3d at 104 ("Because of these significant differences" between the claimed de-
sign for a sectional sofa grouping and the prior art Schweiger model proffered by the accused
infringer, "the Schweiger model does not create basically the same visual impression as does
Durling's design, and therefore cannot suffice as a primary reference."). The Durling court
concluded that "[wlithout such a primary reference, it is improper to invalidate a design pat-
ent on grounds of obviousness." Id. at 105.
483 Int'lSeaway, 589 F3d at 1240 (citation omitted). The omitted footnote reads: "That
combination or modification would not necessarily yield a single piece of prior art identical
to a patented design since there may be no motivation to change the prior art to achieve such
identity." Id. at 124o n.5.
484 Id. at 1240.
485 See In re Rosen, 673 F.2d at 391 ("[Tlhere must be a reference, a something in ex-
istence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design in
order to support a holding of obviousness. Such a reference is necessary whether the holding
is based on the basic reference alone or on the basic reference in view of modifications sug-
gested by secondary references.").
486 The InternationalSeaway court characterized this similar designed object as "a single
anticipatory reference," i.e., a reference that is substantially similar to the claimed design in
the eye of an ordinary observer. Int'lSearay, 589 F.3d at 1238-39 (inquiring whether it would
be obvious for "the features of the prior art [to] be combined to create a single anticipatory
reference").
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be invalid as obvious. Whether this is the court's intended meaning is
not entirely clear, however, because it failed to cite Rosen or any other
supportive authority when discussing its approach. Indeed, none of the
precedent cited in the International Seaway decision (or anywhere in this
Article) expressly applies a bifurcated approach utilizing both ordinary
designer and ordinary observer perspectives to determine obviousness.487
Rather, "[Federal Circuit] precedents teach that 'the ultimate inquiry
under section 103 is whether the claimed design would have been obvious
to a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the type involved.' 488
Courts and the USPTO should reject InternationalSeaway's unsupported,
overly complicated, two-part approach to design nonobviousness. The
better view is to evaluate design nonobviousness entirely from the
perspective of an "ordinary observer," the consumer purchaser having
some familiarity with the prior art.489 In other words, the second part of
International Seaway's perspective (that of the "ordinary observer" 4 ) is the
only perspective necessary.491
487 See, e.g., supra note 482 (questioning International Seaway's reliance on Darling as sup-
port for International Seaway's bifurcated analysis, considering that the court in Durling did
not even reach the issue whether the alleged combination would have been obvious); see
infra note 491 (explaining how International Seaway erroneously relied on Whitman Saddle as
authority for using an ordinary observer perspective when analyzing invalidity, because the
Court in Whitman Saddle plainly performed its analysis from the perspective of an "ordinary
workm[a]n of the trade").
488 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc. 566 E3d 1372, 138o (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(emphasis added) (quoting Durling v. Furniture Spectrum Co., io F.3d 1oo, 103 (Fed. Cir.
1996)). Accordingly, InternationalSeaway's bifurcated analysis stands in considerable tension
with Federal Circuit design obviousness precedent as summarized in Titan Tire.
One could argue that International Seaway's two-part analysis is implicitly satisfied if the
"ordinary designer" test explained in Titan Tire is satisfied. If it is true that "the claimeddesign
would have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill" under Tiran Tire, then it must also
be true that (i) the combination/modification could have been made by an ordinary designer,
and (2) that the combined/modified design is the same as (and therefore at least substantially
similar to) "the claimed design." However, the converse is not necessarily true. Although
a design identical to "the claimed design" surely satisfies the ordinary observer/substantial
similarity test, when references are combined or modified by an ordinary designer "to arrive
at a single piece of art for comparison" under International Seaway, that single piece of prior art
is not necessarily identical to the claimed design and in fact need not even be substantially
similar. Thus, the design obviousness tests set forth in International Seaway and Titan Tire are
not logically identical.
489 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F3d 665,677 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (en banc)
(instructing that the "ordinary observer" test should be applied "through the eyes of an ob-
server familiar with the prior art"); see also infra Part IV.C.
490 Int'l Seaway, 589 F 3 d at 1240.
491 Ve recommend below that the practice of combining features of multiple prior art
designs to render obvious a claimed design tends to punish good design and should be elimi-
nated. See infra Part IV.E.
As a less preferred option, we would limit the practice to combinations of a primary Rosen
reference with secondary references that disclose exactly the same type of underlying article
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4. Summary.-More than one hundred years after the Supreme Court in
Gorham and Whitman Saddle spawned a confusing dichotomy of inconsistent
approaches to design protection, it is time for the Federal Circuit to
reconceptualize the nonobviousness requirement as applied to designs.
The courts and the Patent Office must refocus on the true value of designs
that is worth protecting: their ability to create an overall visual impression
on consumers that can make the underlying products appear unique,
distinct, and desirable. The existing obviousness jurisprudence must
be reconsidered with this guiding principle in mind so that nonsensical
precedent is no longer followed, and the law of design patents can better
reflect and promote the design arts. The following Part proposes a number
of tools and options that courts should consider in order to reorient design
patent law towards its policy objectives.
IV RECOMMENDATIONS
The judicial decisions analyzed in the previous Part amply demonstrate
the problematic subjectivity inherent in applying the utility patent-
originated requirement of nonobviousness to ornamental designs.
Nevertheless, the current patent statute compels the courts and the USPTO
to do so. The Patent Act provisions specific to designs mandate that "[t]
he provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to
patents for designs, except as otherwise provided."4 92 Although 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 explicitly enumerates only that patentable designs must be "new,
original and ornamental design[s] for an article of manufacture,"49 3 courts
have uniformly read the section's "shall apply" language as importing the
requirement of nonobviousness from 35 U.S.C. § 103.49
("having the same degree of freedom for design") as the primary reference (and the "claimed
design"). See infra Part IV.E. Obviousness should result only when the differences between
the primary Rosen reference and the claimed design are found in our narrowly-defined cat-
egory of secondary references, and only when those differences are essentially de minimis or
trivial in terms of effect on the overall appearance of the claimed design. See infra Part IV.E.
A conclusion of obviousness under such circumstances does not require the perspective of a
"designer of ordinary skill." See infra Part IVE. Contra Int' Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1240 (The
role of the designer of ordinary skill is "determining whether to combine earlier references
to arrive at a single piece of art for comparison with the potential design or to modify a single
prior art reference."). Rather, given the triviality of the differences under the framework we
propose, the combination of prior art design features that would render a claimed design obvi-
ous would be self-evident to an "ordinary observer."
492 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2oo6).
493 Id.
494 SeeInt'lSeaway, 589 E3d at 1238 (Section 171 "requir[es] application of the provisions
of sections 102 (anticipation) and 1o3 (invalidity (sic: obviousness])."); Titan Tire Corp. v.
Case New Holland, Inc., 566 E3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (The court cited § 17i for
the proposition that "[d]esign patents are subject to the nonobviousness requirement of 35
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We do not dispute that under the current statutory scheme, U.S.
design patentability mandates nonobviousness.495 Rather, we contend
that courts and the USPTO have previously unrecognized flexibility in
how they apply the nonobviousness requirement to designs. Tools exist
to facilitate a more nuanced approach in the design context. Parts I, II,
and III analyzed in depth the design process, design patent legislation, and
design nonobviousness judicial decisions. The insights drawn in Parts I, II,
and III form foundational tools for meaningful change in the application of
design nonobviousness. The remainder of this Part presents our particular
recommendations for applying the nonobviousness requirement in a
manner more specifically tailored to promoting progress in the design arts.
We offer these recommendations as a menu of options to spur discussion
and debate among the courts, the USPTO, the design community, and its
legal representatives.
A. Recognize That Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Nonobviousness
Requirement to Utility Inventions Have Very Limited, if any, Applicability
to Design Patentability
In Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., the Federal Circuit
raised but did not answer the question of whether the Supreme Court's
2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.96 applies to design
patentability.497 Although the Federal Circuit found it "not obvious that
the Supreme Court necessarily intended to exclude design patents from
the reach of KSR,"4 98 nothing in KSR evidences an affirmative intent by the
Supreme Court to include design patents, either.4 " The question remains
U.S.C. § 103."); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 E2d II17, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(The court cited the "shall apply" language of § 171 as the reason why "[a] patented design
must meet the substantive criteria of patentability, including non-obviousness in accordance
with the law of 35 U.S.C. § 103."); see also supra Part III (critiquing courts' application of
nonobviousness requirement, and its predecessor "invention" requirement, to designs).
495 We doubt, however, that the nonobviousness requirement as currently applied by
U.S. courts and the USPTO is the best way to test the protectability of a design. Ideally,
industrial design should be protected by a sui generis registration system. But repeated
attempts to enact such a system in the U.S. have not succeeded. See supra Part II (describing
failed attempts to enact a U.S. registration system for designs outside the confines of the
patent system). Thus, U.S. patent law continues to govern protection for designs when trade
dress and/or copyright protection are not available or adequate. Protection under the patent
law contemplates satisfaction of the nonobviousness requirement, even for designs. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 103, 171; Titan Tire, 566 F.3d at 138o; L.A. Gear, 988 E2d at 1124.
496 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
497 Titan Tire, 566 F-3d at 1384-85.
498 Id. at 1385.
499 Although the Supreme Court in KSR referred to "designers," it did so when refer-
ring to those persons working in the electro-mechanical technology at issue. See KSR, 550 U.S.
at 424 ("The proper question to have asked was whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill,
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open because the Federal Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction
denial on appeal in Titan Tire without resolving the "'new and untested
ground"' of whether and how KSR should be applied to design patents.50
The Supreme Court's decision in KSR has very limited, if any,
applicability to design patents. Courts should be cautious in automatically
applying the specific holdings of KSR to designs. Most of the KSR Court's
discussion is completely irrelevant to what design patents protect-the
ornamental appearance of an article of manufacture, considered as a whole,
not as a combination of its individual features or the manner by which the
article's design was achieved. The subject matter of a design patent is
fundamentally different from a utility patent, as evidenced by the separate
statutory provisions that define the eligible subject matter of each type of
patent.s0 ' Indeed, a patented design "need not have any practical utility,"5 0 2
the antithesis of a utility invention.
The Supreme Court in KSR reaffirmed that its landmark 1966 decision,
Graham v. John Deere Co.,s03 still dictates the proper nonobviousness
considerations.sm Graham instructed that a nonobviousness determination
lends itself to several basic factual inquiries: (1) "the scope and content
of the prior art"; (2) "differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue"; (3) "the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art"; and (4) "[s]
facing the wide range of needs created by developments in the field of endeavor, would have
seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor."). The KSR decision concerned the obvious-
ness of an invention claimed in a utility patent. The Court did not discuss design patents or
the subject matter they protect; namely, the ornamental designs of articles of manufacture, as
opposed to the functionality of such articles.
5oo Titan Tire, 566 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc.,
No. 4:o7-cv-ooo63-JEG, 2007 WL 2914513, at *ii (S.D. Iowa Oct. 3, 2007) (order granting
preliminary injunction)).
501 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6) (defining subject matter of utility patents), with 35
U.S.C. § 171 (2006) (defining subject matter of design patents).
502 In re Nuijten, 5oo F3d 1346, 1357 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Nuryten court held that a
claimed electrical signal, standing alone, was not a "manufacture" within the meaning of 35
U.S.C. § iox, and that its holding was not contravened by the design patent case In re Hrmby,
373 E2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967)). Id. The Nusyten court explained that
Hruby dealt with a 35 U.S.C. § I7 design patent for an aesthetically
pleasing water fountain rather than a § io utility patent, and is there-
fore of limited applicability to this case. The subject of a design patent
need not have any practical utility Compare § 1or ("new and useful")
with § 171 ("new... and ornamental").
Id. (ellipsis in original). The Nuijten court did "not decide whether a signal of the sort ad-
dressed in this case would merit a design patent." Id.
503 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
504 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 399 ("While the sequence of these questions [set forth in Graham]
might be reordered in any particular case, the factors define the controlling inquiry.").
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uch secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, [and] failure of others."sos
Although Graham's multi-factor analysis undoubtedly continues to
control in the realm of utility invention patentability, the first three of the
Graham factors have little meaning for designs. For the following reasons,
factors (1)-(3) do not lend themselves to a particularly helpful or objective
analysis. Designers are not constrained in the prior art sources to which they
turn for inspiration;s0 thus the standard notion of identifying the analogous
prior art encompassed by Graham factor (1) does not reflect design practice.
A design patent claim is a visually depicted claim to the overall appearance
of an article. Thus a mandate under Graham factor (2) to identify discrete
differences by comparing such a claim with prior art designs undermines
the holistic essence of the design's contribution. Attempting to identify a
level of "ordinary skill" in the pertinent design field pursuant to Graham
factor (3) is perhaps the most problematic part of the analysis-the far more
meaningful perspective is that of the "ordinary observer."507
Like its predecessor Graham v. John Deere Co., the KSR decision
undeniably concerned the validity ofutility patents. In Graham, the Supreme
Court invalidated a utility patent claiming a shock-absorbing device for
a plow shank;"' in KSR, it invalidated a utility patent on an adjustable
electro-mechanical gasoline pedal for an automobile.509 Both KSR and
Graham dealt with "combination" mechanical inventions, each component
of which was arguably taught by a prior art reference. The holdings of both
cases, that it would have been obvious to combine the prior art teachings
to achieve the claimed mechanical inventions, are inapposite to designs.
505 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
506 See supra Part I (discussing designers' virtually unlimited sources of design inspira-
tion, which sources may be designs of articles having nothing whatsoever in common with the
article being designed).
507 See supra Part I (observing that designers view the concept of an "ordinary designer"
as nonsensical, and that approximately half of all industrial designers are consultants who
design many different types of articles); infra Part IV.C. (detailing our argument for utilization
of "ordinary observer" perspective when analyzing design nonobviousness); cf Yoder Bros.,
Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 E2d 1347, 1379 (5th Cir. 1976) ("We see no meaningful way
to apply the third [Graham] criterion to plants i.e. the level of ordinary skill in the prior art.");
infra Part IV
In contrast with factors (H3), Graham's "secondary considerations" factor (4) seems po-
tentially useful in assessing design nonobviousness. Some types of secondary considerations
evidence may be probative of consumer reactions to designs, considered as the overall visual
appearances of products. For example, evidence of commercial success and copying might
show that the market demand for a relatively commoditized product (i.e., a product owned by
many people and always having the same general functionality regardless of its producer or
design, such as furniture or a cellular telephone) is created by the product's aesthetics.
508 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 4.
509 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 426 (agreeing with district court's analysis that "claim [four]
encompassed obvious subject matter").
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Designs are claimed centrally rather than peripherally.sO Designs claims
are visual depictions or drawings that do not recite or identify components,
elements, or limitations; what is claimed is the overall appearance of the
underlying article of manufacture-its overall visual impact.s" The en
banc Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed this fundamentally distinct nature
of designs by instructing courts to generally refrain from construing design
claims by translating these visual representations into words."1
Utility patent inventions are typically made by inventors attempting
to solve particular technical problems. The KSR Court instructed that a
utility invention is likely obvious and thus unpatentable if it resulted from
the application of known options already within the technical ability of
510 See Mov, supra note 9, § 5:41 ("The [design] system operates under central claim-
ing, where the scope of the patent right is determined by the scope of the associated parent
disclosure, rather than the system of peripheral claiming that is used in connection with utility
patents.").
511 See Dobson v. Dornan, i18 U.S. io, 15 (1886) (In a case alleging infringement of a
design patent on a carpet, the Court stated that "the claim in this case covers the design as
a whole, and not any part of it as a part, and it is to be tested as a whole as to novelty and in-
fringement."). Although the concurrence in Dobson thought the patent invalid, id. at 18 (Field,
J., concurring), the accused infringer "[did] not question the novelty of the invention." Id. at
15. In contrast with Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893), decided less than ten
years later, the Supreme Court in Dobson mentioned only the requirement of novelty and said
nothing about any requirement of "invention" for design patentability. See Dobson, 118 U.S.
at 15.
The Federal Circuit recently reemphasized that the proper scope of a design patent must
be the claimed design's overall appearance, and not merely a collection of individual features.
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (en banc), the Federal
Circuit abrogated the "point of novelty test" for design patent infringement, which found no
infringement where an accused design lacked a feature that in the patented design was shown
to be novel over the prior art. By contrast, the "ordinary observer" test, which was reaffirmed
as the "sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed," is concerned
with the overall appearance. Id. at 678. "[U]nlike the point of novelty test, the ordinary ob-
server test does not present the risk of assigning exaggerated importance to small differences
between the claimed and accused designs relating to an insignificant feature simply because
that feature can be characterized as a point of novelty." Id. at 677.
512 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F3d at 679 ("Given the recognized difficulties entailed in try-
ing to describe a design in words, the preferable course ordinarily will be for a district court
not to attempt to 'construe' a design patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description
of the claimed design."). The Federal Circuit recognized that in an earlier case involving
an obviousness determination, it had required a district court to "attempt to 'translate [the]
visual descriptions into words' in order to communicate the reasoning behind the court's deci-
sion and to enable 'the parties and appellate courts ... to discern the internal reasoning em-
ployed by the trial court."' Id. at 679 n.i (alteration in original) (quoting Durling v. Spectrum
Furniture Co., ioi F.3d 1oo, 1o2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Although nonobviousness was not at issue in
Egyptian Goddess, the court characterized During as simply "[riequiring ... an explanation of
a legal ruling as to invalidity," and observed that such an explanation "is quite different from
requiring an elaborate verbal claim construction to guide the finder of fact in conducting the
infringement inquiry." Id.
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a person having ordinary skill in the particular field."' The KSR Court
invoked a problem/solution approach in describing an "obvious to try"
scenario:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and
there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or
her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the
product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that
instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it
was obvious under § 103.su4
As interpreted by the KSR Court, an "obvious to try" situation is one in
which a combination invention results from selecting among a limited
number of known solutions to a particular technical problem.
Several factors highlight the inapplicability of this KSR reasoning to
design patents. First, a primary goal of design is to add value and salability
to products by giving them an aesthetically pleasing appearance."' Unlike
the inventors contemplated in KSR, designers are not responding to market
pressures to solve technical problems. Instead, designers typically seek
to create previously untapped market demand by making known, familiar
products more desirable to the consumers of the products."'6 Second,
designers are rarely, if ever, limited to a "finite number of identified,
predictable solutions."s' Rather, they seek inspiration in an unlimited
number of sources that need not have anything in common with the
underlying article the designer is working with."' Third, application of
513 See KSR, 55o U.S. at 421.
514 Id.
515 See supra Part I (discussing industrial designers' creative process).
516 See DREYFUSS,supra note 67, at 23-24 ("[Wlhat we are working on is going to be rid-
den in, sat upon, looked at, talked into, activated, operated, or in some way used by people
individually or en masse. If the point of contact between the product and the people becomes
a point of friction, then the industrial designer has failed. If, on the other hand, people are
made safer, more comfortable, more eager to purchase, more efficient-or just plain happier-
the designer has succeeded."). For additional description of what industrial designers do, see
supra Part I.
517 KSR, 550 U.S. at 42I.
518 See Kemnitzer Interview, supra note 33 (explaining that there are no limits on the
sources of inspiration for industrial design; for example, a hypothetical industrial designer
working on the design for a cellular telephone may "jump from a flip phone to armadillos to
a lobster claw to a forklift truck"). Today's industrial designers are frequently finding inspira-
tion from the study of "bio-mimicry," which seeks to emulate the characteristics of plants
and animals and apply them to the design of products for humans. Id.; see also Ashlee Vance,
Design Software with Organic Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2oo9, at B6 ("'Designers are constantly
looking to nature because they can find ideas that have some fundamental level of efficiency
and robustness... [aind there seems to be a general hunger for bio-mimicry as inspiration."')
(quoting Bob Little, president of solidThinking, maker of design software incorporating mor-
phogenesis tool, a filter based on algorithms that mimic growth and weight support of human
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an undefined and unbounded test, such as KSR's reference to "common
sense,"s'1 is particularly unwieldy when applied to the creative design of a
product's ornamental appearance.sz0
Rather than trying to contort the holdings of Graham and KSR to fit
designs, which are fundamentally different subject matter than the
mechanical combination devices of those utility patent decisions, courts
and the USPTO should consider the Supreme Court's design patent
decisions to be their primary source of guidance. We detailed above
the analytical weaknesses of Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.,"2 ' in which the
Supreme Court applied the nebulous utility patent standard of "invention"
to deny protection for the design of a riding saddle.s"' A better approach
would hew to the Supreme Court's foundational design patent decision,
Gorham Co. v. White."' Although the parties in Gorham disputed design
patent infringement rather than validity, the Supreme Court's decision
addressed design patents generally and emphasized the policy goal of
promoting progress in the design arts. Courts have the means to apply
the nonobviousness requirement to designs in a manner that serves, rather
than frustrates, this paramount policy goal.
To the extent that the Supreme Court's recent KSR decision is relevant
at all to the nonobviousness of designs, it would be only for the general
principle that the nonobviousness requirement should be applied in a
flexible manner. The KSR Court rejected the Federal Circuit's formalistic
"teaching, suggestion, or motivation [TSM] test" for utility patent
nonobviousness, observing that "[t]hroughout this Court's engagement
with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and
flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its
TSM test here."524 The Federal Circuit's erroneously rigid approach in
KSR prevented courts and the USPTO from utilizing other appropriate
tools available for evaluating the nonobviousness of an invention.s2 s At
bones).
519 KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
520 Justice Holmes once cautioned against permitting the availability of protection for
artistic subject matter to be decided at the mercy of a few adjudicators' subjective opinions.
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a danger-
ous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
521 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
522 See supra notes 262-83 and accompanying text (critiquing Whitman Saddle).
523 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (4 Wall.) 511 (1871).
524 KSR, 550 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). The strict TSM test, as applied by the
Federal Circuit to determine the nonobviousness of Teleflex's patent, insisted that the prior
art references cited in combination contain an explicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the references and make the claimed automobile pedal assembly. Id. at 414.
525 Id. at 415-18 (directing courts to consider factors such as market forces, common
sense, and predictability in order to inform the nonobviousness analysis).
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this level of generality, courts and the USPTO can properly rely on the
Supreme Court's KSR decision as authority for interpreting and applying
the nonobviousness requirement for designs in a flexible manner, one that
furthers the goal of promoting progress in the decorative arts.
B. Fine-Tune the Nonobviousness Requirement for Non- Utility Subject Matter
by Looking to the Plant Patent Example
Part III of this Article described the courts' difficulties with application
of the nonobviousness requirement (and its predecessor, the requirement
for invention) to designs. Courts also have struggled with application of the
nonobviousness requirement to a third type of patentable subject matter:
plants. Prior judicial examination of the nonobviousness requirement for
one type of non-utility patent subject matter-plants-provides important
insights for the analysis of patentability of the other type of non-utility
patent subject matter-designs.
In Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp.,26 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confronted a challenge to the validity of seven
plant patents claiming varieties of ornamental chrysanthemum plants. 27
After giving "considerable thought" in light of "the difficulty and novelty
of the issues presented," the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
that the accused infringer had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of
validity for the plant patents in suit.sa Sustaining the nonobviousness of
the claimed plants, the Fifth Circuit utilized a "shift in focus" that led it to
a "more productive inquiry for plant patents."s2 9
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis in YoderBros. by conceding that the
nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103 applied to plant patents.
This followed from the incorporation language of the plant patent statute
(which is almost identical to that of the design patent statute). Section 161
of the Patent Act provides that
526 Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976).
527 See id. at 1376-77, 1377 n.31 (describing the seven plant patents in suit).
528 Id. at 1377.
529 Id. at 1379. Yoder Bros. appears to be the sole decision of a U.S. appellate court
on the merits of plant patent nonobviousness; neither the C.C.P.A. nor the Federal Circuit
ever decided the issue. This conclusion is based on the results of August 2009 Westlaw and
LexisNexis searches of federal appellate decisions using the search phrase ("plant patent"
AND (obvious! OR nonobvious! OR i03)).
In a non-precedential decision, Oglesby Plant Labs., Inc. v. Atkinson, No.95-1353, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13452 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 1996), the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's grant
of summary judgment that the plant patent in suit was not invalid, rejecting several validity
challenges that included obviousness. See id. at *3,*6. Neither court applied the nonobvious-
ness requirement on the merits, however. The Federal Circuit affirmed because the validity
challenger (a prose litigant) failed to present any evidence in support of its obviousness argu-
ment. See id.
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Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new
variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly
found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an
uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents
for plants, except as otherwise provided.5*
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that "[slince section 161 makes the general
patent law applicable to plant patents except as otherwise provided, we
take as our starting point the general requisites for patentability, and then
apply them as well as we can to plants.""'
For utility patents, the Fifth Circuit noted, "the three requirements
for patentability are novelty, utility, and [non]obviousness." "I For plant
patents, however, "the requirement of distinctness replaces that of utility,
and the additional requirement of asexual reproduction is introduced."s'
The court observed that "[tihe third requirement, nonobviousness, is the
hardest to apply to plants, though we are bound to do so to the best of our
ability.""
The Fifth Circuit forthrightly acknowledged its "problem in applying
patent concepts" to the ornamental plants at issue, namely that "[b]eauty
for its own sake is not often a goal of inventors-indeed, even ornamental
plant breeders might be more aptly described as seekers of beauty for
profit."35 As is the case with ornamental plants, it is inherently difficult
to apply utility patent concepts such as nonobviousness to ornamental
designs for articles of manufacture. Like the breeders of new ornamental
varieties of plants, designers seek to enhance the external beauty of an
underlying product (here, an article of manufacture), in order to increase
appeal to consumers and hence product sales. Designers' efforts must be
evaluated based on the end result-the patented design-rather than the
process used to develop the design.
The Yoder Bros. court proceeded by modifying the multi-factored
standard for nonobviousness previously announced by the Supreme Court
530 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2oo6) (emphasis added).
531 Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1377 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 162).
532 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. H§ 101, 103).
533 Id. Requirements for design patents likewise differ from those for utility patents.
The requirement of ornamentality for designs replaces that of utility. See 35 U.S.C. § 171;
see also SHOEMAKER, supra note 283, at 15 (In the 1902 Patent Act, "the law was amended to
substitute the word 'ornamental' for the word 'useful' in the former statute."). The design
statute also adds the requirements that a patentable design be "original" and "for an article of
manufacture." 35 U.S.C. § 171.
534 Yoder Bros., 537 F2d at 1378.
535 Id. at 1379 n.35-
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in Graham v. John Deere Co.s 36 The Fifth Circuit had no difficulty in applying
the first two factors in a manner tailored for plants. "Rephrasing the
[Graham v.] John Deere tests for the plant world," the Fifth Circuit applied
Graham factor (1), the scope and content of the prior art, by "ask[ing]
about (1) the characteristics of prior plants of the same general type, both
patented and nonpatented."sm7 The court rephrased Graham factor (2),
the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, as "(2) the
differences between the prior plants and the claims at issue."s3 s
In contrast with the first two Graham factors, the Fifth Circuit saw "no
meaningful way to apply the third [Graham] criterion to plants-i.e. the level
of ordinary skill in the prior art."539 Although the court did not elaborate,
it presumably concluded that defining a hypothetical "plant breeder of
ordinary skill" would be an exercise in futility. Because the Fifth Circuit
viewed the first two Graham factors as analogous to the "distinctness"
requirement already in the Plant Patent Act, the court concluded that the
nonobviousness requirement had to carry "an independent meaning."
As applied to plants, nonobviousness "must refer to something other than
observable characteristics."
The Fifth Circuit looked to its precedent in pharmaceutical patent cases
for insight into the problem of applying the nonobviousness requirement to
"new and esoteric subject matter.""4 In EliLilly &Co. v. Generix DrugSales,
Inc.,s43 the Fifth Circuit sustained the patentability of a chemical compound
because it achieved unexpectedly good therapeutic value. Even though
the compound was "closely related in structure to a known or patented
drug," the court concluded that it would have been nonobvious and hence
patentable because it "exhibitfed] anew needed medicinal capability."5 "
536 Id. at 1378 (discussing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)). The
Graham factors are detailed supra Part IV.A.
537 Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1379.
538 Id.
539 Id.
540 Id.
541 Id. By "something other than observable characteristics," the Yoder Bros. court was
not suggesting that the manner of breeding or cultivating the claimed ornamental plants fac-
tored into its analysis. Rather, the court felt that the increased beauty and desirability of the
plants provided a measure of the value added by them. Id. While related to the "observable
characteristics" of the plants, indications of value such as increased beauty and desirability are
actually measured by the effect and impression made on observers. Such effects and impres-
sions are not observable characteristics of the plants themselves.
542 Id. The Fifth Circuit referred to the nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103
as codifying the "invention" requirement. This is an example of the courts stubbornly cling-
ing to "invention" as a qualitative standard for patentability. The § 103 nonobviousness frame-
work established in the 1952 Patent Act was intended to replace the nebulous "invention"
standard and provide a more workable standard for assessing patentability. Seesupra Part II.
543 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 46o F.2d 1o96 (5th Cir. 1972).
544 Id. at 1103.
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The Eli Lilly decision is consistent with the well-established principle of
chemical patent law that unexpected results can overcome a prima facie
case of obviousness based on structural similarity."4 In the chemical arts,
the subject matter to be assessed for patentability is not only a compound's
chemical structure but also the totality of its properties. 4
Adapting this analysis to the question whether a patented plant would
have been obvious, the Yoder Bros. court observed that
The same kind of shift in focus would lead us to a more productive inquiry for plant
patents. If the plant is a source of food, the ultimate question might be its
nutritive content or its prolificacy. A medicinal plant might be judged by
its increased or changed therapeutic value. Similarly, an ornamental plant
would be judged by its increased beauty and desirability in relation to the
other plants of its type, its usefulness in the industry, and how much of an
improvement it represents over prior ornamental plants, taking all of its
characteristics together.547
In other words, the nonobviousness inquiry is amenable to fine-tuning,
depending upon the type of plant at issue. Under the Fifth Circuit's
analysis, nonobviousness turned on a plant's enhancement in value-
whether nutritive, therapeutic, or increased beauty-to its consumers.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the patented ornamental
chrysanthemum plants in suit satisfied this value-added test. Based on
an "objective judgment" of the patented plants' "new and different
characteristics," including "ornamental value, hardiness, longevity, etc.,"
and "[vliewing the evidence offered on the patent validity question as a
whole," the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that the
accused infringer had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of validity
as to the patented chrysanthemum plants."
The Yoder Bros. decision is an important model for "shift[ing the]
focus" of the nonobviousness analysis in order to reach a "more productive
545 See 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note i9, § 5.o6li][b][i] (discussing submission to
Patent Office of affidavit evidence of 'unexpectedly superior properties or advantages' of the
claimed invention as compared with the prior art products or processes" (citing In re Peterson,
315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003))); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms. Inc., 471
F3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2oo6) (affirming district court's judgment sustaining validity of pat-
ent claim to chemical compound although prior art disclosed adjacent homolog). The court
explained that "patentability for a chemical compound does not depend only on structural
similarity" and noted "unexpected beneficial properties" of the claimed compound. (citation
omitted). Id.
546 See In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) ("From the standpoint of patent
law, a compound and all of its properties are inseparable; they are one and the same thing.");
see also Eli Lilly, 471 F3d at 1378 ("This court will not ignore a relevant property of a com-
pound in the obviousness calculus." (citation omitted)).
547 Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1379 (emphasis added).
548 Id. at 1382.
526 [Vol. 99
2010-201l NONOBVIOUSNESS IN DESIGN PATENTS
inquiry" for patentable subject matter beyond utility inventions.19
Although YoderBros. addressed the patentability of plants, its application of
the nonobviousness inquiry to subject matter valued for its ornamentality
and beauty rather than utilitarian functionality is directly pertinent to the
patentability of designs. Just as the Yoder Bros. court departed from the
Graham standard by looking at the overall aesthetic effect of plants bred
for their beauty, analysis of design patents for nonobviousness can likewise
benefit from a proper focus on the true value of a design-its visual impact
upon consumers. The Yoder Bros. analysis thus offers courts a template for
thoughtfully adapting nonobviousness principles to designs.sso
C. Utilize Gorham 's "Ordinary Observer" as the Statutory "Person Having
Ordinary Skill in the Art" When Determining the Nonobviousness of Designs
In its foundational design patent decision, Gorham Co. v. White, the U.S.
Supreme Court formulated a test for determining whether two designs have
the requisite "sameness of appearance" for design patent infringement.s'
Convinced that "substantial identity" was the proper standard, the Court
considered whether the designs must be analyzed for substantial identity
from the perspective of an "expert" observer or an "ordinary" observer."'
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the expert should compare
the two designs.5 ' If an accused design escaped infringement because
of minor details that would be noticeable to the expert but overlooked
by "those who buy and use" the designed product, "the patentees [would
549 Id. at 1379.
550 If application of Yoder's "more productive inquiry" lowers the threshold for design
patentability, this relaxation of traditional nonobviousness standards is surely commensurate
with the narrower property right that results. Both plant patents and design patents are much
narrower in scope than utility patents. The Federal Circuit interprets the Plant Patent Act as
limiting "the scope of a plant patent [to] the asexual progeny of the patented plant variety."
Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In order to
establish infringement of its plant patent, a patentee must therefore establish that the defen-
dant's allegedly infringing plant is the asexually reproduced progeny of the original patented
parent plant. Id. at 1569. An independently developed plant, even if genetically identical to
the patented plant, does not infringe. See id. at 1570. Design patents likewise are considered
quite narrow in scope. In reMann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Design patents have
almost no scope. The claim at bar, as in all design cases, is limited to what is shown in the ap-
plication drawings.").
551 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511,526-27 (1871) ("We are now prepared to
inquire what is the true test of identity of design. Plainly, it must be sameness of appearance,
and mere difference of lines in the drawing or sketch, a greater or smaller number of lines,
or slight variances in configuration, if sufficient to change the effect upon the eye, will not
destroy the substantial identity.").
552 Id. at 527.
553 Id.
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be] injured, and that advantage of a market which the patent was granted
to secure [would be] destroyed."s" The Court defined the appropriate
standard as follows:
[Ilf, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing
it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.5 1s
Under the "ordinary observer" test of Gorham, the ordinary observer
is deemed to be an ordinary purchaser of the product in which the
claimed design is embodied.ss6 The ordinary observer is also deemed to
be familiar with prior art designs.ss' Below we demonstrate that utilizing
the perspective of an "ordinary observer" for evaluating nonobviousness
of designs better promotes progress in the design arts than would utilizing
an "ordinary designer" perspective. The ordinary observer perspective
correctly recognizes that the value of a design is in its ability to provide a
distinct visual impression upon the relevant consumers and purchasers of
the designed products.
554 Id. at 528.
555 Id.
556 SeeArminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) ("[Tlhe focus of the ordinary observer test is 'on the actual product that is pre-
sented for purchase, and the ordinary purchaser of that product."' (quoting Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 E3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
The manner in which a design is claimed can affect the identity of the ordinary purchaser,
and the identity of the ordinary purchaser in turn can affect the scope of a claimed design.
More sophisticated purchasers are generally more likely to notice differences between de-
signs, and would find infringement less frequently. Id. at 1321. For example, in Arminak the
claimed design was for a trigger sprayer shroud used in connection with household cleaning
products. Id. at 1318. The Federal Circuit emphasized that the design patent encompassed
only the sprayer shroud and not the entire cleaning product. Id. at 1323-24. The ordinary
observer was therefore deemed to be an industrial purchaser of trigger sprayers because only
such industrial buyers ever purchased the article embodying the claimed design by itself, i.e.,
the triggers individually (generally for assembly into retail products). Id. By contrast, retail
consumers ordinarily purchased the entire cleaning product, including the bottle and trigger
sprayer together. Id. Because the ordinary purchaser was deemed to be a sophisticated indus-
trial buyer of sprayer shrouds, the court found that the differences between the patented and
accused designs would be noticeable by such purchasers, resulting in no infringement by the
accused design. Id. at 1324. Had the design patent encompassed the bottle as well, presum-
ably the ordinary observer would have been a less sophisticated retail consumer who may
have regarded the two designs as being the same.
557 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F-3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. zoo8); Int'l
Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F-3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cit. 2009) ("In Egyptian
Goddess [the en banc Federal Circuit] refined the ordinary observer test by characterizing the
ordinary observer as being'deemed to view the differences between the patented design and
the accused product in the context of the prior art."' (quoting Egyptian Goddess, 543 E3d at
676)).
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1. An "Ordinary Observer" Perspective Properly Emphasizes the Visual Nature
of Design Patent Subject Matter.-A design patent protects the overall
visual appearance of an article of manufacture. The article's appearance
is something perceived by the human eye-it is observed. The observer
of the article experiences its design through his or her sense of vision,
and the value or success of any given design may be measured by the
impression that its overall appearance makes upon the observer."' As the
C.C.P.A. explained in In re Laverne, "[tihe test [to determine obviousness
of a design] is inherently a visual test, for the design is nothing more than
appearance, and the appearance is that of the article as a whole. No special
skill is required to determine what things look like, though individuals
react differently."s5 9
By contrast, assessing nonobviousness from the perspective of an
"ordinary designer" steers the focus away from the appearance of the
designed article as a whole. It reorients the inquiry towards the manner
of designing the article-an improper focus on the process of design
rather than its result. Applying the "ordinary designer" perspective leads
to conclusory and highly subjective decisions as to whether the inclusion
or removal of particular design features would have been "obvious" to a
designer of ordinary skill who designs such articles. 560
The very notion of an "ordinary designer" of any particular article is
problematic. The Laverne court recognized that the hypothetical § 103
"person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains"
does not easily translate to "a designer having ordinary skill" in creating
designs for particular types of articles. 6 ' Because of the adaptability and/
or consulting nature of their work, industrial designers are not typically
identified as possessing "ordinary skill in the art of designing chairs" or
"ordinary skill in the art of designing silverware patterns," for example. 6 1
In contrast with the typically specialized inventors of utility patent subject
matter, it is relatively rare for designers to work exclusively with particular
products or in particular industries. 6 3 By necessity, they must be familiar
with design trends in a wide variety of fields. It is the job of industrial
designers
558 See supra Part I (explaining that designers seek to have their designs invoke certain
reactions and impressions in consumers).
559 In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, ioo6 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (internal citation omitted).
56o See supra Part III (discussing how the court in In re Nalbandian, 661 E2d 1214
(C.C.P.A. 1981), provided no explanation for why it believed that the differences between the
claimed design and the prior art were obvious variations).
56I SeeInreLavenre,356E2datl oo5-o6.
562 See supra Part I (explaining that approximately half of IDSA designer members are
consulting designers who design a wide variety of products in different industries).
563 See supra Part l.
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to be familiar with over-all trends that are above and beyond the particular
industry with which we are dealing. For example, with the air full of jet
planes, the public may be so conditioned to these sleek forms that it will
accept or even seek out such forms translated into household appliances.
We must make an evaluation of the extent of this conditioning process.sM
Attempting to judge the nonobviousness of a design from the perspective
of a "designer of ordinary skill in the art" is fundamentally unsound because
the notion of a "designer of ordinary skill in the art" has no useful meaning
in the real world of industrial design. Rather than employing the designer's
perspective, we recommend that nonobviousness of designs be assessed
from the perspective of the viewer, i.e., the "ordinary observer" of Gorham
Co. v. White.s6 s The Gorham court held that "substantial" similarity between
designs should be judged "in the eyes of men generally, of observers of
ordinary acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which
the design has been placed that degree of observation which men of
ordinary intelligence give."" Like the C.C.P.A. in Laverne, we would again
extend this same "ordinarily intelligent man" perspective to the realm of
design nonobviousness. 66
The ordinary observer of U.S. design patent law is deemed to be the
ordinary purchaser of the underlying designed article, and is also familiar
with the prior art.56 As such, the ordinary observer represents the target
audience of designers-the typical consumers of the designed products.
Because designers measure the success of a design in its visual ability
to invoke in consumers certain reactions to and associations with the
underlying product, only the perspective of the ordinary observer can
meaningfully measure whether a design has succeeded in creating the
intended distinct visual impression." To the extent that the design patent
system purports to reward designers of "nonobvious" designs with a patent,
it would be more appropriate for consumers, not designers, to effectively
decide whether the design creates a visual impression worthy of protection.
564 DREYFUSS, supra note 67, at 45.
565 Gorham Co. v.White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511,528 (1871).
566 Id. at 528.
567 See In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, loo6 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
568 See Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 E3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cit.
2oo9) (In Egyptian Goddess the en banc Federal Circuit "refined the ordinary observer test by
characterizing the ordinary observer as being 'deemed to view the differences between the
patented design and the accused product in the context of the prior art."' (quoting Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F-3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cit. 2oo8) (en banc))); Egyptian Goddess,
543 E3d at 676 (describing ordinary observer as familiar with prior art designs); Arminak &
Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F 3 d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cit. 2007) (describing
ordinary purchaser of underlying designed article).
569 See supra Part l.
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2. The Validity/Infringement Parallelism of the Gorham "Ordinary Observer"
Perspective Should Extend to Design Patent Nonobviousness.-The Federal
Circuit currently evaluates the novelty of a claimed design from the
perspective of an "ordinary observer."s 0 The same "ordinary observer"
perspective is applied to determine infringement of a design patent.s1
The Federal Circuit's use of the "ordinary observer" perspective in both
contexts is based on the maxim that "'[t]hat which infringes, if later,
would anticipate, if earlier.'"' The converse of this parallelism principle
is generally that if an accused device is outside the scope of a claimed
570 See Int'l Seaway, 589 E3 d at 1240 (concluding, based on Federal Circuit's en bane
rejection in Egyptian Goddess of a point of novelty component in the test for design patent
infringement, that "the ordinary observer test must logically be the sole test for anticipation
as well"); Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (In de-
termining either "infringement or anticipation [of a design patent claim], the court compares
the claim to the accused or allegedly anticipating article. For infringement or anticipation to
be found the two designs must be substantially the same." (citing Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528));
id. at 1313 ("Two designs are substantially the same if their resemblance is deceptive to the
extent that it would induce an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives, to purchase an article having one design supposing it to be the other." (citing Gorham,
81 U.S. at 528) (emphasis added)).
571 See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528; Egyptian Goddess, 543 E3d at 680.
572 Door-Master, 256 F 3 d at 1312 (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537
(1889)); see Int'l Seaway, 589 F3d at 1239 ("[Ilt has been well established for over a century
that the same test must be used for both infringement and anticipation."). The International
Seaway court recognized that "[olne possible exception [to the maxim] is product by process
claims." Id. at 1239 n.4 (citing Amgen Inc. v. E Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 580 F3d 1340, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2009) ("For product-by-process claims, that which anticipates if earlier does not
necessarily infringe if later.")).
A more accurate recitation of the maxim would be "[that which would literally infringe if
later in time anticipates if earlier than the date of invention." Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient,
Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987). It has long been held that for equitable reasons, an
accused device cannot escape infringement of a utility patent merely because it is outside the
literal boundary of the claim language. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 6o7 (1950) ("[Clourts have ... recognized that to permit imitation of a patented
invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing."); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330,343
(1853). This principle is known as the "doctrine of equivalents."
The scope of a design patent claim is very narrowly construed, dictated only by the pat-
ent drawings, and so the doctrine of equivalents is virtually never applied or analyzed by
courts in design cases.In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Design parents have
almost no scope. The claim at bar, as in all design cases, is limited to what is shown in the ap-
plication drawings."); 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 19, § 23.0517] (questioning whether,
with respect to designs, there is any reason to distinguish between literal infringement and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, "[gliven the mode of claiming with design
patents, that is, a claim that merely refers to the drawing(s) illustrating the design, and given
the Gorham standard for determining infringement, that is, substantial similarity to an ordinary
observer of the claimed and accused designs, . . . and excluding similarity due to common
functional features").
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invention, then if such a device were instead prior art, the claimed invention
should be patentable over such prior art."
Maintaining this parallelism between validity and infringement lends
further support to our recommendation that nonobviousness of designs,
like their infringement, should be judged solely from the same "ordinary
observer" perspective.57 4  The Federal Circuit in International Seaway
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp. recently relied on this parallelism principle
in announcing that "[o]bviousness, like anticipation, requires courts to
consider the perspective of the ordinary observer."s7 s Nevertheless,
International Seaway set forth a bifurcated approach that additionally
requires consideration of an ordinary designer's perspective regarding the
combination of prior art teachings. 7 6 Even if supplemental to an ordinary
observer's perspective, any use of the ordinary designer perspective is still
harmful and inappropriate for the design patent system.
The use of different perspectives for validity and infringement can
yield absurd results, as the following example demonstrates. Suppose a
first design "A" is patented, and a second design "B" has an appearance
distinct in the eyes of an ordinary observer, such that it would not infringe
the patented design A. Now suppose instead that design B is the subject
of a pending design application and that design A has been cited as prior art
against design B. If any aspect of obviousness is judged from an "ordinary
designer" standard, design B may be unpatentable even though it would
clearly fall outside the scope of design A from an infringement standpoint.
This is because an ordinary designer has a greater knowledge and familiarity
with the design process than an ordinary observer and may be more likely
to view design combinations and modifications as "obvious" over the prior
art.
By contrast, if the same "ordinary observer" test is utilized for design
patentability, then a design that would not infringe a prior art design (if
it were patented) would be patentable in its own right. This result is
573 This converse is illustrated by Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Goeffrey & Assoiates,
904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 199o). The court in Wilson Sporting Goods recognized that a paten-
tee should not be able to use the judicially-created doctrine of equivalents to ensnare subject
matter over which the patentee could not have obtained exclusionary rights in the first in-
stance by applying to the USPTO for patent protection of that scope. See id. at 684.
574 See Int'l Seaway, 589 E3d at I244 ("[The district court correctly held that the or-
dinary observer test is the sole test of invalidity [of a design patent]."); cf id. at 1243-44
("Obviousness, like anticipation, requires courts to consider the perspective of the ordinary
observer.").
575 Id. at I243-44.
576 Id. at 1240 ("For design patents, the role of one skilled in the art in the obviousness
context lies only in determining whether to combine earlier references to arrive at a single
piece of art for comparison with the potential design or to modify a single prior art reference.
Once that piece of prior art has been constructed, obviousness, like anticipation, requires ap-
plication of the ordinary observer test, not the view of one skilled in the art." (internal citation
omitted)); see supra Part Ill.C.3, for further discussion of InternationalSeaway.
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both logical and appropriate. Otherwise, a prior design patent operates
to bar designers from protecting their subsequent designs when those
subsequent designs are outside the scope of the patented design. The
policy goal of the design patent system is to promote progress in design,
but such progress is substantially hindered if the protectability of two
distinct designs depends on which design was the first to appear as prior art
under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Designs that are visually distinct from one another
for purposes of infringement should each be equally eligible for patent
protection.
3. The European Union Design Protection Experience Should Inform the Proposed
"Ordinary Observer" Perspective for U.S. Design Patent Nonobviousness.-
Design requires protection in a global marketplace. U.S. courts and
policymakers should be aware that foreign jurisdictions utilize a single,
uniform perspective for evaluating design infringement and validity. In
particular, the European Union (EU) uses the perspective of an "informed
user" to evaluate not only the protectability of a design as a Community
Design, but also to determine whether the Community Design has been
infringed.s' Characteristics of the EU's informed user are well aligned
with the ordinary observer perspective we propose for assessing the
nonobviousness of U.S. design patent claims.
The EU is a recognized international leader in legal protection for
industrial design."' In 2001, the EU enacted a regulation to create a unitary
EU-wide "Community Design."579 The regulation established a suigeneris
577 See Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 6.1, Community Designs, 2001 2002 O.J. (L 3)
I, 4 (EU) [hereinafter Community Design Regulation], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:oo2:o03:OOOI:0024:EN:PDF ("A design shall be con-
sidered to have individual character if the overall impression it produces on the informed user
differs from the overall impression produced on such a user by any design which has been
made available to the public: (a) in the case of an unregistered Community design, before the
date on which the design for which protection is claimed has first been made available to the
public; (b) in the case of a registered Community design, before the date of filing the applica-
tion for registration or, if a priority is claimed, the date of priority." (emphasis added)); id. at
5, art. 10.1 ("The scope of the protection conferred by a Community design shall include any
design which does not produce on the informeduser a different overall impression." (emphasis
added)).
578 See Saidman & Esquerra, supra note 34, at 428-29 (The U.S. industrial design pro-
tection system "lag[s] significantly behind [that] of the European Union," and the EU's
Community Design Regulation "serves as a model for how the United States could go about
implementing an industrial design sui generis law through the copyright statute.").
579 Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at I. The Community Design
Regulation entered into force in March 2002. See id. at 24, art. I I.I I ("This Regulation shall
enter into force on the 6oth day following its publication in the OffitialJournal of the European
Communities."). The Regulation was published in the OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITy on Jan. 5, zoo2. Id. at I.
A Community Design is a unitary right because it is obtained through a single appli-
cation filed with the EU's Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks
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system for protecting designs, outside of either the patent or copyright
regimes.sso
The EU implemented its Community Design system after years of
careful study and deliberation by policymakers in order to arrive at an
appropriate and customized form of protection for design. 8' The EU's
purposeful, deliberative process stands in stark contrast to the "prolonged
inattention" that characterizes the U.S. design patent system.ssz The
development of the EU's "individual character" requirement, assessed
from the perspective of an "informed user" as described below, is a
particularly informative model for effective and appropriate protection of
designs in any jurisdiction.
and Design) ("OHIM"), located in Alicante, Spain, and results in "one design right for one
area encompassing all Member States." Id. at I; see also Institutional Information, OFFICE FOR
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/OHIM/insti-
tutional/institutional.en.do (last updated Dec. 20, 2010) (describing institutional information
regarding the OHIM). The OHIM began registering Community Designs on April I, 2003.
Martin Schlotelburg, The Community Design: First Experience with Registrations, 25 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 383, 383 (2003).
580 The Community Design regime incorporates some aspects of both patent and copy-
right protection, but the rights granted are distinct. For example, Community Designs may be
registered or unregistered. An unregistered Community Design (like a copyright) protects its
owner only against copying, see Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 7, art. 19.2,
and lasts three years from the date that the design was first publicly disclosed within the EU.
See id. at 5, art. II.I. In contrast, a registered Community Design is protected (like a patent)
against any unauthorized use (including making, offering, selling, importing, or exporting a
product incorporating the design). See id. at 7, art. 19.1. The registered Community Design re-
mains in force for five years from the date of application filing with the OHIM, and the period
of protection is renewable for a maximum duration of 25 years from filing. See id. at 5, art. 12.
581 See generally Herman Cohen Jehoram, Culmination of Protection in the EC Design
Proposals, 16 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 514,514 (1994) (describing history of European develop-
ments in design protection).
Prior to 2002, with the exception of the Benelux countries which previously introduced
a uniform law, individual countries ("member states") within the EU protected industrial
designs in accordance with their own national laws; the scope of protection of such designs
was limited to the territory of the protection-granting member state. Community Design
Regulation, supra note 577, at I. "Substantial differences" developed between the various
member states' design protection laws, creating conflicts in trade between the states. Id.
These differences led the EU to first enact a Community Design directive, Council
Directive 98/71, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 28 (EC),availableathttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998Loo71:EN:HTML, followed by the Community Design
Regulation discussed herein. "The substantive provisions (prerequisites and scope of pro-
tection) [of the Community Design Regulation] are congruent with those of the Design
Directive." Annette Kur, Unit Head, Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition and
Tax Law, Keynote Lecture at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Symposium: The
Global Future of Industrial Design Protection: The European Community Design Right: A
Uniquely Tailored System for Protecting Industrial Designs (Feb. 26, 2009) (transcript avail-
able from Professor Janice Mueller at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law).
582 Moy, supra note 9, § 5:41 (observing that U.S. design patent system has resulted from
"prolonged inattention, rather than any ongoing purposeful development").
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The EU's Community Design system is a "registration" system rather
than an examination system as required for U.S. design patents. The
EU authority that administers the system, the Office for Harmonization
in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) ("OHIM"), does
not substantively examine design applications against the prior art. 8 3
Rather, the validity of a Community Design can be challenged only post-
registration, either via an application for a declaration of invalidity filed in
the OHIM,5" or as a counterclaim in an infringement proceeding."'
The EU's criteria for validity of a Community Design are that the design
(1) "is new" and (2) has "individual character." 8 6 The latter individual
character criterion parallels the U.S. requirement of nonobviousness to
the extent that it is a "something beyond novelty" requirement. But
the EU's sui generis design system does not define individual character
as nonobviousness, nor as the "inventive step" required for European
patents. 87 Rather, a Community Design possesses "individual character
if the overall impression it produces on the informed user differs from the
overall impression produced on such a user by any design which has been
583 See Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at I2, art. 45 (describing only "[e]
xamination as to formal requirements for filing"); see also Schlotelburg, supra note 579, at 386
("Prior to registration Community designs are examined only with respect to the formalities
of the application (payment of the fee, quality of the representation, etc.), i.e.[,] compliance
with the requirements for protection are not subject to examination ex officio (except where
the subject-matter of the application is not a design or where it offends public policy or moral-
ity).").
584 Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 13, art. 52.1 (providing that ap-
plications for design invalidity may be filed in the OHIM by "any natural or legal person").
Invalidity decisions are made in the OHIM in the first instance by its Designs Invalidity
Division; these decisions are appealable to the OHIM Boards of Appeal. See Pedro Rodinger,
Community Design Invalidiy: The Issues, as Viewed Through the Case Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
& Pluc. 629, 629 (2009). The Boards' decisions are in turn appealable to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and in some circumstances the CFl's
decisions may be appealed to the ECJ. See id. As of September 2009, a total of six OHIM
Board of Appeal decisions on Community Design validity had been taken to the CFI but the
CFI had not issued decisions in any of the cases. See id.
585 Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 8, art. 24.1.
586 Id. at 4, art. 4.1. Novelty is satisfied for a Community Design "if no identical design
has [previously] been made available to the public." Id. at 4, art. 5.1. Designs are "deemed to
be identical if their features differ only in immaterial details." Id. at 4, art. 5.2.
587 The EU's Community Design system is decidedly not a U.S.-style patent system for
designs. The EU does not apply an "inventive step" requirement to designs, as is the case
for patents issued by the European Patent Office. See Convention on the Grant of European
Patents (European Patent Convention), art. 56, conclusion date Oct. 5, 1973, 1o65 U.N.TS.
199(entered into force July lo, 1977),availableat http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/
html/epc/1973/e/ar56.html ("An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step
if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.").
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made available to the public [before the effective date of the Community
Design]."sa8
Two aspects of the individual character definition are particularly
important. First, it is the design's "overall" impression made on the
informed user that must differ from that of any prior art design. The EU
properly focuses on differences in overall appearance of a product, that is,
the product's design as it is holistically observed, rather than dissecting
the design's individual features.s8 9 Nothing in the individual character
definition considers or turns on the manner in which the designed product
was made or manufactured.5 9
Second, the EU's individual character requirement must be determined
from the perspective of an "informed user,"'9 not a designer, of the product
in question. Although the Community Design Regulation does not
define the "informed user," several appellate decisions of the OHIM have
explored the characteristics of this hypothetical person. The decisions
clarify that the informed user is a purchaser and user of the product having
the protected design; informed users have done their homework and are
reasonably familiar with the available range of competing products. The
informed user "has a certain degree of awareness and familiarity with the
subject matter of the design," as well as "some awareness of the prior art
and the product trends in the relevant market."592 Depending on the
product or object involved, a number of different types of consumers or
users of such products or objects could properly be "informed users."593 In
588 Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 4, art. 6.1 (emphasis added).
589 The recitals of the Community Design Regulation elaborate that the overall impres-
sion produced by the design on the informed user must "clearly differ" from that produced
on him by the prior art. See id. at 2 ("The assessment as to whether a design has individual
character should be based on whether the overall impression produced on an informed user
viewing the design clearly differs from that produced on him by the existing design corpus,
taking into consideration the nature of the product to which the design is applied or in which
it is incorporated, and in particular the industrial sector to which it belongs and the degree of
freedom of the designer in developing the design.") (emphasis added). EU law is not uniform
on the weight to be given recitals, however. See Tadas Klimas & Jurate Vaiciukaite, The Law
of Recitals in European Community Legislation, i5 ILSA J. Irrr'L & COMP. L. 61, 62 (2oo8) ("The
doctrine surrounding recitals in EC law is mystifying.").
590 See Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 4, art. 6.2 ("In assessing indi-
vidual character, the degree of freedom of the designer in developing the design shall be taken
into consideration.") (emphasis added). In the U.S., some courts have appropriately focused
on the aesthetic appearance of a design when evaluating nonobviousness, while other courts
have improperly focused on the manner of construction of the underlying product. See supra
Part III.
591 Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 4, art. 6.1.
592 Rodinger, supra note 584, at 638. The informed user is not the same as a purchaser in
the trademark law sense, who "has to rely on his imperfect recollection of trade marks which
may lead to a risk of likelihood of confusion." Id. at 639. Rather, the informed user makes a
direct visual comparison of the challenged design versus the prior art design. Id.
593 Case R 1001/2005-3, Pepsico, Inc. v. Grupo Promer Mon-Graphic, S.A., i, 8 (OHIM
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any event, the informed user is not a designer, an expert, or a specialist."*
"[Tihe evaluation of individual character does not rest on the impression
made in specialised circles, but on the impression on an informed user who
is presumed to have a certain degree of knowledge or understanding of
design." 95
In a recent application of the EU's informed user framework, the OHIM
Third Board of Appeal declared invalid a registered Community Design of
the exterior of an engine intended to power lawnmowers in Honda Giken
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Kwang Yang Motor Co.-9
3d Bd. App. Oct. 27, 2oo6) [hereinafter Pepsico], available at http://oami.europa.eulLegalDocs/
BoA/2oo5/en/RIooL_2005-3.pdf (holding that the informed user of small toy promotional
disks called "rappers" or "pogs" could be "a number of different persons"); id. ("It could be a
child in the approximate age range of 5 to to years, since the products are promotional items
intended for young children. Alternatively the informed user could be a marketing manager
in a company that makes biscuits or potato snacks, since these are the typical products which
are promoted by giving away [the] small flat disks . . . ."). It made "little difference" to the
Board "which of these categories of person [was] created as the informed user," because "both
will be familiar with the phenomenon of rappers." Id. See infra this Part for further discussion
of Pepsico.
594 See Case R 1214/2oo6-3, Atria Yhtymi Oyj v. HK Ruokatalo Grp. Oyj, I, 8 (OHIM
3d Bd. App. Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://oami.europa.eu/LegalDocs/BoA/2oo6/en/
RI214-2oo6-3.pdf (describing "informed user" of meat foodstuffs as a person "who regularly
consumes meat products" but is "not a designer, a manufacturer or a specialist in the food
industry"); Case R 1337/2oo6-3, Honda Giken Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Kwang Yang Motor
Co., 1, 8 (OHIM 3d Bd. App. Oct. 8,2007) [hereinafter Kwang], available at http://oami.europa.
eu/LegalDoes/BoA/2oo6/en/RI3 3 7 _2oo6-3.pdf (describing "informed user" of a lawnmower
engine as "someone who wants to use a lawn mower to cut the grass in his garden"); Case R
1310/2005-3, Galletas United Biscuits, S.A. v. Arluy, S.L., 1, 8 (OHIM 3d Bd. App. Nov. 28,
2oo6), available at http://oami.europa.eu/LegalDocs/BoA/ 2005/es/R1310_2005-3.pdf (de-
scribing "informed user" of cookies as "an ordinary person, without professional profile," who
"buys cookies to be consumed").
595 Alexander Bulling et al., The Community Design: A Nerw Right of Design Protection for the
European Community, 86 J. PAT. &'TIADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y III, 115 (2004). Similarly, the ordinary
observer in U.S. design patent law is deemed to be the ordinary purchaser of the designed
article, see Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 5ol F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871)), and possesses some
familiarity with the prior art. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F3d 665,676 (Fed.
Cir. zoo8) (en banc).
596 Kwang, supra note 594, at i i. The view we depict in the text is the first of seven
views included in Kwang's application for a Registered Community Design. Id. at 2 (repro-
ducing views). As of September 2009, an appeal from the OHIM Third Board of Appeals'
decision in Kwang was still pending before the Court of First Instance of the European Court
of Justice. See Case T-o/o8, Kwang Yang Motor v. OHIM, 2oo8 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
(Mar. 8, 2oo8), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?Submit=Submit&do
crequire=alldocs&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=ioo&lang=E
N&numaff=T-lo/o8.
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In assessing the design's individual character, the Board defined the relevant
informed user as "someone who wants to use a lawn mower to cut the grass
in his garden, needs for example to buy one and has become 'informed'
on the subject by browsing through catalogues of lawn mowers; visiting
specialised stores, garden centres; downloading information from the
internet, etc."s97 Because lawnmowers are "technical tools," the "informed
user" would place "primary importance" on "factors such as power source,
ease of operation, ability to dispose of mown grass, possible hazards, etc."59 8
Thus, the Board concluded, the informed user would "more likely ... be
impressed by the overall aspect of the product-in this case by the internal-
combustion engine of the lawn mower which powers it-rather than by
relatively insignificant details, which concern minor aspects of the engine
(such as the exact shape of the cap or the number of holes in a vent)."5 "
Because the challenged and prior art designs differed only in a single minor
detail (the placement of a starter cord), the challenged Community Design
lacked individual character and was therefore invalid. 6
Although the EU's informed user is not a designer or a manufacturer,
the informed user's perspective is influenced by the degree of freedom that
was available to the designer of the product in question."' If the designer
597 Kwang, supra note 594, at 8.
598 Id. at io.
599 Id. (giving examples of minor details "such as the exact shape of the cap or the num-
ber of holes in a vent").
6oo Id. at 9, I 1.
6oi See Community Design Regulation, supra note 577, at 4, art. 6.2 ("In assessing in-
dividual character, the degree of freedom of the designer in developing the design shall be
taken into consideration."). The degree of freedom concept has been interpreted to mean that
"the more a design is dictated by, for example, its function, the less freedom of action is avail-
able to the designer in creating that design, and accordingly the requirement of individual
character in such a case may be more easily satisfied than in the case where aesthetic aspects
giving greater imaginative latitude to the designer are the essence of the design." G. Scanlan
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enjoyed a relatively high degree of freedom, the individual character
requirement is less likely to be satisfied when the resulting design differs
from the prior art design in only minor respects. For example, the Board
in Kwang considered that lawnmower designers enjoyed a "high degree
of freedom" when designing at least the upper, exposed part of the
lawnmower engine (in contrast with the lower part closest to the ground)."
This liberal degree of design freedom reinforced the Board's conclusion
that the challenged Community Design would produce the "same overall
impression" on the informed user as that produced by the prior art design."
The only difference between the designs was the position of the starter
cord (placed on opposite sides of the designs).' Discounting these "minor
differences" in design, the overall impression did not differ to the informed
user. 5
In contrast, even minor differences can result in a different overall
impression to the informed user when the designer's degree of freedom
was relatively limited. For example, in Pepsico, Inc. v. Grupo Promer
Mon-Graphic, S.A., Pepsico obtained a Registered Community Design
for promotional items for games in the form of small (approximately 2-4
centimeters in diameter) metal disks known as "rappers" or "pogs."6
& Sarah Gale, Industrial Design andthe Design Directive: Continuing and Future Problems in Design
Rights?, J. Bus. L., Jan. 2oo5, at 91, 94.
Although not further defined by the Regulation, the degree of freedom concept is also
incorporated into its infringement standard. See Community Design Regulation, supra note
577, at 5, art. 10.2 ("In assessing the scope of protection, the degree of freedom of the designer
in developing his design shall be taken into consideration."). As is the case for the "informed
user" standard, the "degree of freedom" concept is another instance in which the EU's tests
for protectability (i.e., individual character) and infringement are structured in parallel.
602 Kwang, supra note 594, at i I.
603 Id. Comparing the challenged and prior art designs, the Board found that in both,
"each component (vent, fuel tank, air filter cover, muffler, top cover, starter cord) is easily
discernible and its position is identical." Id. at to-ii.
6o4 Id. at o-iI.
605 Id. at I I.
606 Pepsico, supra note 593, at 8; id. at 2 (reproducing design shown in text); see also
Rodinger, supra note 584, at 629 n.3 (describing size of disks). As of this writing in January
20O, an appeal from the OHIM Third Board of Appeals' decision in Pepsico was still pending
before the Court of First Instance of the European Court of Justice.
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The Board held that the informed user would understand that a designer
of rappers would have a limited degree of freedom. According to the
Board, the "paradigm" promotional product of the "pog" type was "a small
flat or nearly flat disk on which coloured images can be printed. Often
the disk will be curved toward the centre, so that a noise will be made
if a child's finger presses the centre of the disk."w7 A designer of such
disks would face severely constricted design freedom, because "[a] rapper
that does not possess these characteristics is unlikely to be accepted in
the marketplace."a Given the marketplace-generated constraints on the
design, "even relatively small differences suffice to create a different overall
impression."6" Reversing the Invalidity Division, the Board determined
that Pepsico's registered Community Design and Grupo Promer's prior art
design (which had a different contour and two fewer concentric circles in
the disk's center area) would "produce a different overall impression on
the informed user."61 0 Thus, the Board sustained the validity of Pepsico's
design.6"
The EU's successful development of its Community Design
system illustrates how to evaluate design validity using an "informed
user" perspective that considers the degree of freedom available to a
designer. Although a few U.S. courts have applied analogous principles
in evaluating design patent nonobviousness, 1z such application has never
been widespread or uniform. Creation of an EU-style sui generis design
registration system in the United States appears unlikely in the near
term.61 3 Nevertheless, legislative inaction need not prevent U.S. courts from
reconceptualizing the nonobviousness requirement in a manner informed
by the EU's purposeful, deliberative experience with design protection.
D. Limit Design Anticipation to "Strict Identity" Situations and Apply the
Gorham "Substantial Similarity" Test as the Measure of Design Obviousness
A patentable design must be novel as well as nonobvious. 6" The
Federal Circuit currently evaluates the novelty of designs (in patent
parlance, determines whether designs are "anticipated") under the same
607 Pepsico, supra note 593, at 8.
6o8 Id. at 8-9.
609 Id. at 9.
6io See id.
6II See id.
612 See, e.g., In r Faustmann, 155 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A. 1946), discussed further supra Part
III, and In re Borden, go E3 d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996), discussed further supra Part III, and infra
Part IV.E.
613 See supra Part II.
614 See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2oo6).
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"substantially similar" test applied to determine infringement of design
patents in Gorham Co. v. White.' Courts in the pre-Federal Circuit era
likewise applied a test of substantial similarity when determining the
novelty of designs. 16
We recommend that the novelty of designs be assessed in a manner
that more closely parallels the "strict identity" standard imposed on
utility patent inventions.6 1" The strict identity (or identicality) standard
for proving anticipation follows from the preamble language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. That language provides that "[a] patent may not be obtained though
the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of
this title, if . . [it would nevertheless have been obvious]."6 18 As applied
to utility patent claims, which generally recite multiple elements (or
preferably, "limitations"), the strict identity standard for anticipation means
that "[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference." 19 Moreover, the prior art reference must describe or show
each element or limitation "'arranged or combined in the same way as in
the claim."'
6 1
0
615 See Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 E3d 1233, 1244 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (The district court "correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that the exterior features of the patented [clog] designs were substantially similar to the
[prior art Crocs brand clog design]," but summary judgment of anticipation was vacated due
to the district court's failure to compare the insole [interior] portion of the designs.); Hoop v.
Hoop, 279 F3 d 1004, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The ultimate test for design-patent inventor-
ship, like the test for anticipation and infringement, is whether the second asserted invention
is 'substantially similar' to the first." (emphasis added) (citing Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 51I, 528 (187); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985,990 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)); Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 256 E3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2oo1) (In de-
termining either "infringement or anticipation [of a design patent claim], the court compares
the claim to the accused or allegedly anticipating article. For infringement or antiapation to
be found the two designs must be substantially the same." (emphasis added) (citing Gorham,
81 U.S. at 528)).
616 See Phoenix Knitting Works v. Rich, 194 F. 708, 714 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1911) ( "The law
is well stated by complainant ... in this language: The test of novelty of a design, the test of
infringement of a patented design, and the test of anticipation of a patented design are each
and all the same simple test. Do the designs look alike to the eye of an ordinary observer-and
not whether careful scrutiny and inspection will reveal differences." (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)); Bevin Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Starr Bros. Bell Co., 114 F 362,363 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1902) ("In design patents the test of identity, on questions of anticipation and infringe-
ment, is the eye of the ordinary observer.").
617 See Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 E3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(vacating district court's invalidation on summary judgment of utility patent as allegedly an-
ticipated because the "strict identity required of the test for novelty" had not been not satis-
fied).
618 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) (2oo6).
619 Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
620 Net MonCyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F 3 d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (citation
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Federal Circuit precedent reveals some tension concerning which of
these two tests is appropriate for design anticipation. Although the bulk
of Federal Circuit cases analyze the question under the "substantially
similar" test, a few decisions have applied the "strict identity" approach.6 1 1
The decisions cannot be reconciled or synthesized, because the two tests
are mutually exclusive. That is, whether two designs are "substantially the
same" cannot logically be the same determination as whether the designs
are "strictly identical."
The roots of this tension within design patent jurisprudence likely stem
from the courts' blind application of the maxim "'[t]hat which infringes, if
later, would anticipate, if earlier."" The "substantial similarity" test was
first set forth in Gorham Co. v. White as a test for design patent infringement
(validity not being at issue).' Thereafter, courts extended the same
test to the question of design anticipation.62 4 An early twentieth-century
decision, Williams v. Syracuse & S.R. Co., concluded that the ordinary
observer test (phrased as, "[d]o the two things present to the eyes of the
ordinary observer and purchaser and user the same general appearance?")
"must be the test as to invention, and as to the newness and originality of
the patented design, and, also, as to anticipation. That which infringes, if
subsequent, anticipates, if prior."62 5 Just as the Williams court assumed that
the test for anticipation "must be" that of substantial similarity, other early
twentieth-century courts likewise applied the substantial similarity test to
design anticipation without any serious discussion or justification.6 6
omitted).
621 See Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F 3 d 1456, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (For design
anticipation, "[tihe publication must show the same subject matter as that of the patent, and
must be identical in all material respects." (emphasis added)).
622 See Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. zoo) (quot-
ing Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530,537 (889) (alteration in original)).
623 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511,518(1871).
624 See Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Valgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
2009) ("[I]t has been well established for over a century that the same test must be used
for both infringement and anticipation." (citation omitted)). The International Seaway court
recognized that "[o]ne possible exception [to the maxim] is product by process claims." Id.
at 1239 n.4 (citing Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 58o E3 d 1340, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2009) ("For product-by-process claims, that which anticipates if earlier does not necessarily
infringe if later.")).
625 Williams v. Syracuse & S.R. Co., 161 F. 571, 577-78 (C.C.N.D.N.Y- 1908) (citations
omitted).
626 See, e.g., Bevin Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Starr Bros. Bell Co., I14 F. 362, 363 (C.C.D. Conn.
1902) ("In design patents the test of identity, on questions of anticipation and infringement,
is the eye of the ordinary observer.").
In Phoenix Knitting Works v. Ric/, 194 F. 7o8 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1911), the court held that
[tihe test of novelty of a design, the test of infringement of a patented
design, and the test of anticipation of a patented design are each and all
the same simple test. Do the designs look alike to the eye of an ordinary
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Design patent claims are visual depictions that do not recite individual
limitations, unlike utility patent claims. Thus the standard case law
formulation of the strict identity test for anticipation of utility patent claims
is not directly applicable. We would instead derive an anticipation test
for design claims from the "identically disclosed" preamble language of 35
U.S.C. § 103 and ask, "does a single prior art design exist that identically
discloses the claimed design?" The requisite identity should be construed
strictly, such that the claimed design would lack novelty (that is, be deemed
anticipated) only in instances where the design had been exactly disclosed
in the prior art. Examples of such instances include prior publications,
public uses, or sales of the identical, now-claimed design.' If such barring
events occurred, then the claimed design has been anticipated. On the
other hand, if a prior art design exists that is deemed similar but not
identical, then the extent of the similarity should be evaluated under a
different rubric; namely, the nonobviousness requirement and the "ordinary
observer"/"substantial similarity" framework we propose herein.
As recommended above, when applied to designs, the nonobviousness
requirement should operate in a manner that parallels the test for design
patent infringement.6 8 A design patent is infringed if "in the eye of an
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two
designs are substantially the same."62" Adapting this test to the requirement
observer-and not whether careful scrutiny and inspection will reveal
differences.
Id. at 714 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 77) (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly,
the Phoenix Knitting court acknowledged that Gorham did not address validity, but neverthe-
less accepted the above explanation of the law without question, justification, or citation to
authority. Indeed, the court noted that "novelty ... was not in question" and "the language
we quote [from Gorham] has little application to sustain a patent in a case where both novelty
and originality are attacked.... [H]owever,... we believe the law is well stated by complainant,
on page 77 of its brief." Id. (emphasis added).
627 See 35 U.S.C. § iO2(a)-(b) (2oo6); Cont'l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway
Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1077-8o (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's grant
of summary judgment that patent for design of plastic juice container was invalid under "on
sale" bar of 35 U.S.C. § I02(b) where patentee provided molds and three-dimensional article
drawings that embodied the patented design to potential customers in the U.S. more than a
year before filing design patent application); In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1581 (Fed. Cit. 1988)
(affirming USPTO's rejection of design application claim on grounds of § 102(b) public use
where applicant had publicly displayed a table embodying the claimed design at a trade show
in the U.S. more than one year before filing application); cf Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28
F3d 1192, 1196-1200 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (vacating district court's grant of summary judgment
of invalidity based on § io2(b) public use of patented design for spice container because fact
questions existed about alleged experimental use; patentee's consultant showed design to col-
lege students for evaluation of article's functional (rather than aesthetic) features more than a
year before patentee filed design patent application).
628 See supra Part IVC.2; cf. Int'lSeaway, 589 F.3d at 1243-44 ("Obviousness, like antici-
pation, requires courts to consider the perspective of the ordinary observer.").
629 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). The similarity must be such
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of nonobviousness, it follows that if the differences between the claimed
design and the prior art (limited as we propose below) are minor enough
that an ordinary observer would have considered them "substantially
similar," then the claimed design would have been obvious. In other
words, we suggest that when 35 U.S.C. § 103 is applied to designs, it should
be interpreted as follows:
A design patent may not be obtained though the claimed design is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if
the differences between the claimed design and a prior art design are such
that the claimed design as a whole would have appeared substantially the
same as the prior art design to an ordinary observer at the time the claimed
design was made.
E. Modify or Eliminate the Current Procedure of Combining Prior Art Designs to
Establish Design Obviousness
Designers draw upon sources of inspiration and influence without
bound." They regularly consult or consider a variety of prior designs,
regardless of whether the prior designs bear any logical or functional
relationship to the product they are currently designing. Virtually every
new design utilizes some combination of prior art design elements. To
suggest that it would be "obvious" to combine or modify any particular
prior design features has no meaning for designers."' Designers' choices
are essentially artistic, unlike the functional motivations facing inventors of
utility inventions, to whom the word "obvious" has meaning. In order to
promote progress in the design arts, the law should encourage, not penalize,
the borrowing of prior design features and design concepts to be combined
into new designs.
When concluding that a claimed utility invention would have been
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and thus unpatentable, the USPTO (during
prosecution of pending applications) and the courts (during litigation
challenging the validity of issued patents) typically identify each limitation
of the claim in question as having been disclosed or described in a prior
art reference. This approach contends that it would have been obvious
for a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the claimed utility invention to have combined the teachings of multiple
references in order to arrive at the claimed invention.632
"as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other,
the first one patented is infringed by the other." Id.
630 See supra Part 1.
631 See supra Part I.
632 The Supreme Court recently expanded the bases for concluding that the person of
ordinary skill would have engaged in such a combination, stating that "any need or problem
known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can pro-
vide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed." KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
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The courts and USPTO have long applied the same combining of
references procedure to assess whether a claimed design would have been
obviousY3 For example, the design patent applicant in In re Glavas, a
decision issued by the C.C.P.A. in 1956, appealed a USPTO obviousness
rejection of his claimed design for a rectangular and concave-shaped
swimming float.? The USPTO had based its rejection on a combination
of prior art references that included not only a conventional swimming float
but also pillows, bottles, soap, and razor blade sharpeners. 5 The C.C.P.A.
in In reRosen identified the issue before it as "whether the various elements
selected by the PTO from each of these [prior art design] references would
have made the overall appearance of the claimed design obvious." 6 6
The Federal Circuit has perpetuated the C.C.P.A.'s practice of applying
a combination of references approach to assess designs. The Circuit stated
in 1996 that "[i]f [a] basic reference alone does not render the claimed
design unpatentable, design elements from other references in the prior art
can be considered in determining whether the claimed design would have
been obvious to one of skill in the art.""6  Elsewhere the court confirmed
that the nonobviousness inquiry for designs "is whether one of ordinary
skill would have combined teachings of the prior art to create the same
overall visual appearance as the claimed design[,]" explaining that "[o]nce
[a] primary reference is found, other references may be used to modify it to
create a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed
design.""
The courts' attempts to explain whether and how prior art references
should be combined against a claimed design raise more questions than
they answer.63 9 For example, the Glavas test requiring that references be
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). We discussed KSR and its very limited applicability to design
patentability in supra Part IV.A.
633 See generally supra Part III.
634 In re Glavas, 23o F.2d 447, 448 (C.C.P.A. 1956). The Glavas decision is further de-
tailed in supra Part III.
635 See InreGlavas 230 F.2d at 448-49, 451.
636 In re Rosen, 673 F2d 388, 390 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The court further noted that "a § 103
rejection of a claimed design need not be based on a single reference," id. at 390-91, but add-
ed the constraint that "whether the holding [of obviousness] is based on [a] basic reference
alone or on the basic reference in view of modifications suggested by secondary references,"
the USPTO must identify "a reference, a something in existence, the design characteristics of
which are basically the same as the claimed design in order to support a holding of obvious-
ness." Id. at 391.
637 In re Borden, 9o F3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The court concluded that "the
[USPTO] Board was correct in finding an implicit suggestion to combine references in the
prior art and that the Board therefore correctly held Borden's design unpatentable for obvious-
ness." Id. at 1576.
638 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., iol F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
639 See supra Part III.
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"so related" as to "suggest" the combination of design features is vague and
nonsensical. 6 o In re Carlson's "expectation" test for the suggestion prong of
Glavas leaves open at least the fundamental question of what constitutes
an obviating expectation." In re Harvey held that designs may be modified
in "one respect" and still be obvious, but provided no indication of the
outer limits of the "one respect" modification.M2 These attempts to clarify
the law regarding combination and modification of designs have failed
because such matters are inherently highly subjective. The design patent
jurisprudence demonstrates that straining to establish bright line rules as
to whether a design should be protectable over the prior art is an exercise
in futility. This provides another compelling reason to utilize the more
flexible and objective "substantial similarity" test for design obviousness
that we propose above.
The Federal Circuit has recently distanced itself from any endorsement
of combining prior art references to demonstrate obviousness in design
cases. In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the en banc court abrogated
the "point of novelty test" for infringement, recognizing that it "present[s]
the risk of assigning exaggerated importance to small differences between
the claimed and accused designs relating to an insignificant feature simply
because that feature can be characterized as a point of novelty."" By
highlighting the risk of over-emphasizing one particular design feature, the
Egyptian Goddess court reaffirmed that designs should be evaluated as an
integrated visual whole rather than dissected into individual features. In
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., the Federal Circuit observed that
the process of combining prior art references to determine obviousness
of a design similarly places undue emphasis on individual features of the
design, as opposed to its overall appearance. 6" Egyptian Goddess and Titan
Tire signal a welcome judicial receptivity to a new analytical framework
that discourages the conventional approach of combining prior art designs
to establish obviousness.
Such a shift in design nonobviousness jurisprudence would
substantially promote better design because it accords with the actual
64o In re Glavas, 23o F2d at 450, further discussed supra Part III.
641 In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the claimed sym-
metrical design would have been obvious because the asymmetry in the prior art rendered the
symmetry "expected"); see also supra Part III.
642 In re Harvey, 12 E3d io6i, lo65 (Fed. Cir. 1993), further discussed supra Part III.
643 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 E3d 665,677 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (en banc).
644 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1383 ("This process, first
finding a primary reference in the prior art and then modifying it with secondary prior art
references to demonstrate the claimed design's obviousness, may have a tendency to draw the
court's attention to individual features of a design rather than the design's overall appearance.
In this respect, it is similar to the [now abrogated] 'point of novelty' test that until recently was
used in the infringement side of design patent law.").
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practice of designers.1 In contrast, combining individual design features
from multiple prior art designs in order to establish obviousness punishes
good design. Because they can indiscriminately draw on prior designs for
inspiration, designers are able to bring new and refreshing aesthetics to our
surroundings. Further, because they recognize limits in what consumers
will find visually appealing, industrial designers purposefully incorporate
into their new designs some familiar elements from earlier designs:
Almost without exception, our designs include an ingredient we call survival
form. We deliberately incorporate into the product some remembered detail
that will recall to the users a similar article put to a similar use. People
will more readily accept something new, we feel, if they recognize in it
something out of the past. Most of us have a nostalgia for old things. Our
senses quickly recognize and receive pleasure when a long-forgotten detail
is brought back. It may be an old tune, a taste of old-fashioned pudding,
the odor of a particular flower, the patina of an antique table, or, as in most
cases, the remembrance of what something looked like. Somehow these
recollections of the past give us comfort, security, and silent courage. By
embodying a familiar pattern in an otherwise wholly new and possibly
radical form, we can make the unusual acceptable to many people who
would otherwise reject it.6
Because the citation of a combination of prior art designs against a
claimed design tends to stifle, rather than promote, the progress of design,
the optimal approach would be to completely abrogate the combination
practice. Nevertheless, we recognize that to entirely eliminate the practice
would substantially depart from a deeply ingrained concept of patent law.
Further, it may be difficult to successfully allege or defend an obviousness
claim unless one can provide evidentiary support in the form of secondary
references.64" Thus, a more practical recommendation would enforce
narrow limits on the permissible scope of combinations of references,
rather than to entirely eliminate combination practice.
We accordingly recommend that if secondary references are ever to
be cited against a design, such secondary references should be limited to
those that disclose exactly the same type of article as the primary Rosen
reference (and the claimed design). In this regard we interpret the Glavas
"so related" as to "suggest" the combination language"4 as requiring that
645 See supra Part I (discussing designers' creative processes and motivations).
646 DREYFUSS, supra note 67, at 59-6o.
647 For example, to say that a design feature is "de minimis" under In re Harvey, 12 F3 d
lo6 1, 1o65 (Fed. Cir. 1993), or is "expected" under In re Carlson, 983 F2d 1032, 1039 (Fed. Cir.
1992), would be more defensible and persuasive if it could be demonstrated via documentary
evidence of some sort. Providing secondary references indicating that certain design features
for a particular article are commonplace would be more convincing than a bare allegation that
the differences between a claimed design and the prior art would have been "obvious."
648 See In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956); see also supra Part III.B.2.c (dis-
cussing In re Glavas in further detail).
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the secondary references not only are mechanically analogous to the article
embodying the claimed design, but also are exactly the same type of
article. Our proposed approach ensures that only articles having the same
degree of freedom for design are cited against a claimed design. This is in
accord with designers' views that the adaptation of an old design feature or
concept into a new object having a different degree of freedom can produce
a distinct visual impression worthy of protection.69
The Federal Circuit's In re Borden decision exemplifies the limited
combining of references approach that we recommend. In Borden,
the claimed design was directed to a twin neck dispensing container,
essentially a bottle having two openings.6 10 The cited secondary references
were likewise twin neck dispensers, and were relied upon only for their
teachings of two very minor features not found in the primary reference.
Thus, the USPTO examiner did not simply cite any design that showed
the design features that were absent from the primary reference. Indeed,
he did not even cite other bottles generally. Rather, the examiner cited
secondary references disclosing twin neck bottles having two openings,
arranged in the same manner as that of the primary reference.6 s' Because
these prior art designs made under the same degree of freedom had
previously incorporated the two very minor features absent from the
primary reference, and because the presence or absence of such features
had virtually no effect on the overall appearance of the claimed design, the
Borden court held that the claimed design would have been obvious. 52
To the extent that courts or the USPTO continue the practice
of combining multiple prior art designs against a claimed design, it
should be done with great hesitation and only under the most narrow of
circumstances. Where the differences between a Rosen prior art design and
the claimed design are very few and very minor (essentially de minimis or
virtually unnoticeable in terms of effect on the overall appearance), and
those trivial differences are disclosed in prior art designs of the exact same
type of article, then the claimed design has not succeeded in creating a
different overall impression and should not be awarded a design patent.6 s
A conclusion of obviousness under such circumstances does not require the
649 See supra Part I (noting that designers are limited by the degree of freedom they
have when designing a product, and discussing the laudable work of Apple's Jonathan Ive,
who adapted many design concepts from different objects designed by 1960s Braun designer
Dieter Rams).
650 In r Borden, go F.3 d 1570, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also supra Part III (further
discussing Borden).
651 See supra Part III (discussing Borden and including images of the claimed and prior
art designs).
652 In r Borden, 9o F.3d at 1575-76.
653 This conclusion accords with the view of designers, who generally would not per-
ceive as being patent-worthy those designs that make only de minimis changes to a prior art
design. See supra Part I.
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perspective of a "designer of ordinary skill."'" Rather, given the triviality
of the differences under the framework we propose, the combination of
prior art design features that would render a claimed design obvious would
be self-evident to an "ordinary observer." On the other hand, when the
differences between the Rosen reference and the claimed design are more
than de minimis and are not found in prior art designs for the same exact
type of article, the design should be patentable.
F Implement Mechanisms in the USPTO to Obtain and Apply More and Better
Design Prior Art
In Part I we noted the very low incidence of USPTO rejections in
design patent applications based on prior art, including rejections for
obviousness. Examiners may understandably hesitate to make inherently
subjective determinations about the extent of a claimed design's advance
over prior art designs.' Another contributing factor is likely the examiners'
inability to consistently access the most pertinent prior art designs. Below
we recommend three ways in which the USPTO could enhance its
access to pertinent design prior art. Implementing these measures would
facilitate more meaningful patent examination and generate a more robust
jurisprudence on the difficult issue of design patent nonobviousness.
1. Improve Design Prior Art Searching Capability.-The patentable feature
of a design is its aesthetic appearance, something that is not easily
searchable when using conventional text-based databases. The USPTO
currently lacks tools such as sophisticated image recognition software
that could more effectively locate the closest prior art designs.6 6 Unless
design applicants know of material prior art and submit it to the USPTO,
examiners currently must search for prior art designs by using key words or
USPTO classifications. Verbal or numerical categories from the USPTO's
classification system cannot accurately convey a design's overall visual
appearance. Moreover, USPTO design examiners generally cite only prior
design patents rather than non-patent prior art.'" More comprehensive and
654 Contra Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (describing the role of the designer of ordinary skill as "determining whether to com-
bine earlier references to arrive at a single piece of art for comparison with the potential design
or to modify a single prior art reference").
655 See also supra Part III (describing the courts' hesitancy in this regard). USPTO of-
ficials also have noted the difficulty of the analysis, admitting that "unobviousness is not well
suited to ornamental designs." In re Nalbandian, 661 E2d 1214, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich,
J., concurring) (quoting Gerald Mossinghoff, Comm'r, Patents and Trademarks, Speech to the
ABA Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section in New Orleans (Aug. 8, 1981)).
656 See Woodring Interview, supra note 37.
657 See id.
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sophisticated databases with advanced image-based search functionality
could provide immense assistance to examiners in their searches.
2. Make More Frequent Use of Examiner Requests for Information.-A design
patent applicant (like a utility patent applicant) is not required to conduct a
search of the prior art.6 ' An applicant bears an affirmative duty to disclose
only that prior art which is (1) material to patentability and (2) known to
the applicant (or the applicant's representative). 69 Thus, design applicants
who have not searched the prior art may have little or nothing relevant to
submit to the USPTO.
However, USPTO examiners have a mechanism for requesting
information from applicants that is reasonably necessary to properly
conduct their examination. Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 ("Rule 105"),
an examiner could request that a design applicant (or the applicant's
assignee) provide information about any particularly relevant commercial
databases, copies of non-patent literature authored by the design applicant,
information the applicant knows about related art, and any other known
factual information pertinent to patentability. 660  Under the authority
6S8 See 37 C.F.R. § i.56(a) (2oio) ("Each individual associated with the filing and pros-
ecution of a patent application has a ... duty to disclose to the Office all information known to
that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section." (emphasis added)).
659 See id. The duty of disclosure includes not only prior art, but "information" material
to patentability. Id. "'[linformation is material when a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."' Star Scientific,
Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Symantec
Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 522 F3d 1279, 1297 (Fed. Cit. 2oo8)). Because this ex-
pansive definition of materiality can be fairly ambiguous for purposes of design patents (be-
cause their aesthetic merits are so subjective), we believe that our proposal for examiners
to more frequently utilize requests for information will lead to more useful and productive
submissions by design patent applicants.
66o See 37 C.ER. I o105 (2oio). The regulation provides:
(a)(i) In the course of examining... a pending... application filed under
35 U.S.C. iii ... , the examiner or other Office employee may require
the submission, from individuals identified under § i.56(c), or any as-
signee, of such information as may be reasonably necessary to properly
examine or treat the matter, for example:
(i) Commercial databases: The existence of any particularly relevant
commercial database known to any of the inventors that could be
searched for a particular aspect of the invention.
(ii) Search: Whether a search of the prior art was made, and if so, what
was searched.
(iii) Related information: A copy of any non-patent literature, published
application, or patent (U.S. or foreign), by any of the inventors, that re-
lates to the claimed invention.
(iv) Information used to draft application: A copy of any non-patent lit-
erature, published application, or patent (U.S. or foreign) that was used
to draft the application.
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of Rule 105, a design examiner might request, for example, that the
applicant provide a list of corporations or firms that make articles of the
type for which the applicant is claiming design patent protection. The
examiner could also seek the names of designers who have similar styles,
ask for any terms of art that describe the applicant's design features, or
simply request that the applicant identify and characterize the sources of
inspiration and influences for the claimed design. Any information of this
sort could assist the examiner in finding the closest prior art by searching
corporate websites, catalogues, and other non-patent prior art sources.
3. Publish the Content of Pending Design Patent Applications.-Unlike utility
patent applications, pending design patent applications are exempt from
eighteen-month publication.6'1 The claims and exclusionary scope of
design patents are therefore unknown to the marketplace until a design
patent has been granted. As another mechanism to enhance USPTO
examiners' access to the most pertinent design prior art, we recommend
that the Patent Act be amended such that the USPTO would publish the
content of all design patent applications during their pendency. Such
publication would need to occur much sooner than eighteen months after a
design application's filing because the average total pendency for a design
patent application (from filing date to issue date) is currently (in January
(v) Information used in invention process: A copy of any non-patent lit-
erature, published application, or patent (U.S. or foreign) that was used
in the invention process, such as by designing around or providing a
solution to accomplish an invention result.
(vi) Improvements: Where the claimed invention is an improvement,
identification of what is being improved.
(vii) In use: Identification of any use of the claimed invention known to
any of the inventors at the time the application was filed notwithstand-
ing the date of the use.
(viii) Technical information known to applicant. Technical informa-
tion known to applicant concerning the related art, the disclosure, the
claimed subject matter, other factual information pertinent to patent-
ability, or concerning the accuracy of the examiner's stated interpreta-
tion of such items.
Id. See also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICES, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE H§ 7 04 .o- 7 04.14(d) (2oo8) [hereinafter MPEP], available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ pac/mpep/documents/o7oo.htm. As justification for an exam-
iner's request for information under Rule 105, the MPEP cites the example of a situation in
which "the examiner's search and preliminary analysis demonstrates that the claimed subject
matter cannot be adequately searched by class or keyword among patents and typical sources
of non-patent literature." MPEP § 704.11 (criteria (A)). This example would appear to be
particularly pertinent to examination of design patent applications.
661 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(iv) (2006). In contrast, publication at eighteen months af-
ter their earliest effective filing date is the default rule for utility patent applications. See id.
§ i22(b)(1).
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2010) only about fifteen months.62 Optimally, pre-grant publication would
occur immediately upon the filing of a design patent application.
After a pending patent application has been published, any member of
the public can submit patents or publications relevant to the application.6
Submissions that comply with the USPTO's rules will be entered in the
application file.6 6 Entry into the file should expose the examiner to the
submitted prior art, although the examiner is not obligated to apply the art
against the claimed design. The Patent Act currently forbids any protest or
other form of pre-issuance opposition by third parties to the granting of a
patent after the underlying application has been published. 66
4. Summary.-We have suggested several mechanisms for getting better
information about the state of design prior art before USPTO examiners.
The expanded volume of design data would undoubtedly enhance the
quality of design patent examination. USPTO awareness of a greater
volume of pertinent design prior art (including non-patent prior art) could
prompt an increased number of obviousness rejections, which in turn
could be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and
ultimately to the Federal Circuit. The result would be a more robust body
of decisions on the difficult issue of design patent nonobviousness. More
regular and thoughtful analysis of the nonobviousness requirement is likely
662 See Dennis Crouch,Design Patent Application Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 10, 2010, 2:40
PM), Average Pendency of Design Patent Applications Grouped by Month of Issuance, http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/20I o/o I/design-patent-application-pendency.html.
663 See Third-Party Submission in Published Application, 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(a) (2010).
664 Id. Third-party submissions must also be served upon the patent applicant. Id.
§ 1.99(c).
665 See35 U.S.C. § I22(c) ("The Director shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure
that no protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition to the grant of a patent on an applica-
tion may be initiated after publication of the application without the express written consent
of the applicant."). A formal system of pre-grant opposition by third parties has been rejected
by most industrialized country patent systems due to the potential for significantly delaying
the patent application process. Nancy J. Linck et al., A New Patent Examination System for the
New Millennium, 35 Hous. L. REV. 305, 323 (1998) ("Most [countries] have now abandoned
such [pre-grant opposition] proceedings, either because of the delay they have caused or be-
cause they wanted to harmonize their laws." (citation omitted)). On the other hand,post-grant
opposition is a common, well received practice in the European Patent Office, see Convention
on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), conclusion date Oct. 5, 1973,
Io65 U.N.TS. 199, 284-86 (entered into force July 10, 1977), available at http://www.epo.org/
patentslaw/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar56.html, and has been recommended for adoption
in the U.S. patent system. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 7-8 (2003), available at www.
ftc.gov/os/zoo3/Io/innovationrpt.pdf. Those advocating legislative reform of the U.S. patent
system should include a post-grant opposition system for design patents.
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the best and quickest way to challenge and reorient the design patent law
toward its policy objectives.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the nonobviousness requirement
for design patentability operates in stark contrast to the reality of
designers' objectives and practices. The imposition of nonobviousness
as a "something more than novelty" criteria for design patentability
originated with an ill-advised insertion of design protection into the utility
patent system in 1842. Based on an apparent mistake in subsequent
legislative drafting, the judiciary mechanistically imposed the invention
requirement and its successor, the nonobviousness requirement, with little
consideration of the fundamentally different nature of ornamental designs
from utility inventions. The "impossible issue" of how to meaningfully
apply nonobviousness to designs continues to baffle the USPTO and
courts in the twenty-first century.
The time has arrived to reconceptualize the nonobviousness
requirement in a manner that thoughtfully addresses these concerns, with
a view to promoting rather than stifling progress in the decorative arts. To
recap, the reconceptualization we propose recognizes that:
(1) Precedent assessing whether utility inventions would have
been obvious, including the Supreme Court's decisions in
Graham v. John Deere and KSR v. Teleflex, is essentially irrelevant
to the patentability of designs;
(2) Nonobviousness can properly be fine-tuned for design patents
as it has been for plant patents;
(3) The "ordinary observer" perspective of the Supreme Court's
foundational design patent decision, Gorham Co. v. White, is the
best perspective from which to assess design nonobviousness;
(4) Gorham's "substantial similarity" test should be adopted as the
measure of design obviousness;
(5) The practice of combining prior art design features to establish
the obviousness of a claimed design should be severely
restricted or eliminated; and
(6) The USPTO should implement mechanisms to obtain and
apply more and better design prior art.
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Our recommendations are intended to empower policymakers, the
courts, the USPTO, and legal practitioners to press for more appropriate
application of the nonobviousness requirement to designs. At a minimum,
we aim to spur deliberation and debate among all those in a position to
make a difference in U.S. design patent law. By reaching out to designers
to better understand the design process, this Article has taken a first step
toward overcoming the supposedly "impossible issue" of applying the
nonobviousness requirement to designs.
